

J. SIGFRID EDSTRÖM AND THE NURMI AFFAIR OF 1932: THE STRUGGLE OF THE AMATEUR FUNDAMENTALISTS AGAINST PROFESSIONALISM IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT



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In April 1932 the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), led by its flamboyant Swedish chairman, J. Sigfrid Edström, suspended Paavo Nurmi for violating the amateur regulations. Many athletics experts consider that Nurmi was definitely the foremost runner of the time, and some, particularly in our neighbouring country to the East, see him as the world's foremost sportsman of all time. The decision shook the world of sport and aroused particularly strong reactions in Finland. Edström became the most hated person in Finland; in principle he bore the brunt of the Finnish dissatisfaction alone. The ban led to Finland boycotting all competition with Sweden for three years. The inhabitants of Helsinki even refused to travel on the city's trams; they were made by the large Swedish company ASEA (the present ABB), of which Edström was the managing director. Threats were also directed against Swedish sports officials and the Finnish aversion towards "big brother Sweden" was fuelled as never before.²

The ban was extra sensitive as Edström, a Swede, lay behind the decision. No other sporting incident has caused such feelings of indignation between Sweden and Finland. It was not only in these countries that Nurmi's ban created a stir. The American Olympic historian John Lucas notes that Nurmi was the world's leading sportsman after the First World War and that the ban created headlines over the whole world, in particular in Europe and the USA.³

The Nurmi affair was not only about sport, but also, as will be seen in the article, about power, racism and nationalism. The aim of what follows is two-fold: firstly, to analyze the dramatic events around the banning of Nurmi, and secondly to discuss the reasons behind the ban. The following issues form the framework of the presentation:

Who were the main protagonists? How did they act? Who took the initiative in banning Nurmi? What consequences did the Nurmi affair have for relations between Sweden and Finland? In what wider perspective shall the Nurmi affair be perceived?

Protagonists

The main protagonists in the Nurmi affair were not just anybody. They were or became central figures in the world of sport and/or in society as a whole. Here we have not only the above-mentioned Sigfrid Edström (1870-1964) and Paavo Nurmi (1897-1973), but also above all the future Finnish President and national father figure Urho Kekkonen (1900-1986). At the time of the ban he was the chairman of the Finnish Athletics Association. Kekkonen, who had been elected as chairman of the Finnish Athletics Association when he was only 28 years of age, was one of the representatives of the nationalist forces in Finnish society around 1930, amongst other things at the University of Helsinki.⁴ Another of the main protagonists in Finland, Lauri Pihkala, belonged to the extreme nationalist forces in Finnish society and was politically way out on the right wing, unlike Kekkonen from the Centre Party.

The other main protagonist, Sigfrid Edström, was Sweden's leading industrialist for a long period of time, with great influence over industry, society and sport. He had been the chairman of the IAAF since its formation in 1913, and was a member of the IOC and eventually President of the IOC between 1946 and 1952. He also held several top positions within the national and international sports movement for decades.⁵

Nurmi has remained something of a popular hero in Finland in our time as well. His halo was not tarnished after the ban in 1932, quite the opposite. Nurmi was considered to be a victim of Swedes' envy and nit-picking. In Finland the decision to ban Nurmi was considered to be wrong and this is still the case.⁶ There is a great deal of well-known evidence that in Finland people refuse to see him as a "cheat"⁷, one of many in the world of sport in the 1930s, but as a hero. As is well-known, Nurmi was given the honourable assignment of lighting the Olympic flame at the Olympic stadium before the Olympic Games in Helsinki in 1952, together with the legendary Finnish runner Hannes Kolehmainen. A statue of Nurmi also stands outside the magnificent arena. Upon his death in 1973 Nurmi was given a state funeral, an honour that has only been bestowed on a few Finnish sportsmen.

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The fact that Nurmi lit the flame in 1952 must have been provocative for Edström, who was the IOC President at the time and present at the opening ceremony. He resigned at the time of the Olympic Games in 1952 due to old age when he was 82. His successor was Edström's "pupil" and personal friend, Avery Brundage (1887-1995). In his capacity as President of the Amateur Athletic Union, he was also active in the banning of Nurmi. The aim of this article is to show that the initiative behind investigating Nurmi's amateur status came from athletics circles in the USA and not from Edström, as is generally claimed in both Sweden and Finland.

Even today Nurmi and the banning of Nurmi arouse feelings in Finland. In 1999 the Finland-Swede sports journalist Stig Häggblom came out with something resembling a book of memoirs with the title "Paavo Nurmi, Viljo Heino och Urho Kekkonen". His relationship to Nurmi is that of the admirer: "I propose Paavo Nurmi as the greatest sportsman of the century. It could perhaps be said that he is the sportsman of the millennium."⁸ Unlike many in Finland, Häggblom admits that Nurmi was guilty. He had, according to Häggblom, earned a fortune from his running, a fortune that he managed well as a building contractor after his running career. According to Häggblom, Nurmi's USA tour in 1925 generated:

*"...more money than athletics had ever managed to do previously. Those fees were not equalled, and neither was the money that was involved during Nurmi's second tour in 1929, which was not as comprehensive (15 races), but still quite a money-spinner."*⁹

The decision to ban Nurmi was controversial for above all two reasons. Firstly, it was made by the IAAF, an organization that had two Swedes at the top: Edström was the President and Bo Ekelund was the Secretary General. Secondly, the Olympic Games in Los Angeles were about to take place, where it was thought, at least from the Finnish horizon, that Nurmi would take the gold in the marathon in his farewell performance. Nurmi was 35 years old in 1932 and his career was on the way down. In the Olympic Games in Paris in 1924 and in Amsterdam in 1928, Nurmi won all of nine gold medals. He is thereby one of the greats in Olympic history.

