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Olympic 50th Anniversary: Munich Shines and Commemorates the Victims

- “Mark the Shark”: Munich’s “Glamour Boy”
- 50 Years After the Munich Olympic Massacre
- The Quest for a Logo: Ultimately (Almost) Everyone was Pleased
- Show Me the Art: Photographers as News Gatherers
- Bringing the Olympics Back to Los Angeles

CONTENTS

- 1 **Welcome to the Issue**
- 2 **Munich Memories**
by CHRISTIAN WACKER
- 3 **IOC President Visits Ukraine and Meets Athletes**
- 4 **Munich Olympic Park: An Example of Sustainability**
by VOLKER KLUGE
- 8 **“Mark the Shark”:
Munich’s “Glamour Boy”**
by VOLKER KLUGE
- 22 **Walther Tröger and the 1972 Terrorist Attack: An Interview**
by DAVID WALLECHINSKY
- 25 **50 Years After the Munich Olympic Massacre: Remembrance Culture**
by EITAN M. MASHIAH
- 32 **The Quest for a Logo: Ultimately (Almost) Everyone was Pleased**
by VOLKER KLUGE
- 40 **Three Seconds That Have Been Disputed for 50 Years**
by DAVID WALLECHINSKY
- 41 **A Button That Fell Down**
by VOLKER KLUGE
- 44 **Show Me the Art: Photographers as News Gatherers**
by ANTHONY EDGAR
- 50 **Objects Tell Stories: A Visit to the 3-2-1 Qatar Olympic and Sports Museum**
by MARCIA DE FRANCESCHI NETO-WACKER
- 52 **Olympic Television: The IOC Moves to Center Stage (Part 6)**
by RICHARD W. POUND
- 62 **Bringing the Olympics Back to Los Angeles**
by ANN OWENS with BARRY A. SANDERS
- 70 **Biographies of All IOC Members Part XXXIX**
by VOLKER KLUGE
- 74 **Obituaries**
- 78 **Book Reviews**



On the cover: The spirit of the “Cheerful Games” dominates the Munich Olympic Park. However, as beautiful as the view is, the memory of the brutal attack on the Israeli team does not permit viewing it undisturbed.

Photo: picture-alliance; Gabriele Kluge

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Welcome to the Issue



VOLKER KLUGE
EDITOR

At the suggestion of Czech professor Josef Gruss, the 23 of June, the day on which it was decided to reintroduce the Olympic Games in 1894, has been celebrated worldwide as Olympic Day since 1948. In this year's message of "Together, for a Peaceful World", Thomas Bach reaffirmed the role sport can play in building bridges in our divided world and promoting global solidarity. With his trip to Kyiv, the IOC President backed up his words with action.

Before doing that, he took part in the anniversary festival in Munich, where the 1972 Olympic Games were held 50 years ago. As is well known, these Games began cheerfully and in high spirits and ended tragically with the murder of 11 members of the Israeli team. In his speech at the inauguration of the Olympic rings in the Olympic Park, Bach described it as an attack on the entire Olympic community and its values.

In all its ambiguity, Munich 1972 is also the focus of this issue. It commemorates the charismatic US swimmer Mark Spitz, winner of seven Olympic gold medals, and recalls designer Otl Aicher's outstanding visual design, along with the still-controversial basketball final.

An interview conducted by David Wallechinsky with the late mayor of the Olympic Village, Walther Tröger, addresses the dark side. The Israeli historian Eitan M. Mashiah takes stock of commemorative culture in Germany and Israel.

Fifty years ago, many photos were taken in Munich which are now considered iconic – both beautiful but also ugly, like our cover photo of one of the abductors. All these images are part of the visual legacy of the Olympics, which long-time IOC Head of Operations Anthony Edgar describes as one of the strongest and most enduring. Its contribution is at the same time a plea for free and independent reporting of the Games, as enshrined in many IOC documents.

In the case of TV broadcasts, the legal situation is different, as is well known, and no one knows this better than Richard W. Pound, who was appointed chairman of the IOC Television Negotiations Committee in 1983. In part six of his series, the IOC doyen describes how the unprecedented contract with Calgary for US \$309 million came about in 1988 and how difficult the negotiations with Seoul were.

What was unprecedented then would be a bargain today – at least compared to the deal the IOC negotiated with NBC for the US broadcast rights for the Winter and Summer Games until 2032, worth US \$7.65 billion. This package also includes Los Angeles 2028. How the Games returned to this city for the third time is described by Ann Owens and Barry A. Sanders, former chairman of the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games.

As usual, this issue is rounded off by Olympic news, obituaries, reviews, and the IOC biography series. ■

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Munich Memories



CHRISTIAN WACKER
ISOH PRESIDENT

For Munich, even more than other Olympic cities, the Olympic Games were a striking turning point in its history. Economically, socially, and culturally, the city has continued to develop ever since and is now one of the wealthiest and most liveable cities in the world. In Munich's case, the 1972 Olympic Games were the key event for this extraordinary development.

The reverberations of the Games can still be felt in the cityscape today: in 1971 the U-Bahn (subway) was put into operation, and in 1972 the S-Bahn (suburban railway) arrived to connect the city with the surrounding areas. The downtown pedestrian zone was also inaugurated in 1972, and new residential quarters such as the Olympic Village and Neuperlach were built. The Olympic Park as a landmark, meeting place, and event venue lives on to this day, its spectacular tensile roof structure by architects Günter Behnisch & Partners and Frei Otto.

Since the 1972 Games, there have been 220 million registered visitors to the vast Olympic Park landscape with its event venues and TV tower. Soon the whole area might be declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site: the city and the federal state of Bavaria have applied to put it on the coveted UNESCO list.

Anniversary events, like this year's 50th anniversary of the 1972 Games, invite us to remember – which is happening extensively in Munich in these months. Klaus Steinbach, for example, was there in 1972 as an 18-year-old swimmer and won the silver medal with the 4x200 m relay team. Later, from 2002 to 2006, he served as president of the NOC for Germany. For him, the Games are still as vivid as they were 50 years ago – not least because the sports facilities and the Olympic Park still hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Munich and have also been well maintained by the city government.

I myself am a child of this city and experienced the Games as a six-year-old on my father's lap. I still remember the splendour of the colours, the sounds of the sporting events, and the hustle and bustle. The terrorist attack and its consequences remained hidden from me as a child; I only processed and understood it later, in a sense, as part of the collective memory. It is not only for me that these contrasting and irreconcilable experiences mark the memory of the 1972 Olympic

Games. On the one hand, the colourful impressions of a supposedly peaceful gathering of the world's athletes, with which West Germany at the time sought to come to terms with its dark history of Nazi terror; on the other hand, the horrific hostage-taking and massacre that has shaped Israeli–Palestinian relations and the international community's role in them to this day. This year's ISOH General Assembly takes place in Munich from 2 to 4 September and is dedicated to both topics.

For this 50th anniversary, the city is celebrating the spirit of the Games and commemorating the murder of the Israeli athletes with an extensive programme of events in collaboration with 60 project partners (<https://muenchen1972-2022.de/en/home/>). The motto is "Munich on a Path to the Future 1972–2022–2072". The anniversary celebration aims to reflect on the positive effects of the Games on the city's development but also draw the world's attention to the memory of the tragic events. Thanks to the Games, Munich has become a cosmopolitan city – living up to its marketing slogan as a "World City with Heart" (Weltstadt mit Herz). One-hundred-and-fifty events are planned throughout the year based on "encounters" and open to further events. Throughout 2022 are sporting events, theatre performances, lectures, storytelling cafés, exhibitions, and commemorative events to remember the victims of the Olympic tragedy on 5 and 6 September 1972. Each month is dedicated to one of the 12 people murdered by Palestinian terrorists during the Olympics.

The highlights of the Olympic programme are planned for the summer. In August, 4,700 athletes will compete in the European Championships Munich 2022. It will be the largest sporting event in the Olympic Park since the 1972 Summer Games.

The foundation stone for the 1972 Olympic Games was laid on 28 October 1965, when NOC President Willi Daume and Munich Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel met at the Munich City Hall. Daume was able to convince Vogel that Munich was the right place to present the world with the image of a liberal and cosmopolitan Germany, a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War and now a symbol of modern democracy, tolerance, and diversity – even a counter-design to the gigantism of the 1936 Games in Berlin. Unfortunately, the tragic events of the attack overshadowed this wish substantially. ■

IOC President Visits Ukraine and Meets Athletes

Following an invitation by the NOC of Ukraine, IOC President Thomas Bach visited Kyiv on 4 July 2022. He was accompanied by IOC Member and NOC President Sergii Bubka and the Ukrainian Sports Minister, Vadym Guttsait.

Joined by two-time Olympic champion and IOC Member Valeriy Borzov, he met around 100 athletes at the Olympic Training Centre and heard their first-hand accounts of training and competing in extremely difficult conditions. Speaking to them, Bach said: "We want to show the solidarity of the Olympic Movement with our friends here in the Ukrainian Olympic Community because we know that you are living very difficult moments, and we want not only to tell you, we want to show you, we want to reassure you that you are never alone with the Olympic Community."

He also visited a badly-damaged sports facility in Kyiv. Later he held hour-long talks with the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.