Previous research

Paavo Nurmi's life and the events surrounding the dramatic ban have attracted a wide variety of writers.¹⁰ The American Olympic historian, John Lucas, has written an interesting article on Nurmi's tours of the USA in 1925 and 1929. He believes that Nurmi

earned considerable sums of money on these tours and that he returned home a "very wealthy man". There are some more or less scientific contributions in Sweden as well. The historian Ulf Hamilton has written a short article on the banning of Nurmi.¹¹ The Finland-Swede and sports journalist at Hufvudstadsbladet, Stig Häggblom, has written, as was mentioned above, an autobiography, with the Nurmi affair as the underlying theme. His conclusion is that the Nurmi affair ultimately was not about Nurmi but about Kekkonen's actions vis-à-vis Sweden. Kekkonen caused Edström and Ekelund a great deal of irritation when he arbitrarily decided to discontinue the Finnkampen athletics meeting in 1931.¹²

In the IOC's official monumental work The International Olympic Committee. One hundred years the Nurmi affair is hardly dealt with. On the other hand a good picture is given of the IOC's increasing interest in violations of the amateur regulations around 1930. In Allen Guttman's excellent biography of Brundage, The Games must go on, the Nurmi affair is only mentioned fragmentarily. However, Guttman claims that Brundage thought that Nurmi's punishment was too harsh, which contradicts the accepted picture of Brundage wanting harsher punishment.¹³ In the material reviewed it is clear that Brundage was one of the initiators of the Nurmi investigation and that he never questioned the severity of the punishment.

The period between the two wars: the amateur question in focus - the idealistic new order becomes generally accepted

The Nurmi affair is often seen as an isolated incident, an individual IAAF action under the leadership of Sigfrid Edström aimed at Paavo Nurmi. This view is grossly simplified, not to say wrong. During the 1920s the official international sports establishment began to take an increasing interest in the amateur question, or as they called it, "corruption within sport". For example, the IOC had adopted a resolution at its congress in Prague in 1925, where Edström was the chairman, concerning a new amateur definition of its own. The IOC determined that:

*"The following are ineligible to take part in the Olympic Games:
anyone who is, or knowingly has become, a professional in his sport or in any other sport;
anyone who has received reimbursement or compensation for loss of salary."*¹⁴

According to IOC regulations it was thus forbidden to accept money, even compensation for loss of earnings. This led to many sportsmen and sportswomen

with limited financial resources not being able to compete internationally. One further consequence of the breakthrough of the new idealistic order was that under the table black money became common, with several high profile bannings of top sportsmen as a consequence, of whom Nurmi was just one. In 1925 the IOC also decided that each Olympic competitor would sign a declaration: "I, the undersigned, declare on my honour that I am an amateur according to the Olympic Rules of Amateurism."¹⁵

During the rest of the 1920s, the discussion around the amateur question was intensive within the IOC. In 1930 the rules were further tightened, which amongst other things led to football temporarily leaving the Olympic family and instead organizing its own World Cup, which was arranged for the first time in 1930 in Montivideo in Uruguay. After the Nurmi affair the IOC made its amateur regulations even more stringent on the initiative of Edström.¹⁶ My point is that there was a desire around 1930 on the part of the IOC and the IAAF to really clean up regarding the amateur question and to produce clear rules and regulations for both officials and active sportsmen and sportswomen.

Racism, Finnish nationalism and the Finnkampen

The Nurmi affair must be put in a contemporary Finnish-Swedish context. Sports relations were tense around 1930 and the wave of nationalism that spread through Finland, which must have been noticed by its neighbour, contributed to this.

The Swedish sports newspaper, *Idrottsbladet*, closely covered the Nurmi affair and was happy to report the fierce Finnish press reactions. Under the headline "Nationalist frenzy in the Finnish sporting world"¹⁷ threatening letters and the like that the editorial staff and Swedish sports officials had received were reported on. In the opinion of the newspaper the Finnish dissatisfaction was linked to the change that had taken place in the ranks of sports officials in Finland. The President-to-be, Kekkonen, was not popular in Sweden at the time. In 1928 Kekkonen was elected as chairman of the Finnish Athletics Association, which did not escape Edström's attention. In a letter to the IOC President Baillet-Latour, Edström wrote: "Kekkonen is a pure Finn and hates von Frenckell who is a Swedish Finn."¹⁸

The international athletics meetings between Sweden and Finland were marked by scandalous scenes around 1930. The press also contributed to the inflamed atmosphere and the discord between the countries. *Idrottsbladet* published more or less racist articles. In 1931 the troubles came to a head. The spectators' behaviour was also considered scandalous and the press reacted strongly, which resulted in Kekkonen flying into a temper and de-

clining to break off the Finnkampen international meetings against Sweden. Kekkonen informed the top Swedish athletics officials of this in a dramatic speech at the banquet (!) after the Finnkampen meeting in 1931. He mainly blamed the hostile tone in Swedish newspapers.

Kekkonen's speech came as a real bombshell at the banquet. Sweden did not want the Finnkampen international athletics meetings to stop and Kekkonen was severely criticized. His decision remained unchanged, however, until 1939, when the Finnkampen was resumed. It was thus "little brother" who declined cooperation, to the Swedes' annoyance. Kekkonen had, according to Häggblom, trodden on "big brother's" toes and the Swedes were not used to that. According to Häggström, it was Edström's opinion that Kekkonen should be punished for his behaviour and this was best done by banning Finnish athletics' greatest star, Paavo Nurmi.¹⁹

The initiative in the investigation of Nurmi

In what follows the question of who took the initiative in starting an investigation into Nurmi's violation of the amateur regulations will be addressed. Previously Edström and his constant right hand man, Bo Ekelund, chairman of the Swedish Athletics Association, have been considered to be the people mainly responsible in this matter. The sources, however, show something else! The initiative came from the USA and the circles around Avery Brundage, who wanted the Games in Los Angeles to be free of "Pros". Here it can be noted that the American historian Allen Guttmann, who has written a good deal on the Olympic Games and on Avery Brundage, is of the opinion that it was not only Edström and Ekelund who lay behind the decision, but also Brundage and the German, Karl Ritter von Halt.²⁰ Edström, Brundage and von Halt were very good friends. They all belonged to the so called "Beer Drinking Society".²¹

It was known at an early stage by senior Finnish sports officials that sports stars, both Finnish and also those from other countries, accepted money as early as 1928 they began to become concerned about Nurmi starting in Los Angeles in 1932. The following is stated in a personal and confidential letter from the Finnish official Lauri Pihkala to Brundage:

*"We cannot deny Nurmi Purje and the others amateur pass when they leave for the U.S.A. as it impossible to prove how and where from they have got their travelling expenses...Well, if you want to, please control the men strictly and let them know in due time that they should turn back to Finland if they want to avoid suspension. My personal opinion of Nurmis last trip over in your country is that he did not run of pure interest, but we were unable to prove anything of him."*²²

Pikhala was thus aware of the money circus within athletics and not least that surrounding Nurmi. It is also interesting to see that as early as 1928 he was concerned about what would happen in Los Angeles. It should be added that he was a close friend of Avery Brundage. Pikhala came to play a central role in the Finnish defence of Nurmi after he was banned in 1932.

Many people were thus aware of Nurmi's transgressions, but they acted as if they knew nothing about the money circus until the IOC and IAAF decided to get tough.²³ The lack of interest or rather the hypocrisy was due to the fact that there was an established unofficial culture in the world of sport which had a more pragmatic attitude to violations of the amateur regulations. This attitude was a violation of the idealistic ideology that Edström and Brundage were fighting for. This pragmatism appears to have been great, not least in Finland, which is interesting bearing in mind more recent disclosures of doping and how these have been handled.

Now to the question of who took the initiative in initiating an investigation of Nurmi. The Swedish sports official Sven Låftman stated the following shortly after the Nurmi affair:

*"In Finland it was claimed that it was Swedish actions that led to the verdict. This is probably not true...It was principally pressure from America that led to the verdict."*²⁴

It should be mentioned that Låftman was a sports official in the Stockholm club IK Göta. An investigation showed that Låftman and others had paid money to foreign sportsmen, including Nurmi.²⁵

Låftman's claim is highly interesting and is supported by the correspondence between Låftman and American sports officials. A few examples by way of illustration: at the end of the summer of 1931 the USA wanted to include violations of the amateur regulations on the sporting agenda in the light of the coming Olympic Games in Los Angeles. John Gates, Athletic Director at Yale University, wrote to Charles W. Kennedy at Princeton University. Gates wanted to draw Kennedy's attention to the fact that during a trip to Europe he had come to the realization that everyone who was interested in athletics in the Nordic countries was of the opinion that "Nurmi should be barred from Olympic games competition". He also pointed out that the Nordic organizations did not want to investigate Nurmi's amateur status, but they wanted such an investigation to be initiated by "The Olympic Committee". Gates' letter led to extensive correspondence between senior sports officials in the USA in September 1931. Kennedy wrote to Brundage on the matter and then the snowball started to roll.²⁶ Brundage was

of the opinion that the Board of the IAAF should take up the question of Nurmi's amateur status.²⁷ Låftman was also informed by Gates of the course of events on the other side of the Atlantic. Gates was concerned that his initiative would come to the knowledge of others and wanted his involvement to "be kept confidential".²⁸ He thus realized the sensitivity of the question in Sweden and Finland.

Sigfrid Edström decided to act in the light of the Americans' initiative. He was, however, uncertain about what strategy to apply. Edström was concerned that an investigation of Nurmi would lead to a failure and "a good deal of unpleasantness", which can be seen in a letter to Ekelund:

*"What shall we do in this matter? Personally I am much in favour of keeping a tight rein on stars who are secretly professionals, and this is what Nurmi appears to be. But how can we obtain evidence?"*²⁹

The above shows that the initiative to investigate Nurmi's amateur status came from American sports officials. It was thus not Edström or Ekelund who took this fatal decision for Nurmi. This conclusion is confirmed in a letter that Edström wrote to the American Amateur Athletic Union before the IAAF congress in Berlin in 1932:

*"We received in the later part of the last year a letter from your president Mr. Brundage, who asked us to investigate if the remuneration for the travelling expenses of Mr. Nurmi was in order."*³⁰

Nurmi's fall - the German tour

Even in the weeks before the IAAF suspended Nurmi in Berlin on 3 April 1932, there was a lively discussion in the Swedish press concerning Nurmi's violation of the amateur regulations.³¹ It had thus leaked out that a ban might be on the way. Nurmi was also aware of this and briefly commented on the possible ban. This is interesting from several angles. In the first place, there was an air of resignation about Nurmi with respect to the future and in the second place it may be interpreted as some kind of admission. In the third place, it confirms the prevailing culture within sport at the time - sportsmen at the top level accepted money and most people knew about it:

*"I am already old, at least as a sportsman, so it really does not worry me much if I am declared unfit to compete. If this should happen anyway, the same fate should be prepared for all international talent, and the associations that are dependent on them."*³²

At the beginning of 1932 Edström and the IAAF had thus had enough; it was time to go from words to action. The rigid amateur regulations were not only to be something on paper that was not complied with. Edström sent a special communication to all of IAAF's members and demanded that they took action against sportsmen violating the amateur regulations. He also pointed out that payments were often made via a third party, who was clearly a middleman, to make it more difficult to prove allegations against the sportsman. Edström demanded action:

*"We wish you to carefully study if you in your country any such offence has taken place. If you find that any one - athlete or club - has offended against the Amateur status of the I.A.A.F., we ask you to punish him."*³³

How, then, would the IAAF go about putting the amateur problem to rights? The tough and effective method was chosen, namely making an example of someone and they chose to take action against the world's best athlete. It was thus not only Nurmi, which is sometimes claimed in different contexts, who was to be scrutinized, but all top international runners. Before the IAAF's meeting in Berlin, six Finnish runners stood accused, but Nurmi was the only one to be finally suspended. In Poland there was an investigation at the same time against the athlete Stanislaw Patkiewicz and pending the result of the investigation he was banned from all competition.³⁴ The great French runner Jules Ladoumègue was also banned by the French association at the same time.³⁵ Edström proudly informed the IOC President Baillet-Latour that the IAAF was on the way to banning a number of semi-amateurs who wished to take part in the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.³⁶

In March 1932 Edström and the IAAF had obtained evidence against Nurmi after an investigation by the German Athletics Association. The evidence was considered sufficient for a verdict of guilty, but they had not thought about the fact that Kekkonen was a lawyer, and the evidence brought forward was scrutinized as lawyers are wont to do.³⁷ Kekkonen and the Finnish association found that the evidence absolutely did not prove Nurmi's guilt as they saw it. Edström wrote to the Finnish association in his capacity as President of the IAAF. He enclosed the documents that confirmed when, where and how much money Nurmi had received during his German tour. The Germans, with Karl Halt von Ritter at the helm, had gone about things thoroughly. Detailed information about the sums of money that Nurmi had accepted were enclosed with the letter to the Finnish association. However, it turned out that the evidence was not so water-

tight and that it was difficult to truly prove that Nurmi had accepted money.³⁸ But this did not stop Edström. It can be mentioned here that the German Athletics Association was led by Ritter von Halt³⁹, a personal friend of Edström's, a member of the IOC and a member of the Board of the IAAF, which also explains the German thoroughness and the desire to really obtain evidence against Nurmi. Von Halt was severely criticized in the German newspapers after Nurmi was banned, which Edström explained with the fact that the journalists were semi-professional "and support the professional sport".⁴⁰