Photo: NOC of Ukraine

During a media conference, President Zelensky welcomed the new strengthened initiatives by the IOC that President Bach had announced during the visit, which include coordinating the support for more than 3,000 Ukrainian athletes both at home and abroad and tripling the aid fund for athletes to USD 7.5 million. Additionally, Sergii Bubka, as the coordinator of this fund, will continue to rally and coordinate the support of the entire Olympic Movement. (IOC/JOH)

The 4x100 m relay team from Trinidad and Tobago have finally received their gold medals from the Olympic Games Beijing 2008. The medals were awarded at the Olympic Museum in Lausanne. Aaron Armstrong, Keston Bledman, Marc Burns, Emmanuel Callender and Richard Thompson received them from IOC President Thomas Bach. The ceremony was held in line with the Olympic Medal Reallocation Principles established in 2018 and follows the IOC EB's decision to reallocate the gold medal after the disqualification of the Jamaican team.

Milano Cortina 2026 is set to become the most gender-balanced Olympic Winter Games in history. The sports and event programme will include a record 47 percent female participation. Eight new events have been added to the programme. The changes concern four sports: ski mountaineering (a new Olympic sport/men's sprint, women's sprint and mixed relay); bobsleigh (skeleton mixed team event); luge (women's doubles); skiing (freestyle men's dual moguls, freestyle women's dual moguls, and ski jumping women's large hill individual).

The status and challenges of Nordic Combined in terms of international representation, particularly outside Europe, were discussed by the IOC EB. Of great concern was that the 27 medals available at the last three editions of the Winter Olympics were won by athletes from only four NOCs. The decisive argument for keeping Nordic Combined on the 2026 programme was the situation of the male athletes, for whom the Olympics are only three-and-a-half years away and who have already been preparing for these Games for many years. This is not applicable for the women's category as they have had only one World Championship to date, with the participation of athletes from only 10 National Federations. The inclusion of Nordic Combined in the Olympic Winter Games 2030 depends on a significant positive development, particularly with regard to participation and audience.

Boxing qualifying events and competitions at Paris 2024 Olympics will not be run under the authority of the International Boxing Association (IBA). That was decided by the IOC EB on 24 June 2022. It follows the continuing and

very concerning issues of the IBA, such as its governance and its refereeing and judging system. Whether or not boxing will be included on the 2028 programme will be discussed at a later stage. With regard to the planned IBA qualification pathway to Paris 2024, the EB noted that no host-city agreements had been signed for the qualification competitions and that there was an insufficient number of certified referees and judges to deliver the planned events.

In establishing its Human Rights Strategic Framework, the IOC is making further progress. During the 139th Session on 20 May 2022, IOC Members were presented with a progress report as an introduction to the key principles of the IOC Human Rights Strategic Framework, which is scheduled to be finalised by September 2022. In line with Olympic Agenda 2020+5, the framework will cover and provide specific action plans for each of the IOC's three different spheres of responsibility: the IOC as an organisation, as owner of the Olympics and as leader of the Olympic Movement.

(IOC/JOH)

Munich Olympic Park: An Example of Sustainability

By VOLKER KLUGE



Photo: Peter Frenkel

The meadows are greener than ever, and the roof is still in place

Since 1972 Munich has had an Olympic Park (German: Olympiapark) no Olympic rings – until now. With the unveiling of the “spectacle” on the roof of the Small Olympic Hall by IOC President Thomas Bach, a “celebration of play, sport, and art” commenced 50 years later at the same location, an occasion for the Bavarian capital to celebrate the Olympic anniversary. The motto is “On the path to the future: 1972–2022–2072”.

As far as the sustainability of Olympic sports facilities is concerned, Munich truly has nothing to hide. With their harmonious unity of architecture and landscape, the facilities for the 1972 Olympic Games

were decades ahead of their time in terms of thinking green. While walking on the grass is prohibited in other locations, in this park, it is expressly encouraged. This is thanks to landscape architect Günther Grzimek, whose resilient meadows date back to when they were first seeded.

The impressive Olympic buildings are still in use after half a century, apart from the cycling stadium, which was demolished. The fact that the giant tent roof became a landmark of the city and a testimony to the cosmopolitan spirit of the Germany’s nascent democracy continues to make 89-year-old Professor Fritz Auer happy today. Of the five architects from Behnisch & Partners who won the Olympic building competition with their design in 1967, he is the only one still living.

The tent-like roof structure initially faced stiff resistance, especially because, two years in, it turned out that it would not cost the planned 12 million German marks but 100 million. Moreover, there were doubts about whether the structure would work on a technical level. Alternatives were examined, but the “battle for the roof” was won a year later. There were lengthy calculations, with 10,000 unknowns validated: this Olympic landscape could be built. Since then, around 80,000 square metres of plexiglass have been held together by thousands of metres of steel cables and tonnes of screws. Neither heat, snow, nor hurricane-force storms have been able to harm them so far.

The fact that the Munich City Council committed itself in 2017 to preserving this unique work of art was also thanks to a referendum that voted in favour of keeping the original stadium and against converting it into a mere football arena. For the first time in 20 years, the European Athletics Championships could be held in Munich in August 2022.

A disgruntled fencing junior in front of the TV screen

In 1972, Thomas Bach was unhappy. The then 18-year-old, who had become German junior champion in foil fencing and third in the Junior World Championships in Chicago in 1971, had hoped to be nominated for the Olympic team. “However, in its inestimable wisdom, the federation thought I was too young,” the IOC President stated at the reception of the German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB).

Instead, as a junior athlete, he was offered a place at the Olympic youth camp, but Bach refused that offer: “I was offended at the time: I didn’t need consolation prizes.” Angered, he went on holiday to Spain, which proved to be the next wrong decision. “I wasn’t happy there either. I didn’t spend a day at the beach. I just sat



in front of the TV at the pub. Then I flew back early to watch the Games on TV at home.”

No medal was won by a German fencer in Munich on that occasion. All the greater was Bach’s satisfaction when he won second place with the foil team the following year in Gothenburg. He won the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal with the same team. The World Championship title followed in 1977.

A 16-year-old high jumper – old enough for an Olympic victory

While Thomas Bach was supposedly too young for the Olympics at the time, the high school student Ulrike Meyfarth, at 16 years and 123 days, was old enough to win the gold medal in the high jump – and to break the world record, at the height of 1.92 m. To date, she

A relaxed round with IOC President Thomas Bach and Olympic Park Director Marion Schöne. The host was Miriam Welte, vice-president of the German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB) and 2012 Olympic cycling champion. Right: Olympic torch from Munich 1972.

Photo: Gabriele Kluge



Ein Zelt Dach für München und die Welt: Die Verwirklichung einer Idee für Olympia 1972 [A tensile roof for Munich and the world: the realisation of an idea for the 1972 Olympics]

Munich: Allitera, 2022, 196 pages, 30.00 EUR, ISBN 978-3-96233-322-5

Left: The 89-year-old Olympic architect and book author Fritz Auer at the 2022 celebration in Munich.

Photo: picture-alliance

The star of the parade was the 1972 Olympic mascot "Waldi", designed by a 12-year-old boy in a competition organised by the Passau Dachshund Museum. The 150 live dachshunds that ran in the procession contributed to the lively atmosphere.

Photo: picture-alliance



Munich was and remains vibrant and stands against anti-Semitism, as a banner (right) testifies. The 3,500 participants were enthusiastically celebrated on the 4.5 km route from the city centre to the Olympic Lake. Photos: Gabriele Kluge; Peter Frenkel

is the youngest Olympic athlete to win in an individual discipline. With her previous year's performance of 1.80 m, the German Athletics Association (DLV) had actually only nominated her so that she could gain experience. She made the best of it. However, today she sees the Olympic victory as a "flash in the pan".

She has far more appreciation for her second Olympic gold medal, which she won 12 years later – this time at 2.02 m. "It was a hard-won achievement," said Ulrike Nasse-Meyfarth. There had been difficult years before that, which required a new beginning after the failure of Montreal 1976 when she was eliminated in the qualification, and with the Olympic boycott of Moscow 1980. In 1982, she became European champion with a world record (2.02 m); in 1983, she was runner-up in the World Championships – and finally came the golden finish in Los Angeles.

In Munich 1972, the Germans competed in separate teams – now, 50 years later, their medal winners from East and West were united. The German Olympic Academy (DOA) invited them to a reunion that included a panel discussion moderated by Manfred Lämmer, an ISOH member and president of the European Olympic Academies. Ulrich Wehling, who won gold in the Nordic combined in Sapporo (and repeated the Olympic victory in 1976 and 1980) represented the winter athletes on the podium. Olympic champions Heide Ecker-Rosendahl (long jump and 4x100 m), Peter Frenkel (20 km walking) and Klaus Wolfermann (javelin) contributed memories from track and field. When discussing friendships, swimmer Klaus Steinbach (silver in the 4x200 m freestyle relay) reflected on the outstanding Mark Spitz, whom he met again after the Games and got to know better.

The younger generation had their say in a second panel round, and they did not spare their criticism of today's conditions. Nevertheless, there was a longing to finally host the Olympic Games once again. ■



The Olympiabergr (Olympic hill) was created from the rubble of the Second World War on the former Oberwiesenfeld military airfield. It offers a magnificent view over the artificial Olympic Lake and the Olympic landscape. Right: The 290 m high Olympic Tower.



A "family photo" of the 1972 German medal winners, taken by Olympic walking champion Peter Frenkel 50 years later. Right: "Olympic treadmill" for marathon running at home – a relic from the *Spielstraße* (play street) from 1972. Photos: Gabriele Kluge; Peter Frenkel

“Mark the Shark”: Munich’s “Glamour Boy”

By VOLKER KLUGE



Mark Spitz, born on 10 February 1950 in Modesto, California, seven-time Olympic champion in Munich in 1972, twice relay champion at the Olympics in Mexico City in 1968.

Photo: picture-alliance

The 1972 Olympic Games in Munich began with the appearance of a charismatic athlete not seen before. Between 28 August and 4 September, 22-year-old American swimmer Mark Spitz won seven gold medals. Four were in individual disciplines, three in the relays, and every time with a world record.