In August 1932, almost a month after the final ban, Idrottsbladet published the report that formed the basis for the ban. There it was stated that there was no evidence against Nurmi, except for one exception. He had accepted 300 dollars in connection with a competition in Danzig. It was Idrottsbladet's opinion that the IAAF had acted incorrectly. It was even considered that a trap had been set for Nurmi. However, it was pointed out that there was no doubt that Nurmi was a professional, but they reacted to the way of going about things and the basis for the verdict.⁴¹

The German tour in 1932, which came to be Nurmi's fall, gives some information about how he acted at his meeting with the organizer. One of the organizers writes to Fr. Hasseler, the Secretary General of the German Athletics Association, about his meeting with Nurmi:

*"Greatly Honored Mr. Hassler!
I acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 20th, and submit the following three receipts:
M700.--signed by Iso Hallo for the 3 Fins
M300.-- " " Nurmi
M700.-- " " Sukzi for Nurmi
Nurmi refused absolutely to sign a receipt and declared he had never signed a receipt. The money, M1000.--, was presented to him in the presence of Sukzi, Boltze (1878), Dannenberg (1878), Bankdirektor Luecke (1878) and Lohnhoff (1878). The honorprize (a beautiful vase with dedication) was refused by Nurmi. Originally Nurmi demanded M 2500. I called his attention to the fact that I could not pay more than M 1000.- - under any circumstances, as I was under the impression that this amount would adequately cover his travel expences. This negotiations, during which the silent Finn was exceedingly talkative, lasted 1½ hours and took place in Nurmis room, to the exclusion of the public."⁴²*

The senior Finnish sports officials were unable to convince the IAAF that Nurmi was innocent. The IAAF considered that the evidence was sufficient and at its Board meeting in Berlin on April 3, 1932,

it was decided to suspend Nurmi indefinitely. The decision was not definitive but was valid until the IAAF congress in Los Angeles, which was to be held at the end of July immediately before the Olympic Games. The IAAF Board had really met in Berlin to discuss the "Ladoumèque case", but it also took up the Nurmi affair. The following press release was issued by the IAAF:

"The Board considered itself compelled, due to several reports which showed severe violation of the amateur regulations, to suspend the Finnish runner Nurmi from all international competitions until a definite decision has been made by the Finnish athletics association..."⁴³

The IAAF could not ban Nurmi itself, but formally it was, as has been previously mentioned, only the Finnish Athletics Association that was able to do so. It was thus the national association, not the IAAF, that had ultimate power over its sportsmen. This very fact came to be the Finnish Athletics Association's most important argument in trying to get the IAAF's decision declared invalid.

The Finnish senior sports officials act

The ball was thereby in the court of Kekkonen and the Finnish Athletics Association. How would they react? Would they accept the suspension of Nurmi or try to get him cleared? This was a challenge for the lawyer Kekkonen. At the end of March 1932 the Finnish Athletics Association had a meeting, where it was determined that Nurmi had not accepted one "penny" too much.⁴⁴

Lauri Pihkala acted immediately after the decision to suspend Nurmi in Berlin and telegraphed "confidentially" to Avery Brundage, the chairman of the American Amateur Athletic Union. He was obviously not aware of the fact that Brundage was one of those who had taken the initiative in the action against Nurmi, something which Brundage did not make Pihkala aware of either. Brundage admitted that the allegations against Nurmi were serious, but not legally proven. Pihkala also came with a disguised threat. Finland would possibly not take part in the Los Angeles Olympic Games if Nurmi was not acquitted: it would then be impossible to finance the costs for the squad's travel and board and lodging if the great star was not allowed to participate.⁴⁵

Brundage firmly advised Pihkala not to use the Nurmi affair with the aim of giving their "star athlete" advantages. In his opinion it would lead to negative public opinion with regard to Finland in the rest of the world. He also believed that most people considered Nurmi to be innocent, but that his case should of course be tried.⁴⁶

The drama continued. Edström also complained to Brundage about the attacks from the newspapers in Sweden and Finland, but also added that his Finnish friends had pointed out that "it is only amongst the plebian population that they are displeased with disqualification of Nurmi."⁴⁷

A letter from Pihkala to Brundage in 1934 further reveals that he had as early as 1931 advised the Finnish Athletics Association not to send Nurmi to Los Angeles as his reputation in the USA was doubtful. Pihkala also stated that Nurmi had asked him for advice as to whether he should retire after the ban in April or continue. Pihkala advised him to continue to train, as otherwise it would have been impossible to bring in enough money for the trip from sponsors of the Finnish Olympic squad!⁴⁸ Again it is clear that the Finns were aware of Nurmi's professionalism, but that they refused to acknowledge it.

On April 18⁴⁹ Kekkonen and Sinisalo, the chairman and secretary, respectively, of the Finnish Athletics Association, replied to Edström and the IAAF. In his capacity as a lawyer Kekkonen chose to try to clear Nurmi on the basis of legal technicalities of principle instead of trying to refute the allegations in the actual issue, the violation of the amateur rules.

Kekkonen probably knew that there was no point in claiming that Nurmi was innocent, since as stated above it was an established unofficial truth that top athletes earned a great deal of money from their sport. One Finnish sports official was of the opinion that the Finnish bitterness was due to the fact that it was just Nurmi that had become the scapegoat in an "accepted system". He considered that Nurmi was clearly a professional. The official claimed that he himself could incriminate more than ten other athletes. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the timing was poor. It was going to be Nurmi's last season and the Olympic Games in Los Angeles would be his great farewell performance.⁵⁰

Kekkonen pointed out that interviews had been held with Nurmi, in which he denied having accepted money. "Likewise he denied having obtained on his German tour any travelling expenses above the amounts he duly wrote receipts for."

Kekkonen's defence can be summarized in the following points:

The German allegations were based on hearsay and suspicions

No-one should be suspended without a hearing

The IAAF's rules had not been followed. The Federation was not able to suspend any sportsman, but only to give recommendations. It was up to the national association to decide on a ban.

Kekkonen ended the letter by demanding that the ban on Nurmi be lifted as soon as possible and that all members of the IAAF should be informed of this decision.⁵¹ The letter is formally written, and its tone is one of great bitterness with regard to the IAAF's actions.

Edström replied immediately for he was a man of action. He asked the Finnish Athletics Association six questions. He demanded that they be answered with a yes or a no by 15 May at the latest. The questions were about whether Nurmi had accepted money at different places. One question was about whether he had left without paying the hotel bill in Danzig! Question 1 can serve as an example of the type of question: "Has Mr. Nurmi during his stay in Berlin in September and Oktober 1931 received any money outside the sum for which he has given receipts?"⁵²

Kekkonen och Sinisalo replied that when interviewed, Nurmi had answered no to all the questions with the exception of the fact of having left the hotel without paying the bill. There they referred to the fact that it was common practice among organizers that they always paid for this cost in northern Europe. The letter again ended with the wish that Nurmi's ban be lifted as soon as possible. There was thus a deadlock between the parties involved, to say the least!

The banning of Nurmi caused great concern amongst the American organizers of the Olympic Games. William Garland of the organizing committee in Los Angeles telegraphed to Edström. In his opinion the news concerning Nurmi was disturbing and he emphasized that all of the USA wanted to see Nurmi run. Garland, a successful businessman in Los Angeles had invested a lot of money and prestige in Games, was of course worried when one of the super stars was not participating. Edström replied slightly irritably that Nurmi had accepted large sums of money and that it would go against the grain for him to see a professional standing amongst amateurs and swearing the Olympic oath.⁵³

Edström on the defensive?

At this point Edström appears to be a trifle uncertain about how he should proceed in the Nurmi affair. Should he continue to push the granite-hard line or should he give in and lift the ban on Nurmi pending the IAAF congress in Los Angeles? In an interview Edström stated: "The logical consequence is probably that the Board (IAAF's, my comment) will lift the suspension of Nurmi that was decided on in Berlin." In a circular letter in May 1932 to the members of the IAAF Board Edström was also of the opinion that the suspension should be lifted.⁵⁴ He also stated in the interview that it was conceivable for Nurmi to go to Los Angeles, but on the other hand new facts could come to light that were damaging for the Finnish runner.⁵⁵ Edström

had probably realized that Nurmi could not be banned on the basis of the IAAF's regulations. But, as can be seen below, Edström's hesitancy soon proved to be temporary or possibly just a front to appease public opinion in Finland, which was, to put it mildly, irritated. Edström was a man of principle who did not change his mind just like that. In a letter to the members of the IAAF Board Edström pointed out that he had contacted the German Athletics Association with a view to obtaining further evidence against Nurmi. At the same time he put a gag on IAAF Board members. They were not to make a statement to the press.⁵⁶ No further evidence against Nurmi was found, but this did not prevent Edström and the IAAF from refusing to lift the ban. The question was taken up by the IAAF Board pending the IAAF congress in Los Angeles. Both the French and the English delegate were of the opinion that the suspension should continue to apply, as the evidence against Nurmi was "absolutely damning".⁵⁷ The chairman of the French association, Joseph Genets, was of the opinion that the Berlin decision could not be changed. Nurmi should be banned.⁵⁸

In this context it is important to remember that the Nurmi affair was of secondary importance to the French. There the ban on Ladoumègue was in focus. The French magazine *Auto* claimed that Nurmi should be definitively disqualified before the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. If this did not happen the magazine considered that Ladoumègue should also be given the opportunity of participating, "especially as the evidence against Nurmi is stronger than that against Ladoumègue".⁵⁹ The French were irritated about the inconsistency that existed between how Ladoumègue and Nurmi were being treated. The former was suspended both nationally and internationally while Nurmi strangely enough was classed as a so-called national amateur by the Finnish Athletics Association, but as a professional internationally. As has been previously mentioned, this was due to the fact that the Finnish Athletics Association refused to accept the IAAF's verdict.⁶⁰ Nurmi competed in Finland and also on one occasion in Estonia as well after the ban.⁶¹

The IAAF Board was thus united in its view of Nurmi's suspension, with the exception of the Hungarian member Stankovits. We see here that it was not just Edström who acted vis-à-vis Nurmi, but the whole of the IAAF Board, with one exception. Edström stressed this fact in a letter to the Finnish sports official Ernst Krogius, who did not want Nurmi's future to be decided in Los Angeles. He was afraid of the unrest that could break out. Edström said that he alone could not change the decisions that the IAAF made.⁶²

Kekkonen's claim that the IAAF Board had acted in contravention of the rules was, as far as can be judged, correct. The Board did not have the authority to ban individual sportsmen, but rather it was up to the national association. Edström was aware of this, of course, and therefore it was decided to change the statutes at the IAAF congress in Los Angeles. The proposal meant that the Board would have the authority to ban sportsmen temporarily or for good if they violated the amateur rules. Kekkonen drew attention to this fact and he again demanded that the ban on Nurmi should be lifted for formal reasons.⁶³ The Finnish sports officials, however, stated that the paragraph could in no way be interpreted in the way that the IAAF had done. Furthermore, they wondered, and apparently justifiably, why the IAAF'S rules and regulations had to be changed if they could already be interpreted in accordance with the revision of the rules in the Nurmi affair. They ended by again demanding that the ban on Nurmi should be lifted.⁶⁴ Edström replied that the IAAF could not lift the suspension of Nurmi as long as the investigation against him was ongoing. However, the IAAF Board would discuss the matter again.⁶⁵

It is obvious that Kekkonen had found a weak spot in Edström. The rules and regulations were not sufficient to ban Nurmi: the IAAF and Edström had interpreted them incorrectly. In this context it should be remembered that Edström was a bigwig who was used to getting his way, both in the world of sport and in the business world. He was not used to setbacks. And as the man of action that he was he strongly disliked nit-picking. Edström wanted to clean up amateur corruption and then no paragraphs were to get in the way.