Yet until Munich, Spitz had not made much of an impact in Europe. In 1967, he competed against Great Britain at Crystal Palace and against West Germany in West Berlin. In 1971, he swam against East Germany in Leipzig and also in Minsk in a triangular match facing the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Before Munich, Spitz had set no fewer than 23 world records, and at the time of the Games, he held the record for 100 and 200 m freestyle and 100 and 200 m butterfly.

People also remembered that he had predicted five, possibly even six Olympic victories in 1968 before the Mexico City Games but had been forced to settle for two relay golds and one silver and bronze medal in individual events.

It remained unclear whether it was Spitz who had bragged about it or whether the media had simply quoted the words of coach George F. Haines. Spitz,

who had been a member of the Santa Clara Swim Club (SCSC) since 1964, which had produced a number of Olympic medallists, later denied ever having spoken about it in public.

So what? Wasn't he a five-time winner at the 1967 Pan-American Games in Winnipeg? Didn't he hold the world records for the butterfly events, which he won at the 1968 US Olympic Trials in Long Beach? He then also qualified for the 100 m freestyle with third place and the 4 x 200 m relay in the swim-off.

After everything had gone according to plan at the Olympic Trials, things went wrong at the altitude training camp in Colorado Springs. Spitz suffered from a severe cold, missing the first 13 training sessions. It didn't bother Haines. He was only worried that his 18-year-old protégé might be too young to deal with the pressure. The coach also did not realise that Spitz had no friends on the team. Older teammates formed a clique, and they gave him the cold shoulder.

This was reported two years later in *Sports Illustrated*.¹ The "unofficial anti-Spitz cabal"² was led by freestyler Kenneth Walsh and Douglas Russell, who had beaten Spitz in the 100 m butterfly trials. However, Haines did not see any problem. He regarded Spitz as the guilty party, with an immaturity the older swimmers took to be arrogance.

An ambitious father and Santa Clara anti-Semitism

Mark's carefree childhood came to an end at the age of eight-and-a-half when he took part in the YMCA swimming programme. When he was nine, his father, Arnold Spitz,³ enrolled him at the private Swim and Tennis Club in Arden Hills, where coach Sherman Chavoor soon became aware of the talent of the younger Spitz. His disciplined attitude also set him apart. But another problem emerged. On Tuesdays, Spitz was not permitted to train because, as a devout Jew, he was expected to attend Hebrew school. Chavoor spoke to Arnold Spitz and explained that missing training days would be detrimental to his son's progress.

Spitz senior promised to find a solution, and a few days later, he announced that his son would no longer attend Hebrew school on Tuesdays. When Chavoor asked him how he had achieved this, he replied: "I don't really know. The rabbi and I had a lot of Talmudic discussions and then the conclusion we came to somehow was that even God likes a winner."⁴

The driving force, however, was an earthly one: an ambitious father who saw a natural winner in his son. Arnold's principle was:

If the children are never really outstanding, you can get the same satisfaction – you can say that I guess, but



*you don't really believe it. Swimming isn't everything, winning is. Who plays to lose? I'm not out to lose. I never said to him, 'You're second, that's great.' I told him I didn't care about winning age-groups, I care for world records.*⁵

Mark Spitz in 1972 in Munich, with his parents Lenore and Arnold.

Photo: picture-alliance

After a while, Spitz senior came to view the age group programme as ineffective, and asked Chavoor to arrange for his son to train under Haines at the SCSC. As the family now lived in Walnut Creek near Oakland, this entailed a daily drive of 65 km to Santa Clara. Training began at 6:30 am, and, starting in February 1964, Mark was driven to the pool by his mother, Lenore. His father did not want to lose his lucrative job as operations manager at a steel production company in Oakland, so the family moved again; now the daily journey to training was 130 km.

The sacrifice paid off. In 1964, Mark competed for the first time in the US Championships, known as the "Nationals". In 1965, he finished seventh in the 1,500 m freestyle in Toledo. The same year, he won four gold medals at the Seventh Maccabiah in Tel Aviv.


Before the advent of the Nazis, there had been many Jewish swimmers in Europe. This was not the case in the United States, where clubs were mostly privately managed. Wallace Wolf, who had participated in the Olympic Games four times between 1948 and 1960 as a swimmer and water polo player, was the exception.

Young Mark Spitz was regarded as an intruder after winning his first 100 m butterfly event at the US Championships in 1966 and setting nine world records the year after. Arnold Spitz claimed:

The Santa Clara anti-Semitism was everywhere. It's built into people. It's a traditional hatred of minorities, a trait of ignorance. It bothered Mark and still does, he never got used to it. The shit [sic] that boy took would

Aged 17, Mark Spitz broke the world records for the 100 m and 110 y butterfly at the dual meeting against the United Kingdom at Crystal Palace in 1967. By 1972, he had set a total of 28 world records.

Photo: picture-alliance



have made anyone else quit the year before. Yet he continued to work his ass off for Haines and won more medals for the Santa Clara Club than anyone.⁶

Chavoor, who had overseen the US women's team as head coach in Mexico in 1968, had to admit that Spitz Sr. was by no means hypersensitive. "I don't know who said what, but Haines and I both heard a constant barrage of remarks such as: 'Five gold medals? You'll be lucky to win *one*, Jew-boy' and 'Hey, Jew-boy, you ain't gonna win nothin' [sic]."⁷

In fact, Spitz won four medals, a tally which would have satisfied many others but frustrated him. The fact that he had only finished eighth as a world record holder in the 200 m butterfly in the final depressed him. In addition, he had an argument with Russell, who had defeated him in the 100 m. It was rumoured that Spitz said he hoped Russell would fail the doping test.

After Russell heard about the alleged remark, he became angry and stormed into Spitz's room. He then threw the medal on his bed and said: "If you need this thing that bad, then here! You can have it!"⁸ Spitz later secretly returned the medal to Russell's room and placed it neatly on his bed.

All this seemed to be forgotten when Spitz moved to Indiana University in Indianapolis after high school in January 1969. He planned to become a dentist. There, he joined the Indiana Hoosiers swim team, who were trained by the experienced coach, James "Doc" Counsilman, said to be an expert in psychological matters. In June, however, at his father's request, he returned to Santa Clara to prepare for the Eighth Maccabiah Games with his sister Nancy, who was three years younger. This time he returned with six gold medals. Nancy won three, ranging from 200 to 800 m freestyle.

Returning from Israel, Spitz informed Haines that he did not want to compete in any further competitions that summer. This annoyed Haines, who felt the team would be affected by the absence of Spitz at the Nationals. SCSC won even so with Nancy as part of the team, but afterwards, the Spitz family received a handwritten letter in which Haines informed them that they were expelled from the club. Arnold solved the problem by buying a house in Sacramento, and his children returned to Chavoor in Arden Hills. The trip to his workplace thus increased to 257 kilometres.⁹

Brundage in the footsteps of Don Quixote

In 1968, Avery Brundage ran for re-election as IOC president for a fourth term in Mexico City. The only opposing candidate was Frenchman Jean de Beaumont. The American was re-elected “unanimously”¹⁰ by secret vote; the result was not announced. Brundage made it public that he would resign irrevocably in 1972 at the age of 85.

The IOC had to face a variety of challenges. The International Federations (IFs) demanded more participation and a greater share of television monies. Issues on the agenda included admission rules, political interference, and the possible de-politicisation of sport by abolishing national flags and anthems, as well as the introduction of sex and doping tests.

Brundage, who had grown up in times when the amateur status of an athlete was still considered sacred and strictly regulated, had set his sights on fighting the rapidly growing commercialisation of sport in general, particularly in the later years of his presidency. His main target or “object of hatred” was alpine skiing, which was dominated by ski manufacturers.

In 1972, matters came to a head when Brundage insisted on the expulsion of Austrian world champion Karl Schranz from the Winter Olympics in Sapporo. Brundage viewed Schranz as the worst of many culprits in the sport.¹¹

But the “example” set was by no means a deterrent, as Hugh Weir, the Australian chairperson of the Eligibility Commission, told the IOC’s Executive Board (EB) at the next meeting. There were no fewer than 25 names on a list of athletes suspected of having infringed Article 26, the clause of the Olympic Charter known as the “amateur paragraph”. It included the eccentric Swedish discus world-record holder Ricky Bruch, Danish sailing legend Paul Elvstrøm, German dressage rider and mail-order king Josef Neckermann, and even entire teams, from Brazilian footballers to Yugoslav basketball players.¹²

For Brundage, the actions of the ski companies in the winter were continued by two German sporting goods manufacturers from Herzogenaurach in the summer. Initially part of one family business, after the Second World War, the brothers Rudolf and Adolf (“Adi”) Dassler split to found separate companies – Puma and Adidas. Despite being based only a few hundred metres away from each other, the pair became bitter rivals. What the fathers started was carried on by their sons Armin and Horst.

Shortly before the Games in Mexico, the “Brush” spike shoe developed by Puma was declared illegal at the instigation of Adidas. To stop the “war of shoes”, the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF)




decided to allow only white shoes. After a short time, however, there was no longer any mention of this rule; national associations had already entered into contracts with the manufacturers.¹³

The Adidas trademark has always been three white stripes, which initially appeared only on shoes and later on athletes’ clothes. Willi Daume, president of the Munich Organising Committee and of the German NOC, came under pressure at home after he allegedly claimed in the Sapporo Session that an Adidas employee wanted to sell him a contract for the delivery of tracksuits for the West German team. Adidas was the world’s largest sporting goods manufacturer at that time, with a turnover of DM 140 million. It therefore felt internationally defamed and discriminated against, and Dassler mobilised his lobbyists, who even pressed the Bundestag into action as they argued it would have the effect of “preserving jobs”.¹⁴

Brundage also informed an unsettled Daume that the three stripes, which had not bothered anyone until then, also violated IOC rule 53.¹⁵ He explained that he would stop companies from trying to bribe athletes at any cost.¹⁶

IOC President Avery Brundage (right) with Vice-President Count de Beaumont (left). Brundage’s 20-year term ended in Munich, two weeks before his 85th birthday.

Photo: AP



Surreptitious advertising: Mark Spitz at the 200 m freestyle award ceremony with his blue sneakers, which he held up in front of the camera so that they were clearly visible. Left: Pictured standing between silver US medallist Steve Genter (left) and West Germany's Werner Lampe (right), wearing a wig.

Photo: Guido Segani, Giorgio Lotti (Mondadori Publishers)

This was easier said than done. Not only the Germans but 25 other Olympic teams had already placed their orders, including Third World countries, which received clothes with stripes in their national colours free of charge. Brundage was irritated but gave in and informed the NOCs that stripes in national colours were allowed – but that white stripes were prohibited as “identification features” of the manufacturer.¹⁷

A few days before the Games began, Brundage’s attacks against the “profiteers” took on absurd dimensions. Accompanied by Daume, he personally inspected the shopping street in the Olympic Village and discovered numerous violations by companies eager to advertise their products and bypass the “identification rule” with tricks. To neutralise surreptitious advertising beforehand, people were placed at the village entrance with solvents so that athletes could remove advertising imprints on sports bags themselves.

But there were also exceptions. For weeks, Adidas and Puma had argued about equipping the last torch runner with their shoes until the IOC decided they had “to be neutral, bearing no identifying marks”.¹⁸ Now, however, they were granted special status. They were allowed to set up a booth at the Village Service Counter, where shoes were distributed free of charge. This was also a place where other more private matters could be discussed. Rivals such as the Japanese Onitsuka Corporation had to find a location in the city to meet their clients.¹⁹

The blue sneakers coup

At the US Olympic Trials in Chicago in early August, Spitz won four individual races. His victories in the 100 m freestyle and the 100 and 200 m butterfly set world records. Together with the three relays, this meant seven potential gold medals. If Spitz were to win them, Chavoor was sure he would never attend dental school. His prediction: “you’ll make a million dollars.”²⁰

Spitz, who had since matured and become more athletic by training with weightlifting Olympic champion Tommy Kono,²¹ refrained from making predictions this time. However, he had no concerns that he might have taken on too much. In Chicago, he had swum eight races in four days, while in Munich, the competitions were spread over twice the time.

The pressure came as a result of unpredictable circumstances. Having just arrived in Munich, Steve Genter collapsed and was hospitalised with a lung problem. Spitz had only just beaten Genter, who stood 1.96 m tall, in the 200 m freestyle at the trials.

In the hospital, Genter learned that Spitz had confided to Chavoor: “Well, I guess that’s one way of getting rid of my competition.”²²

A reporter got wind of the comment and made it public. Although Spitz apologised when Genter was released from hospital five days later, the barb was deeply felt, especially since Spitz advised him not to participate in the competition.²³

For Spitz, however, who had use of the world's best indoor swimming pool in Munich, everything went like clockwork. In his first race, the 200 m butterfly, he proved that he had overcome his "Mexico phobia". West German Hans Fassnacht, who had practised in Long Beach with coach Don Gambriel (and set a world record in 1971), had no chance at all, ending up almost four seconds behind. Forty minutes later, Spitz won a second gold as the final swimmer in the 4 x 100 m freestyle relay.

The third followed 24 hours later with the 200 m freestyle. Even with shaved heads, Genter and West German Werner Lampe found no way of catching Spitz. He could even afford to wear a moustache, which he had grown in four months. Although he had planned to shave it off before Munich, realising that his facial hair had become a focus of attention, he regarded it as a good luck charm. He did not shave it off, a move that was well justified.

At the medal ceremony, Lampe, who had finished third, wore a blonde wig, while Spitz appeared barefoot to the delight of spectators. Carrying his blue Adidas Gazelle sneakers in his hand, he then placed them on the podium behind him during the ceremony. Genter had another idea: he wore a green Puma shoe on his

right foot and "rented" his left shoe to the company with the three stripes.

After this ritual, Spitz took his footwear in his hand and followed the secretary-general of the International Swimming Federation (FINA), Dr. Harold Henning, on the lap of honour. He cheerfully waved his shoes which were now clearly visible to every camera and threw them into the enthusiastic crowd at the end. They were now, in any case, slightly worn. Chavoor later commented on this show as follows:

*The price now had gone up to \$3,000 for a pair of shoes because the ABC television network was going to televise the Olympics in prime time, and for an athlete to make a certain brand of shoe plainly visible on camera was better than buying a \$55,000-a-minute commercial.*²⁴

This performance had supposedly been agreed upon with Horst Dassler, who had made contact with the glamour boy of these Games in the Olympic Village.²⁵ Spitz, who had worn another brand the day before, was to carry the shoes because the loose-fitting tracksuit trousers would have otherwise partially covered them.

Until this coup, swimmers were not suspected of engaging in "illegal" advertising. Market leaders

LETTER BY MR. MARK SPITZ TO THE IOC

The following events took place at the pool on 29th August, 1972, which resulted in the unfortunate publicity which could have caused embarrassment to the USOC and the IOC for which I am sorry.

1. After the finish of the men's 200 metre free style event, I took a considerable length of time before leaving the competition area.

2. Upon arriving in the assembly area for the awards presentation I was asked for many autographs while also pressured into dressing for the awards presentation.

3. Being rushed to the awards stand but not quite finished dressing, I was told to take along with me my personal effects.

4. Since being rushed to the awards stand, I was unable to put my shoes on, I carried them out to the ceremony.

5. Laying the shoes down, I stood to attention to receive my medal along with the other two athletes.

6. The official photographers took pictures of me and the other two medal winners and then asked us to turn around for courtesy to the other press photographers in the stands to take pictures.

7. In the great excitement over winning my third gold medal, I picked up my shoes to put them on and was photographed as I unconsciously waved greeting to the crowd with the hand in which I was holding my shoes, my other hand and arm being wrapped around my fellow athlete. At this time, Dr. Harold HENNING, Honorary Secretary of the FINA, paraded us around the pool and advised us to show our appreciation of the crowd's acknowledgement of our success.

8. Due to the fact that on the previous day we had not paraded around the pool, I thought that after the award ceremony I would pick up my shoes and disappear under the stands into the doping control area, in which case this incident would not have occurred.

9. Since this incident has taken place the committee for the presentation of awards has made sure that the athletes have enough time to properly prepare to receive their awards. I have since then taken measures to not let the incident than happened in the above occur again.

10. No improper act on my part was intentional, only extreme joy and excitement of winning a gold medal in the Olympic competition.

Source: IOC EB meeting, 1 September 1972, Annex 9, 25-26.



Following the scandal regarding the product placement, the International Swimming Federation (FINA) recommended that medal winners take "precautions". After winning his fourth gold medal for the 100 m butterfly, Spitz appeared barefoot for the award ceremony. Left: the Canadian Bruce Robertson, with Jerry Heidenreich on the right.

such as the Australian-based company Speedo were sponsors of entire national teams but did not award individual contracts. In any event, swimsuits were considered unsuitable for advertising since the athletes were mainly in the water. Bathing caps were allowed, but these were unusual at the time for men. Shoes did not count as essential swimming equipment.

Having expelled Schranz from Sapporo, Brundage could not afford to ignore the blatant violation of rules by his own compatriot. On the other hand, he did not want to create new victims. He went to the Olympic Village to talk to Spitz in front of the headquarters of the US Olympic Committee (USOC).

Spitz arrived smartly dressed in his US parade uniform. As his personal trainer, Chavoor was allowed

to be present at the meeting. Chavoor later set down what was said.

Brundage said: "This is pretty serious. That shoe company got a hundred thousand dollars' worth of free publicity."

I said, "Maybe I ought to talk to them and get my cut." I was trying to lighten the atmosphere by being facetious, but didn't get through to Brundage. He made Spitz explain several times about the red shoes and the old blue shoes.

Finally I commented, "Why pick on Spitz: Gunnar Larsson of Sweden waved his shoes when he won the 400 individual medley, and the track men have been waving shoes at the camera all week."

Brundage said, "Yes, but they're not Spitzes."²⁶

The USOC then drafted a statement which Spitz signed. In it, he apologised for the "unfortunate publicity". According to him, it had happened unintentionally because he had not had enough time to put on his shoes before the award ceremony. Upon being photographed, he waved them with "only extreme joy and excitement of winning a gold medal".²⁷

As the Eligibility Commission could not identify any clear evidence of a violation of Rules 26 and 53, the IOC Executive Committee accepted this statement. The only exception was the Russian Konstantin Andrianov, who wanted a disqualification. Spitz received neither a warning nor a fine, for which Vice-President de Beaumont had pleaded. Only the organising committee was admonished for not allowing the competitors sufficient time to prepare for the medal ceremonies.²⁸

The matter was put to rest. Shortly afterwards, the only talking point was why two of the three US athletes were late for the 100 m quarter-finals.

Why "six-and-0" is better than "six-and-one"

In order to distract Spitz before the competition, head coach Peter Daland and Sherm Chavoor invited him to dinner at Humplmayr, a well-known Munich restaurant. Most of the time, Spitz talked about himself and his mild cold. In the end, he admitted to Chavoor that he was a bit of a hypochondriac.