Swedish reactions to the Nurmi affair

The banning of Nurmi led to an intensive debate in the press in Sweden.⁶⁶ Beside the discussion about the issue itself, the newspapers devoted a lot of column space to the violent reaction to Sweden and the Swedish sports officials in the Finnish press. Both Edström and Ekelund received a lot of criticism, which is surprising as the general picture is that it was only Edström who was under attack.⁶⁷

According to *Idrottsbladet* the IAAF's decision was "the most remarkable measure that the sports organization has taken so far concerning a sportsman". Furthermore, it was claimed that the measures were a tragedy for Nurmi, Finland and international sport. The Los Angeles Olympic Games would thereby lose their foremost attraction. However, the newspaper claimed that the IAAF's decision was right in principle. There was evidence that Nurmi had accepted 25 000 marks for a race over 2 English miles in 1931 in Stockholm!⁶⁸

Before the Olympic Games in Los Angeles in

1932, *Idrottsbladet* and certainly many others were split in their view of Nurmi's participation. On the one hand they wanted the best runner in the world to participate: "The Olympic Games without Nurmi are not worthy Olympic Games." On the other hand they hoped that he would be banned for the sake of compliance with the rules.⁶⁹

The difference between theory and practice was enormous around 1930. It was clearly the case, as has previously been mentioned, that everyone knew that top sportsmen in arena sports earned money from their sport. People chose to lie low and turn a blind eye, but in the end Edström, the IAAF and the IOC became tired of this. One Swedish newspaper wrote: "That Paavo Nurmi is the world's most prominent professionally paid amateur is a public secret, and huge sums of money have been paid to him."⁷⁰

According to one source "Nurmi had 'the lowest heart beat and the highest asking price of any athlete in the world'".⁷¹ And another source pointed out after the final verdict in Los Angeles that Nurmi was selfish, that he demanded 45% of the gross gate receipts for his races!⁷² Whether this is true or not is not certain. The figure sounds very high and would have given Nurmi enormous sums of money for each appearance. A contemporary sports journalist confirms Nurmi's large income during the USA tour: "Nobody could match Nurmi at being paid off in the dark. He toured America like a cash register and broke records and banks with equal ease."⁷³

The IAAF congress before the Olympic Games in Los Angeles

During the summer of 1932 the drama began to approach the final act and things were becoming increasingly dramatic. The Olympic Games were soon to start and Nurmi was there. On the crossing on the ship *Drottningholm* to the USA the Finnish and the Swedish squads went on the same boat. The same applied to the officials! Edström was confronted with Nurmi and Kekkonen and so on for a long period of time. They could hardly avoid each other. In a letter Edström commented on the coming crossing: "It is probably best for me not to be alone too near the railings on the boat."⁷⁴

During the crossing talks were held on the Nurmi affair and there was speculation as to whether the suspension would be lifted. The organizers in Los Angeles were also working on Nurmi being allowed to start. Not only Nurmi was sent to Los Angeles. The banned Frenchman Ladoumègue also went to the USA at the expense of a French newspaper.⁷⁵

The pressure on Edström and the IAAF Board was thus enormous before the Federation's congress during the days before the start of the Olympic Games. Large parts of the sports world demanded to see the banned world stars, in Nurmi's case for the last time,

on the Olympic tracks. But the IAAF Board did not budge an inch. The Board decided at its meeting on 28 July to stand firm by its decision from Berlin, which was sensational bearing in mind the strong public opinion and not least of all Nurmi's presence in Los Angeles. All seven members of the Board (Mesars, Edström, Brundage, von Halt, Mericamp, Stankovits and Ekelund) voted for the ban to continue. Brundage also did so, in spite of the rumours to the contrary. He had obviously changed opinion.⁷⁶

According to *Idrottsbladet* the Finnish officials had been allowed to give their view of the Nurmi affair before the decision was made, but their arguments did not convince the Board.⁷⁷ At this point Edström acted both smartly and undemocratically. The decision of the Board was what counted, and the congress was not given the opportunity to air the question. The Nurmi affair would not even be discussed at the IAAF congress the following day. It was not even included on the agenda! Edström thereby did not risk a long debate that might possibly jeopardize the Board's decision. In spite of this the Finnish representatives tried to bring up the question, but Edström stifled the Finnish attempts.⁷⁸ Here we see Edström the man of power in action. Used to tough meetings and difficult negotiations he got his own way.

The congress became stormy anyway when the proposal concerning a statute amendment, Rule 8, came up on the agenda. It entitled the IAAF Board to ban individual sportsmen even if the national association opposed this. The proposal was first carried by 13 votes to 12.⁷⁹ However, Edström considered that the decision had been taken by such a small margin that a working group should further investigate the matter, which the congress also approved. It can also be noted that Nurmi was not banned for life but for two years, that is until the next IAAF congress in 1934. In practice, however, the decision meant the end of Nurmi's career as a great international runner.⁸⁰ The congress was a great victory for Edström.⁸¹

Kekkonen's revenge

The young Kekkonen was angry and longed for revenge after the fiasco with regard to the attempts to clear Nurmi in Los Angeles. Now was the time for revenge! The Swedes would be put in their place. The Finnish Athletics Association under the leadership of Kekkonen decided in 1932 to boycott all cooperation with Swedish athletics as long as the Swedish Athletics Association backed the banning of Nurmi, which according to Kekkonen "contravened the regulations".⁸² After this Kekkonen received a great number of letters from Swedish sports officials, organizers etc., who tried to get him to reverse the decision, but in vain.⁸³ The boycott hit

Swedish athletics hard.

During 1935 there was great dissatisfaction within Finnish athletics and it was decided that the boycott would come to an end. After negotiations during the summer of 1935 that at times were hard between the athletics associations of Sweden and Finland, the parties reached agreement and a cooperation agreement was signed. The Nurmi affair was over after three years of fighting, at least officially!⁸⁴

The Nurmi affair continued to be an important part of the correspondence between Edström and Brundage after Los Angeles as well. In 1934 Edström wrote to Brundage and stressed how important it was to nail Nurmi. He said that Nurmi's methods, that is violating the amateur regulations, had spread over Europe and this threatened the IAAF: "By putting Nurmi out of business we have cleared up the matter and have now a very good standing with all our athletes."⁸⁵ Edström's point is interesting as it shows that it was not the person Nurmi that Edström wanted to punish but the violations against the amateur regulations, which was best done by banning the number 1 figurehead: Nurmi. It was not a personal vendetta on the part of Edström, but the amateur fundamentalist Edström acting to rid sport of the hated professionalism which threatened the very foundations of sport.