Daland was interested in how Spitz viewed the next few days and whether he would compete in all the events. Spitz was afraid to say the number seven. His goal was to do better than Don Schollander, who had won four gold medals in Tokyo in 1964. He had also heard about a certain Nedo Nadi of Italy, after whom a street in the Olympic Village had been named and where the quarters of the US team were located. Nadi had been a fencer who won five Olympic golds in 1920. This was an enticing record for Spitz to break.²⁹

He remained uncertain about the 100 m butterfly because in the previous year, East German Roland Matthes, until then only known as an outstanding backstroke swimmer, had given him a tough race in Leipzig. But on the decisive day, these concerns were rendered irrelevant. Matthes, who typically was the last to take his place on the starting block, missed the starting command. He entered the water late, lagging behind and giving away what should have been an easy medal, while Spitz won his fourth and fifth gold medals that evening in the 4 x 200 m freestyle relay.

Spitz then told Daland that he planned to withdraw from the 100 m freestyle, citing back pain as a reason. According to Chavoor, there were two versions of his explanation: "The first was that he had been jolted on a simulated racing-car device at the Village; the other version was that he had simply been horsing around with the other swimmers and strained himself."³⁰

Long discussions followed until it became clear that Spitz was worried about losing to Jerry Heidenreich, who had broken his American and NCAA mark in the 200-yard freestyle from lane eight at the NCAA Championships in 1971. As Spitz felt certain of winning a sixth gold medal in the final relay, which would break Nadi's record, he calculated as follows: "No, ... I make one bad turn in the 100 freestyle and


Jerry Heidenreich beats me. I'd rather be six-and '0', than six-and-one."³¹

Finally, Chavoor managed to convince him. Spitz, however, swam conservatively in the preliminaries and semi-finals. He settled for second place behind Australian Mike Wenden. It was only in the final that he mobilised all his forces and won half a body's length ahead of Heidenreich. His time of 51.22 seconds beat his own world record by 0.43 s.

What followed was something that could be described as film material. At the paddling pool, where the medal winners were once again prepared for having their photos taken, Spitz enjoyed the run of photographers sitting cross-legged.

Then the champion carefully lifted his towel, and, with a moan, collapsed to one side, but with such precision that he landed exactly on the towel. Bewilderment all around. The doctor and masseur rushed in, treating Spitz's thighs with quick hands. A cramp, it was later reported, had tormented the golden boy.³²

Then Spitz confidently strode barefoot up to the podium so that no one would have anything to talk about. There, spectators saw him from an entirely new side, as he put his arm around his arch-rival with the words: "Great race, Jerry. But for God's sake, don't go



Meeting once again in Munich in 1978: The city presented Spitz with a starting block with number 4 on it – the winning lane, which he had installed on his pool in California.

Photos: Süddeutsche Zeitung; picture-alliance



Mark Spitz and Horst Dassler. Munich was the point of entry into the swimwear business for the son of the founder of Adidas. In 1973, he founded the company Arena in France, for whom Mark Spitz was the most important advertising medium.

Photo: Ward P. Riggins III

out and get drunk tonight. We have the medley relay tomorrow.”³³

Others had long been speculating about what he would do after winning seven gold medals. Film star Kirk Douglas, who had met Spitz and his parents for dinner in Munich, was the first to suggest that his fame would set him up for a career as an actor.³⁴ Politicians also wanted to benefit from his achievements. Rainer Barzel, leader of West Germany’s opposition Christian Democratic Party, provided a helicopter to fly Spitz’s parents, who only found a place to stay in distant Garmisch-Partenkirchen, to Munich in time to see the race.³⁵

The sad day and a failed press conference

For 12 years, Spitz had done his best in swimming, and the press had not always been kind. One of the few journalists who had his trust was Jerry Kirshenbaum, senior editor of *Sports Illustrated*.

After “Mark the Shark”, as Spitz had been baptised by the media, had landed, he was invited to dinner by Kirshenbaum together with Olympic reporter Anita Verschoth and photographer Heinz Kluetmeier. On the evening after his final race, they went to Munich’s exclusive Käfer-Schänke gourmet restaurant. Spitz was welcomed with enthusiasm and asked for autographs.³⁶

By the time they brought Spitz back to the Olympic Village, it was about three o’clock in the morning of 5 September 1972. He took the lift up to his room alone. Two and a half hours later and only a few blocks away, eight Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli quarters.


A special press conference was scheduled for Spitz in the nearby press centre at nine o’clock. This was attended by over 1,000 journalists, to whom press chief Hans Klein first read a statement by Willi Daume on the dramatic events in the village, which was accepted silently. There was consternation when shortly before nine o’clock, Spitz walked in laughing with Chavoor and Daland. No one from the USOC had thought of informing the trio of what had happened. There had been no thought of cancelling the media conference.

It was Kirshenbaum who approached Chavoor and whispered to him what had happened.³⁷ The coach informed Spitz, who reacted in a frightened manner and asked what he should say. Kirshenbaum, who was also Jewish, became a PR consultant by default.

“Well, whatever you say, I don’t think you should say, ‘No comment,’” advised Kirshenbaum. “Say what you feel.” Spitz apparently misunderstood the advice, and to the first question concerning the attack, he responded, “I think it’s tragic. No comment.”³⁸

The press conference turned into a fiasco. A shaken Spitz was reluctant to go to the microphone because he feared being shot by an assassin. To relieve him, Daland responded to questions. This dragged on because the answers were also translated into different languages. The mood became aggressive. One person asked: “You are a Jew, Jews are being killed. What does that mean to you?” Spitz searched for words and then blurted out: “I didn’t come here as a Jew. I came to the Olympics as an American athlete, to represent my country, my teammates and myself.”³⁹ Many considered this a clumsy and ill-considered response, and Spitz found himself accused of a lack of empathy. The editorial of a Jewish weekly newspaper stated: “Would it not have lifted man’s spirits if Spitz had declared his solidarity with Israel as a proud Jew? Would it not have been a magnificent gesture if he had dedicated his seven gold medals to the families of the slain Israeli sportsmen?”⁴⁰

The boiling point had been reached. At this point, the press conference was brought to an end. Chavoor demanded police protection, and all Spitz said was, “Let’s get the hell out of here.”⁴¹ Before returning to the Olympic Village, however, he gave previously agreed interviews with Ben Wett from German television (ARD) and Jim McKay on ABC television. In both cases, the producers stipulated that no questions be asked about the hostages; both adhered to this.



Speechless: Mark Spitz at the press conference on 5 September 1972, a few hours after the Israeli athletes had been taken hostage. Beside him was head coach Peter Daland, who helped to answer the questions.

Photo: picture-alliance

Back in his quarters, Spitz was protected by six armed guards. He spent his time in front of the TV, where one of the guards translated the information from German to English. In the late afternoon, US officials appeared and advised him to leave the country as soon as possible.

What he later claimed is hardly credible: “And then the chancellor of Germany was in my room, saying everything is fine, we’re going to take care of you, and then I was ushered out.”⁴² In reality, Willy Brandt spent

the afternoon in Feldafing by Lake Starnberg, where Daume had made his villa available for the duration of the Games. Brandt arrived at the German Olympic Centre (DOZ) at 7 pm, where he temporarily moved into an office.⁴³

Since Spitz’s departure had, in any case, been planned for the following day, the offer to leave early was welcome – he had serious business to do. However, the route had to be changed. Originally, he was supposed to travel to Stuttgart to receive a Mercedes 450SL. But he had also paid \$50,000 to do a photo in swimming trunks and with the seven gold medals by the German weekly news magazine *Stern*, which was a top priority.⁴⁴


Because of the attack, *Stern* had moved the location for the photo shoot to London, so there was no choice but to make a stopover there. At around 6 pm, Spitz and Chavoor were smuggled out of the Olympic Village in two cars. Spitz lay on the back seat, covered with an army blanket he had pulled over his head. Later, he explained, “So I didn’t really feel that I was in the crosshairs.”⁴⁵ He was taken to Munich-Riem Airport,⁴⁶ where he flew off on a BEA Trident, listed under an assumed name on the passenger list. Nevertheless, he was recognised by a young woman who had spotted his name on his suitcase.⁴⁷ Passengers swarmed around him and asked for autographs.



Wall of Fame: With his four individual Olympic victories and three relay gold medals, Mark Spitz is immortalised on the honour boards in Munich’s Olympic Park. The 112 panels designed by Ott Aicher were originally made of plastic. However, they were replaced with stainless steel versions one year later. They were refurbished in 2022. Photo: Gabriele Kluge

"There's only one" was the headline for the famous Mark Spitz poster. The dimensions of his attractive body were included: "1.82 m tall, 75 kg weight, chest circumference (when breathing in) 112 cm, waist circumference 75 cm, shoe size 44".



Photo: Stern, no. 39, 17 September 1972, p. 122-123/Terry O'Neill



Das gibt's nur einmal

Mark Spitz, ertragsstärkster Schwimmer aller Zeiten geboren am 10. Februar 1945 in Moose, Kalifornien, studiert Zahnmedizin schwamm bisher über 30 Weltrekorde, gewann in München sieben Goldmedaillen, 1,82 m groß, 75 kg schwer, Brustschwimmer (Weltrekord) 112 cm, Taillenumfang 75 cm, Schuhgröße 44





By the time the plane landed at Heathrow, his arrival had become common knowledge. Several dozen reporters were waiting for him at the airport. Guarded by security officers, he and Chavoor moved into rooms at the Portland Hotel near Oxford Street and were eventually escorted to the BBC for a television interview at 11 pm. There they learned about the tragedy that was unfolding in Munich.