Conclusion

The Nurmi affair was not only about Nurmi. It must be seen in its context. It was the result of an intensified struggle against violations of the amateur regulations around 1930 within international sport at the highest level, primarily in the IOC and IAAF. The idea of this idealistic new order was that sport should be a sphere of its own, with as little contact with society as possible. Sport represented something that was clean, innocent, non-commercial, non-political, while society was something that was evil and dangerous which was imbued with commercialism and politics. The international breakthrough of amateur fundamentalism around 1930 proved to be fatal for Nurmi and others. This fundamentalist and uncompromising ideology had preferential right of interpretation within international sport at the highest level up until the 1970s. The definitive break came when Juan Antonio Samaranch became the IOC President in 1980. With him the forces of commercialism were unleashed within the IOC as well.

The amateur ideal not only acted as an obstacle to commercialism's inroads into sport at the highest level. It thereby also constituted an obstacle to the progress of the sporting process. Owing to amateurism, sportsmen were forced to work in parallel with practising their sport. They could not spend long periods of time in training camps

and so on. With the removal of the amateur regulations, not only was commercialism given a free rein but also the sporting process was intensified, clear signs of which can be seen over the past 30 years.

Those leading the IOC's and IAAF's crusade against "the pro" were the personal friends, the lovers of athletics, Edström and Brundage. Both were highly involved in the Nurmi affair. They were men who did not hesitate to take unpleasant decisions in the name of amateurism. It is interesting to note that both of these amateur fundamentalists and money fighters were extremely commercial in their occupational roles. Both were successful in their work in the money-focussed world of business. They thus divided up their lives into different spheres (the sphere of work, the sphere of sport, the private sphere) between which there were sharp dividing lines.

Both Edström and Brundage chose to profile their work as sports officials in a fanatical struggle for the amateur ideal, and with the benefit of hindsight they chose right: both reached the absolute top within the bureaucracy of sport, namely the post of President of the IOC. Today the struggle against doping is possibly the same strategic choice for an ambitious bureaucrat in the world of sport.

Edström's position must be understood in this context. He had been the IAAF's undisputed chairman since 1913. He was also very active in the IOC, with the amateur question as his special domain. Edström, Brundage and the IOC were driven by an inner passion in their struggle against corruption within sport and during the period between the two wars this struggle was started in earnest. Nurmi and others had the misfortune to be active just at this very time. Previously they had never been banned, in spite of the fact that they accepted considerable sums of money. There does not appear to be any doubt about Nurmi's guilt. Most writers, both then and now, seem surprised and impressed by the large sums of money that he earned. However, it should be pointed out here that there is little if any watertight evidence that really proves that he accepted money. Clear parallels can be seen here with today's problem of doping. The fact is that formally the IAAF could not ban Nurmi; only the Finnish Athletics Association could do that. However, Edström and the IAAF did not worry about this. He considered that they were right as far as the issue was concerned and then no legal paragraphs were to get in the way. It was precisely this legal technicality that Kekkonen pointed out time and time again in his attempt to get Nurmi acquitted, but in vain. In summary, it can be said that Nurmi was definitely guilty of violating the amateur regulations, but wrongfully banned by the IAAF.

The initiative to investigate Nurmi's violation of the amateur regulations has been discussed by different writers. Primarily Edström, but also Ekelund, have been considered to be responsible. My sources show, however, that the initiative came from athletic circles in the USA who wanted to have a "clean" Olympic Games in Los Angeles. It fell to Edström and Ekelund to implement this in their capacity as leading figures in the IAAF, and they did not have to be asked twice. On the contrary!

It is well known that there was an unofficial, almost official, culture in the world of sport before the amateur rules were done away with that violated the official rules and regulations, but this cannot justify the actions of Nurmi and other great runners. They cheated, they violated the rules and regulations! In the same way the actions of all of today's sportsmen and women who have been banned for doping cannot be neglected today either, in spite of the knowledge that doping is widespread and almost accepted in certain circles. Without drawing too many parallels between doping and violating the amateur regulations, it can be noted that there are certain similarities, in particular with respect to what the official regulations say and harsh reality.

Endnotes

- 1 Many thanks to Karin Wikberg-Lindroth, Leena Laine, Jan Lindroth och Kenth Sjöblom for constructive comments on the article.
- 2 See e.g. *Idrottsbladet* 15 April 1932.
- 3 John Lucas, "In the Eye of the Storm: Paavo Nurmi and the American Athletic Amateur-Professional Struggle" (1925 and 1929), *Stadion* XVII, 2 (1992), p. 238.
- 4 *Nationalencyklopedin*, see Kekkonen, volume 10, s. 530.
- 5 *Nationalencyklopedin*, see Edström, volume 5, s. 269.
- 6 See e.g. Häggblom, Stig, Paavo Nurmi, Viljo Heino och Urho Kekkonen (Sahlgrens förlag Ab, 1999).
- 7 In one sense it can be claimed that Nurmi cheated. He gained several advantages for himself through his sporting income vis-à-vis his competitors, e.g. regarding the chance to rest, training etc.
- 8 Häggblom, p. 10.
- 9 Häggblom, p. 71.
- 10 For language reasons I have unfortunately not been able to read the Finnish research, see e.g. Finland's history of sport association's almanac 1997.
- 11 Hamilton's essay "The Paavo Nurmi Issue. A Matter of Class and Nationality" is published in *Transformations: Continuity and Change in Sport History II*, ed. Arnd Krüger & Wolfgang Buss (2002).
- 12 Häggblom, p.65ff.
- 13 Guttman, Allen, *The Games must go on. Avery Brundage and the Olympic movement* (Columbia university press, 1984), p. 124. See also note 66, p. 288.
- 14 *The International Olympic Committee. One hundred years, volume 1*, p. 234; See also Karin Wikberg, "Idealism eller professionalism? En studie i den stora amatörräfstens 1945-1946. Part 1", *Idrott, historia och samhälle* 1993.
- 15 *The International Olympic Committee. One hundred years, volume 1*, p. 234f.
- 16 *The International Olympic Committee. One hundred years, volume 1*, p. 288ff.
- 17 *Idrottsbladet* 15 April 1932.