This time too, Spitz received a lot of criticism. A reviewer wrote: "And Mark Spitz, our hero, well, he was marvellous, being interviewed in London while Israeli athletes were dying, talking only about himself and his movie possibilities. Life and in color: death. A regularly scheduled program."⁴⁸


Business continuity: Mark Spitz with his seven gold medals after changing his clothing from Speedo to Arena.

Photos: picture-alliance/United Archives/Roba Archive; Arena

For the rest of the night, things were also restless. When someone knocked on the door loudly at 1:30 am and two dark-haired men stood in front of Chavoor, he feared the worst. However, they turned out to be Italian journalists who only wanted photos and an interview. Neither Spitz nor his coach was able to fall asleep afterwards.

The "war of shoes" followed by a "war of trousers"

The next day was reserved for business. As agreed with *Stern*, Spitz posed in his "Stars 'n' Stripes" swimming trunks with all his medals around his neck in front of the camera of photographer Terry O'Neill,⁴⁹ a man who had photographed the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Judy Garland, and members of the British royal family. The resulting image, depicting the good-looking young man, bronzed and grinning, was published on a double page with over 1.8 million copies in circulation.⁵⁰ According to



Publicity campaign in Australia: Mark Spitz and his wife Suzie riding through the city in an open car during the 1980 Mattara Festival in Sydney.

Photo: Welcome Arena



Mark Spitz would have received a million dollars from the director of Cappy Productions, Bud Greenspan, if he had been able to qualify for the 1992 US Olympic team at the age of 42. He started training again and competed in made-for TV match races against world champion Tom Jager and Olympic champion Matt Biondi. As Spitz was too slow, the film project failed. He also lost his uniqueness after this. Right: Michael Phelps won the Olympic gold medal eight times in 2008. In total, he won 23 gold medals at four Olympic Games. Photos: picture-alliance

Chavoro, Spitz did not receive \$50,000 but \$10,000 plus a royalty of 15 cents on every poster.⁵¹ Another source claimed \$7,500.⁵²

The publisher later sold the photo to an agency, which marketed it as an iconic poster. Allegedly, two million copies were sold, which was considered Spitz's biggest deal. However, the poster soon disappeared into the archives. It was replaced by another one, which shows Spitz in the same pose but wearing swimming trunks different to those of Speedo.

The "war of trousers"⁵³ had begun. Horst Dassler had entered the swimwear business, against the advice of his father, Adi. As the latter refused to have swimwear produced under the Adidas brand, his son founded a new company under the name Arena, based in Landersheim, Alsace.⁵⁴ Spitz became its first sales representative, which was already clear as soon as he stopped swimming after Munich. A few days later, an apparently plugged article appeared with the ambiguous headline: "In Which Arena is Mark Now Playing?"⁵⁵ In addition to Spitz, who spoke of "tempting offers", Chavoro also had his say. He now estimated the value of the seven gold medals at five million dollars. The company was officially founded in August 1973. Four years later, "Team Arena" was unveiled. It

included other former stars such as US swimmers Don Schollander, Shirley Babashoff, and Gary Hall, the British swimmer David Wilkie and divers such as Ulrika Knape from Sweden and Klaus Dibiasi from Italy. The competition intensified, and Arena managed to push Speedo off the top.⁵⁶

One of the first campaigns was to circulate the new Spitz photo among sports journalists, who willingly used it in their reports.⁵⁷ Georges Kiehl, a former French competitive swimmer turned promoter, still laughs about it today, "because this gave the impression that Spitz had won his medals in Munich with Arena."⁵⁸ Kiehl had the task of negotiating the company's first contract with Spitz.

But with a pair of shoes and banknotes, Mark Spitz was no longer available for contact. As a professional, he was now represented by the William Morris Agency, who commissioned Norman Brokaw, one of their most accomplished agents, to market their products.⁵⁹ Now the official goal was to "turn gold into money".

From the "50-Meter Jungle",⁶⁰ the "goldfish" moved to a "shark basin", where he fought successfully but soon felt it was impossible to swim in marked lanes. ■

- 1 William F. Reed, "Swimming Isn't Everything, Winning Is," *Sports Illustrated*, 9 March 1970.
- 2 Richard J. Foster, *Mark Spitz: The Extraordinary Life of an Olympic Champion* (Santa Monica: 2008), 62.
- 3 Arnold Spitz (1925–2004) was the great-grandson of Jewish immigrants from Hungary. In 1896, his grandfather Nathan Spitz (1874–1917) married Terézia Elefánt. Neé Nyirkarász who, she was born in a shtetl in 1875. Mark Spitz's grandfather Morris (1897–1932) was a chicken farmer from Turlock, California, who tried his luck in Hawaii, where his son Arnold entered the scrap trade. Spitz's father married Lenore Sylvia Smith (1929–2017) in 1947. Her great-grandfather Shmel Shimon Zlotkovich (1847–1943) was an immigrant from Lithuania. A blacksmith by profession, he adopted the name "Smith" in the USA. See: wc.rootsweb.ancestry.com, www.genealogy.com.
- 4 Sherman Chavoov with Bill Davidson, *The 50-Meter Jungle: How Olympic Gold Medal Swimmers Are Made* (New York: Coward, McCann, Geoghegan, 1973), 37.
- 5 *Sports Illustrated*, 9 March 1970.
- 6 Chavoov, 87.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 89–90.
- 8 Foster, 84–85.
- 9 Chavoov, 92–93.
- 10 Minutes, 68th IOC Session, Mexico City 1968, 7. According to the counting method then, it was the 67th Session.
- 11 Cf. Volker Kluge, "Schranz and Sapporo 1972 – the 'Hurt' Still Runs Deep," *Journal of Olympic History (JOH)*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2020), 14–25.
- 12 Minutes, IOC EB meeting, 27–30 May 1972, Lausanne, 100–113.
- 13 Jörg Krieger, *Power and Politics in World Athletics: A Critical History* (London: Routledge, 2021), 120.
- 14 Minutes, German Bundestag, 23 June 1972, question by Deputy Dr. Erich Riedl (CSU).
- 15 IOC, Olympic Charter 1971, Rule 53 (Privileges and Duties of the Organizing Committee), 40. "The display of any clothing or equipment such as shoes, skis, handbags, hats, etc. marked conspicuously for advertising purposes in any Olympic venue (training grounds, Olympic Village, or fields of competition), by participants, either competitors, coaches, trainers, or anyone else associated with an Olympic team in official capacity, will normally result in immediate disqualification or withdrawal of credentials."
- 16 Minutes, IOC EB meeting, 27–30 May 1972, Lausanne, 55–56.
- 17 IOC, circular letter, 2 June 1972, Olympic Studies Centre (OSC), Lausanne.
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Mark Spitz as a brand: While the film career he had hoped for brought him little success, he landed numerous advertising contracts after his Olympic triumph, including awards from Schick razors commercials. When it was revealed in 2019 that Spitz was suffering from atrial fibrillation, he was recruited at the age of 69 to promote a personal ECG monitor. Photo: Volker Kluge Archive

Walther Tröger and the 1972 Terrorist Attack: An Interview

By DAVID WALLECHINSKY



The Israeli team entered Munich in 1972. It was comprised of 15 active athletes. The flag bearer was sports marksman Henry Hershkovitz, who managed to escape when the team was attacked. He died on 12 March 2022 at the age of 95. Right: Walther Tröger, mayor of the Olympic Village and IOC Member from 1989 to 2009.

Photos: picture-alliance, Süddeutsche Zeitung

In 1972, when the Black September terrorist group attacked the Israeli team in Munich, Walther Tröger was the mayor of the Olympic Village and served as the liaison between the West German government and the terrorists. Tröger, who died on 30 December 2020, spoke with David Wallechinsky on 19 November 2019 about his experiences.

How did you gain the role of the mayor of the Olympic Village?

I was secretary-general of the German National Olympic Committee. Ernst Knoesel, who was a friend of mine, was the sports director of the city of Munich and was made sports director of the Munich organising committee. He asked me to be mayor of the Olympic Village, and I accepted.

At the Munich Games, as the mayor, what were your responsibilities before and during the Olympics? On a day-to-day basis, what did you do?

At first, I was very much involved in the buildings of the Olympic Village. I had some ideas of my own, which I shared with the foreign companies that built the Olympic Village. During the Games, I saluted the teams as they arrived and made sure they were taken care of. I gave complimentary tickets to the teams so they could see their compatriots competing – tickets were no longer available, but I convinced the organising committee to provide me with some. But that is only part of it.

The other part was, of course, the 5 of September. In general, I did whatever I could. I had outstanding support from the German army. Soldiers worked out

of uniform as stewards to the Olympic Village. They were very well accepted by the teams; despite being soldiers, they helped change the bedding and so on. We also had a cinema in the Olympic Village, which was a first, as was our multifaith church, which served everyone – Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Muslims.

How did you learn about the terrorist attack?

At that time, I lived in a small flat with my family: my wife and two children. At six o'clock in the morning, the phone rang, and my wife picked it up. Georg Wolf, deputy president of the Munich police, said, "Tröger, you must come down. Something's happened." He told me to meet him in the basement of a building, where he was standing with some policemen. And there was the corpse: it was Moshe Weinberg [the Israeli wrestling coach]. Wolf informed me about the pamphlet he had received from the terrorists saying they would let the hostages go free and leave as soon as members of the Baader-Meinhof Group were released along with many – I think 200 or so – Palestine people in Israel. After taking in the situation, our group started to deal with all the aspects of the situation right away.

Who was in the group?