- 18 Edström to Baillet-Latour, correspondence, vol. 295-296, 2 May 1939, Sigfrid Edström's archives, NA; Höglund, 35f; Soumen Heimo, September 1928; Höglund, p. 178ff.
- 19 Häggblom, p. 71ff.
- 20 Guttman, p. 51.
- 21 Brichford, Maynard, "Olympic Personas", in *Cultural Imperialism in Action. Critique in the Global Olympic Trust*, Editors Nigel B. Crowther, Robert K. Barney, Michael K. Heine (2006), p. 241.
- 22 Lauri Pihkala to Avery Brundage, correspondence, 5 January 1928, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 23 See e.g. Lucas, p. 232.
- 24 Account, Sven Låftman's archives of the history of sport, NA.
- 25 Wikberg, Karin, "Amatörfrågan i Sverige under mellankrigstiden", Finland's history of sport association's almanac 1997, 53f.
- 26 Cates to Låftman, correspondence 31 August 1931, Sven Låftman's archives of the history of sport, National Archives.
- 27 Brundage to Hulbert, correspondence 4 September 1931, Sven Låftman's archives of the history of sport, National Archives.
- 28 Cates to Låftman correspondence 12 September 1931, Sven Låftman's archives of the history of sport, National Archives.
- 29 Edström to Ekelund, correspondence 23 September 1931 (vol.243), Sigfrids Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 30 Edström to Amateur Athletic Union of the U.S., correspondence 11 February 1932, (vol. 252), Sigfrid Edströms archives, National Archives.
- 31 See e.g. Idrottsbladet 6 April 1932.
- 32 Idrottsbladet 14 March 1932. The letter was published in Idrottsbladet, which had taken it from Dagens Nyheter.
- 33 Edström to members of the I.A.A.F., correspondence, 8 April 1932, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 34 Idrottsbladet 9 March 1932; Edström to Polski Związek Lekkoatletyczny (vol. 248), Sigfrid Edström's archives, NA.
- 35 Häggblom, p.71.
- 36 Edström to Baillet-Latour, correspondence 16 March 1932, (vol. 252), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 37 Kekkonen even became the Minister of Justice in 1936, only 36 years old.
- 38 These documents, the so-called Blue Book, are preserved in Kekkonen's archives.
- 39 After the second world war, von Halt was accused of having Nazi sympathies and was held in a Russian prisoner of war camp in Germany. Edström was very involved in the attempts to get him released and also sent food and clothes to von Halt's wife in Germany. Edström considered that the allegations against von Halt were a pure fabrication!
- 40 Edström to Brundage, correspondence 1 October 1932, (vol. 253), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 41 Idrottsbladet 26 August 1932.
- 42 Who wrote the letter cannot be seen from the copy, which is probably a translation from the German. But most things suggest that it was a German organizer who was writing to Hessler after an enquiry from X to Hessler, correspondence, PT-Brun-Micro (19), IOC's archives.
- 43 Idrottsbladet 4 April 1932; Idrottsbladet 6 April 1932.
- 44 Idrottsbladet 1 April 1932.
- 45 Pihkala to Brundage, correspondence, 9 April 1932, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 46 Brundage to Pihkala, correspondence, 6 June 1932, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 47 Edström to Brundage, correspondence 5 November 1932 (vol. 253), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 48 Pihkala to Brundage, correspondence, 13 Maj 1934, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 49 It can be noted here that Idrottsbladet had a short article as early as 11 April with in principle the same content, which says a good deal about how well informed the newspaper was.
- 50 Idrottsbladet 27 June 1932.
- 51 Kekkonen/Sinisalo to IAAF/Edström, correspondence, 18 april, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 52 IAAF/Edström to Soumen Woimistelut - ja - Urheiluttitto, correspondence, 25 April 1932, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 53 Edström to Garland, correspondence 21 May 1932, (vol. 255), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 54 Ekelund (Edström signed the letter) to Members of the Council of the I.A.A.F, correspondence 9 May 1932 (vol. 254), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 55 Idrottsbladet 22 April 1932.
- 56 Ekelund (Edström signed the letter) to Members of the Council of the I.A.A.F, correspondence 9 May 1932 (vol. 254), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 57 Idrottsbladet 2 May 1932.
- 58 Idrottsbladet 2 May 1932.
- 59 Idrottsbladet 2 May 1932.
- 60 Idrottsbladet 18 May 1932.
- 61 Lucas, p. 239.
- 62 Correspondence between Edström and Krogius, 3 May, 5 May, 23 May och 28 May, (vol. 257), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 63 Kekkonen/Sinisalo to Edström/IAAF, correspondence, 2 June 1932, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 64 Kekkonen/Sinisalo to Edström/IAAF, correspondence, 10 June 1932, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.
- 65 Edström to Finland's Athletics Association, correspondence 9 May 1932, (vol. 255), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 66 The debate was reproduced in parts, which were often commented on in Idrottsbladet. In this article no systematic review of the debate is carried out, but it is only reproduced fragmentarily based on Idrottsbladet. The focus here is on Edström's and Ekelund's reactions.
- 67 See e.g. Idrottsbladet 6 och 13 April 1932.
- 68 Idrottsbladet 4 April 1932.
- 69 Idrottsbladet 27 June 1932.
- 70 Idrottsbladet 9 March 1932.
- 71 Guttman, p. 51.
- 72 Idrottsbladet 12 August 1932.
- 73 Lucas, p. 230.
- 74 Edström to Ekelund, correspondence 28 May 1932, (vol. 254), Sigfrid Edström's archives, National Archives.
- 75 Idrottsbladet 15 juli 1932.
- 76 Lucas, p. 237.
- 77 Idrottsbladet 29 July 1932; Edström to Kekkonen 28 July 1932 (24/2), Kekkonen's archives.
- 78 Idrottsbladet 29 July 1932; Idrottsbladet 1 August 1932.
- 79 Minutes of the eleventh congress of the International amateur athletic federation (24/2), Kekkonen's archives. Strangely enough Idrottsbladet gives a completely different result.
- 80 Idrottsbladet 9 August 1932.
- 81 Häggblom, p. 75.
- 82 Kekkonen to Wide 1 June 1933 (24/2), Kekkonen's archives.
- 83 See also Jonason to Kekkonen 1 April 1935: Kekkonen to Jonason (24/2), Kekkonen's archives.
- 84 See various press cuttings; National Sports Association of Sweden to Pihkala 6 July 1935; Hufvudstadsbladet 16 July 1935(24/2), Kekkonen's archives.
- 85 Edström to Brundage, correspondence, 9 April 1934, PT-BRUN-MICRO (19), IOC's archives.