Minister of Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher from the German government, Minister for Interior from Bavaria Bruno Merk, the Munich police president, Manfred Schreiber, and myself. We sat down together and tried to sort out everything. Then a phone call came; a policewoman on the line said that the terrorists wished to negotiate with the mayor of the Olympic Village. They knew who I was. So we decided that I would be the one to go meet them, which I repeated 12 times that day.

Did you go alone or was someone with you?

At first, I was alone. Later, I was accompanied by others, such as representatives of the local Arab community and even Genscher and the mayor of Munich, Hans-Jochen Vogel. I was the only negotiator who was there all 12 times.

Why did they choose you, and how did they know about you?

I never found out. I must say, I had a really bad feeling when I first met the head [Luttif Afif]. Of course, I had because he always had a loaded hand grenade in his hand! And there were armed people from the group on the balconies around us. He spoke fluent German. I asked him, "Why did you do that?" And he said, "We have an order. We are soldiers. We have to make our position known to the world, and this is the window to the world." None of us had access to the Israelis. We tried to find out – we even once brought them something to eat with



"Terror in the Olympic Village": Front page of the *Village News*, 6 September 1972.

Source: Sonderheft zum Jahrestreffen, Internationale Motivgruppen Olympiaden und Sport (IMOS)

policemen disguised as cooks, but they were not allowed inside. The only exception was when Genscher said, "I wish to talk to the hostages." The leader said, "I will go with you." Then we went up, the two of us. It was a terrible sight. There was a corpse lying there; it was [Youssef] Romano, I think. The others seemed utterly dejected. We managed to speak with the hostages; I helped Genscher because he didn't speak English. Our group had discussed the possibility of letting the hostages fly out with the terrorists. One of the hostages, [Andre] Spitzer, said, "We would rather be sent with them than stay here because we fear your police."

Were you receiving communication from government bodies, from the German and Israeli governments?

I was not always informed about everything because sometimes Genscher spoke with the government and took the call. I knew there was a direct line with Golda Meir. And Golda Meir offered to send over people. There was discussion about letting the terrorists leave, but the final decision by our government, and maybe by Golda Meir and the Israelis, was not to let them out. Our government decided it would be unacceptable for our guests to be taken out of the country without our permission.

So, your role was less decision-making than conveying the decisions?

Yes, as it developed. But then came the decision of faking the release: bringing them to the airport, one outside of Munich, and then trying to kill them there or on the way there.

On the 40th anniversary of the attack, Walther Tröger spoke at a commemoration event in Herzliya near Tel Aviv in June 2012.

Right: photos of the victims.

Photo: picture-alliance



That was a military airport, wasn't it?

It was a military airport, yes. Genscher and the other two wanted to go to the official airport at Munich-Riem. I told them, "That's crazy. You cannot do that at such an airport. Taking them there will cause too many problems – but there is that other airport further out." They said, "Okay, all right," and then they prepared everything. We decided to bring the two groups by bus to two helicopters. We did a practice run, going to where the helicopters would be. I was leading with a gun on my neck and Mr. Schreiber, the head of police, had two or three gunmen waiting there. When we arrived, he called out to them, "This is only a rehearsal, this is only a rehearsal." So they left, and the leader of the terrorists laughed at me and said, "Let's go back." That was a relief. Then we decided to take a bus. I went in with all the hostages, but it was so crowded that the [head of the terrorists, Luttf Afif] said, "No, no, not in such a crowded bus." Then we had to get a new one, a bigger one, but we needed a qualified driver. That took two or three hours altogether. The second time I did not go with them. Instead, I waited where the two helicopters were waiting for them. They arrived, and then they left – that was all I experienced directly.

How did you find out what happened next?

I was sitting in my office with the ambassador of Israel [Eliashiv Ben-Horin], waiting for an update. Then came an announcement from the head of information of the National Olympic Committee: "They have been freed – everything's okay." I looked at the ambassador

and said, "Do you believe that?" He said, "No." I said, "Me neither." Then we waited and waited until finally – close to midnight – we received the information that everybody had been killed.

What actions did you take personally to support those who were still in the village?

I went to bed very late and got up early the next morning when my friends from Israel came. The three leading people were and still are very close, good friends of mine: the president of the NOC [Joseph Inbar], the secretary-general of the NOC [Heim Glovinsky], and the head of mission [Shmuel Lalkin]. They said, "Listen, we must apologize, we must go back, we cannot stay here. Do you understand? We have to go back to Israel with our corpses, with our dead. But do whatever you can so that the Games go on." I understood – they knew what this meant. The more these things happen with the desired results, the more they will happen. Later, [President of the Organising Committee Willi] Daume and [IOC President Avery] Brundage arrived. They had not been there the day before due to meetings all day. The three of us met in my office. We, Brundage and I, had to convince Willi Daume, who was devastated. We decided two to one: the Games must go on!

Two to one. Who was the one?

Daume. Brundage and I pointed out what my colleagues from Israel had said. As president of the IOC, Brundage was entirely right. Then the executive board of the IOC agreed: "The Games must go on." ■

50 Years After the Munich Olympic Massacre: Remembrance Culture in Germany and Israel¹

By EITAN M. MASHIAH, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

"They shot the hell out of us..." – Willi Daume, president of the Munich Olympic Organising Committee (quoted in Eden and Wagner 2010, 76).

"I can assure you here that despite this heinous crime, the athletes of Israel will continue to compete in the Olympics in a spirit of brotherhood and fairness. Deeply shaken, the Israeli delegation leaves this place. We want to thank everyone for the solidarity shown to us..." – Shmuel Lalkin, Israel team chef de mission 1972 (quoted in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 September 1972).

The murderous and unprecedented attack on the Israeli delegation at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games brought an abrupt end to the atmosphere of "cheerfulness" that the organisers had tried so hard to cultivate to promote a unique beacon of peace and brotherhood in the history of the Olympic Games.

The words spoken afterwards reflect the general bewilderment of the Olympic hosts and the devastation on the side of the Israeli delegation in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy. The conciseness of the words by Willi Daume, the president of the organising committee (OC) of the Munich Games, quickly became one of the most distinguished narratological elements in connection with an event that went down in history as the "Munich Olympic Massacre."

In contrast to Willi Daume's brief statement was the timeless reaction by Shmuel Lalkin, the Israeli chef de mission. Not only did he express collective grief but, above all, the promise to the Israeli nation and the world that despite the most perfidious act of violence, the Israeli team would not be deterred from participating in future sporting competitions and, by extension, from upholding democratic values. The statement is still referred to in Israel today, 50 years later, not only in commemorating the past but



Memorial on the campus of the Wingate Institute to the 11 Israeli athletes murdered during the 1972 Olympic Games.

Photos: Eitan M. Mashiah Archives

also in facing challenges of the respective present in disapproval, boycotts, or plain and straightforward anti-Semitism such as anti-Israeli actions and verbal harassment. The 13 Israelis who have won Olympic medals are proud of their achievements and also aware of those in whose footsteps they walk. They are the footsteps of David Berger, Zeev Friedman, Yossef Gutfreund, Eliezer Halfin, Yossef Romano, Amitzur Shapira, Kehat Shorr, Mark Slavin, Andre Spitzer, Yakov Springer, and Moshe Weinberg. These are the names of members of the Israeli delegation who were murdered at the Munich Olympics in 1972. They were killed, but their legacy lives on in every Israeli athlete who competes in the international arena.

Televised live and reported almost instantaneously by international media, the "Munich Olympic Massacre" made a major impact at the time. However, it did not prove to be a historic "turning point" (Staas 2012) but was treated for decades as a mere footnote in (contemporary) transnational history. This perception



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Munich memorial site in Ben Shemen Forest, Israel, about four kilometres from the Lod airport.

Photos: Eitan Mashiah Archive



shifted after its historical recontextualisation in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The events of 9/11 are considered the beginning of a more developed type of terrorism that attracts widespread media coverage and, as such, is embedded at the nexus of sociocultural memory and politics (Nacos 2016).

This form of terrorism no longer primarily serves to localise the corresponding physical act of violence. Instead, it ensures its activities are presented in “a visual framework” (Klonk 2017, 65) as instantaneously as possible and transmitted through the respective global popular mass media. This type of action, further dynamised through the internet, spread by social media and other digital possibilities, is therefore likely to intensify in the future. In this context, such terrorist events can be seen as a “stage play” (Weimann & Winn 1994, 72), “orchestrated” (Klonk 2017, 49) to awaken a feeling of helplessness in the targeted global audiences. This psychological effect arises from the realisation that everyone in the world is in a similar situation at a given time. The helplessness of those affected underscores the confidence of those who carry out the terrorist act. This psychological effect emanating from the staging draws its manipulative power from the evocative media images.

Although this theoretical framework has only been established in recent decades, the mass effect is already a clear motivational factor for the people behind such attacks.

Terrorist incidents such as the blowing-up of airplanes at Zarqa airfield in Jordan on 13 September 1970 must be therefore understood as a prelude

to a more significant action to come. Palestinian representatives at the time were increasingly frustrated about the political and military setbacks they faced in Israel and its neighbouring countries.

Their overall approach was set out by one of their representatives: “If the world is not willing to consider the fate of the Palestinians, then the world will not be spared the same fate that the Palestinians suffered” (Frangi 1983, 119).



Monument on Yud Alef square in Tel Aviv by Eli Ilan, which has commemorated the 11 murdered Israeli athletes since 1974.

The first authentic global multimedia live broadcast of the 1972 Munich Games, with colour television in many Western countries, represented the start of a new television age (Gajek 2013, 421–423). An astonishing number of different sets of “iconic images” condensed immediately as well as over the past five decades in the context of this historical event. The “masked man on the balcony” is the most enduring image of the day. It represents a seemingly anonymous terrorist embodying “the vague sense of threat and anxiety that inevitably follows terrorist attacks” (Klonk 2017, 152–153). Other visual elements developed primarily through forms of reproduction in various international print media and reenactments in documentaries and feature films. In this way, each stage is re-imagined for a new generation and has a repetition effect for the previous generations to remember. Thus, an event that happened 50 years ago becomes tangible across generations.

These visual icons are not only of central importance for the respective audiences but also create, in this particular case, a sustainable cross-generational recognition value through their symbolic effect. At the same time, these transformations mark the transition of the event from communicative to cultural memory. This transformation is essential because the process of remembrance by society and the individual is a multidimensional dynamic process, not a static construct. In this context, memory processes need to be constantly renewed by the various agents of memory involved (governmental authorities, organisations for the bereaved and victims, the media, and scholars). Its

timelessness is negotiated in the respective “memory frame.” Accordingly, public memory, as in the case of the Munich Olympic Massacre, is characterised by arguments, conflicts of memory, and a “hectic and uncertain ability to act” (Halbwachs 1985, 181). The interplay between text and film on the diachronic timeline, between fact and fiction, influenced the transcultural narrative framework in each case.

Nevertheless, this conflict is the starting point for the fact that the historical event on the diachronic level of perception has been handed down through the last five decades and thus also actively staged for its recipients. This significantly distinguishes the Munich Olympic massacre as a historical event from other acts of violence and has helped ensure that it has lost none of its topicality to this day. In this context, however, there are also potential conflicts. The interest groups involved are therefore involved in an active transnational discourse on the politics of remembrance.

Immediate reactions and collective memory frames

The German organising committee was just as shocked as the international community when the tragic outcome became known. Serious consideration was given to stopping the Games, but the idea was rejected. The famous words of IOC President Avery Brundage, who insisted “The Games must go on!” have been burned into global sporting history (see Guttman 1984). At the same time, the Olympic flag flown at half-mast in



Graves of five of the terrorism victims at the Kiryat Shaul cemetery in Tel Aviv (from left to right): Andre Spitzer, Mark Slavin, Eliezer Halfin, Kehat Shorr, Amitzur Shapira. Photos: Eitzan Mashiah Archive

The crime scene:
Munich,
Connollystrasse 31.
In front of the building,
which the Max Planck
Society acquired for
use as a guest house in
1974, a stone plaque
from the Jewish
Community
commemorates the
murdered athletes.

Photo: Gabriele Kluge



the Olympic Stadium became a visual expression of the powerlessness of the wider community (This was also true in 1996 after the Centennial Olympic Park bombing, which killed two and left 111 injured).

“They shot the hell out of us,” said Willi Daume. [Original in German: “Sie haben uns die Seele aus dem Leib geschossen”, lit: “They shot our soul out” – eds.] These words became iconic, although this formulation is not unproblematic. In Eden and Wagner’s interpretation (2010, 76), the “soul” in this phrase stands for the “Olympic ideal” that was shattered by the incident. However, the interpretation of the meaning of “us” remains open. Considering public speeches and newspaper articles made at the


time, this pronoun likely refers to Willi Daume himself and, by extension, to the OC. It can also be extended from official bodies of the OC to official bodies in Bavaria, the West German Federal Republic, and the host nation as a whole. This reflexivity creates a new primary victim narrative. The status of a victim derives its legitimacy from the lasting damage the taking of hostages caused to the attempts to present Munich and Germany in a different light.

From the beginning, the families of the Israeli victims were not only of secondary importance in German memory politics (until at least the late 1990s) but were also repeatedly held jointly responsible for the tarnished image of the “cheerful Games” (Knau



Klagebalken (Wailing Beam) in Munich’s Olympic Park, created by sculptor Fritz Koenig (1924–2017) in 1994/95. The 10-metre-long granite monolith comes from the quarry of the Flossenbürg Nazi concentration camp. The names of the murdered Israelis are in Hebrew, that of the German policeman in German.

Einschnitt (Incision), a memorial site at Kolehmainenweg in the northern part of Olympic Park in Munich. Inaugurated in 2017, the installation built into the Lindenhügel (Linden hill) shows a 10-minute video of footage from 5 and 6 September 1972 in a continuous loop.



2017). The apparent disrespect and ignorance the families faced also came from the IOC and culminated in a public dispute that lasted decades. Since 1976, for 50 years, the families have pleaded for a minute of silence in remembrance of the victims, a request which was repeatedly denied for various reasons. It was first considered too political; later, there was a desire not to alienate Arab/Muslim states, which had largely sympathised with the terrorist operation.

Various documentaries have since been produced about the attack, including *Requiem for Sportsmen*² (1983) and the more recent *After Munich*³ (2019), which both portray several family members of the victims, particularly Ankie Spitzer and Ilana Romano, who emerged as the “faces” of the bereaved families. Their lasting painful, angry, and frustrated messages have been voiced at commemoration events over the years but quickly faded from public consciousness.

The details of their compensation claims, including their numerous failures and partial successes, form their own history. It starts with the initial financial support, amounting to approximately DM 500,000 per family (Schiller & Young 2010, 219; Streppelhoff 2012, 177; Kellerhoff 2022, 171).

A key grievance, however, was that the German authorities “expressly [had] not admitted any [contributory] guilt” in connection with the payments (Kellerhoff 2022, 171) – payments which consisted primarily of donations and insurance. The families,

however, asked for an acknowledgement of this guilt, including penalties to involved personnel, which never came.

Over the decades, details of the incomprehensible failures of the German crisis team have come to light, additionally aggravated by publicly discussed false accusations, for instance, that German bullets killed the hostages at Fürstenfeldbruck (Ponger 1992, 11). Such claims and media reports not only led to a wider public debate, but also to a protracted, expensive, large-scale lawsuit lasting seven years (1994–2001). At the end, the German courts, in different instances, rejected their claims, which, according to German federal law, exceeded the statute of limitations.

Even so, the German government decided to award a sum of DM 6 million,⁴ which eventually converted to 3 million euros as an explicitly “humanitarian gesture”. This should be understood in the context of the German court decisions, which maintained that while “there is no longer any legal entitlement to compensation payments for the relatives of the victims,”⁵ the German authorities nevertheless were interested in calming the public pressure.

That this did not satisfy the families of the bereaved became apparent in 2012. After pleas for a minute’s silence at the 2012 London Olympics were again rejected, the families represented by Ankie Spitzer and Ilana Romano once again accused the German authorities of ongoing deception over

Memorial at the main gate of the Fürstenfeldbruck airbase, site of the failed attempt to free the hostages. The monument, created in 2012 by sculptor Hannes L. Götz, consists of 12 wrought-iron flames that embody the 12 sons of Jacob and the tribes of Israel that arose from them, and commemorates the 12 victims of the Olympic attack.



what had happened at Fürstenfeldbruck (Kellerhoff 2022, 175–176). The international media took up the allegation that one of the victims had suffered genital mutilation.⁶ Although this accusation is not supported by historical evidence, it still resulted in international headlines with extensive print and broadcast media coverage.

Those dynamics eventually paved the ground for the most recent development: a legal claim for 110 million euros from the frozen European bank accounts of the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (Deininger & Ritzer 2021, 11). The families regard him as the ideological motivator and financial backer personally responsible for the Munich Massacre. Their claim is supported by the threat of yet another boycott, as the families do not wish to be simply “extras” at commemoration activities.

Such feelings are understandable given the events of the last 50 years. The financial damage claims currently being negotiated in international courts are in fact secondary for the families involved, whose main goal still is to receive more information about the historical circumstances and to hold the parties involved responsible. This assumption can be derived from their vows, repeatedly stated over decades, to access essential information and hold those responsible accountable.

What remains

“We, in particular, remember those who lost their lives during the Olympic Games. One group still holds a strong place in all of our memories and stands for all of those we have lost at the Games: the members of the Israeli delegation at the Olympic Games Munich 1972 [...]. We invite everyone around the world to respect a moment of silence, wherever you are – and for all of us here at the stadium, we invite you to stand for this moment of silence.” – Stadium announcement, Olympic Opening Ceremony Tokyo, Olympic Stadium

After 49 years, the one-minute silence for the murdered Israeli athletes, to be held as part of an official Olympic Games ceremony, was finally granted in Tokyo. In 2021, the IOC gave in to the demands of the bereaved families after a struggle that lasted five decades. Since the dispute in 2012, the IOC realised that in the allegedly non-political arena of international sport, a lasting culture of remembrance for athletes killed and injured in the context of the Olympic Games is not only possible but necessary. What is certain is that the 11 murdered Israelis will continue to be commemorated at the following Olympic Games. However, representatives must not forget the conditions that led to the historical event.

Acts such as the exclusion, isolation, and boycott of Israeli athletes, mostly by athletes from Arab and other Muslim countries, should be rejected, fought, and finally overcome. Maurice Halbwachs (1985) wrote that public memory entails complex memory conflicts, especially when there are such different transnational and transcultural dimensions as in the case of the Munich Olympic attack, where spheres of interest were affected.

The collective trauma resulting from the Munich Olympic Massacre provides an occasion to develop a sustainable culture of remembrance that, through various memory agents, can initiate transcultural learning processes to support mutual understanding and respect, regardless of religion, nationality, gender, or race. "Never again" applies not only to the Holocaust but also to the increasingly central claim of the bereaved families who have lost loved ones to terrorism.

Like 9/11, Munich 1972 was a significant milestone. In commemorating this milestone and on behalf of the many other equally innocent victims of terror and violence, the free democratic community should stand united and resolutely against attempts to protect the perpetrators and refuse them the ultimate victory. ■

1 Parts of this article were published in German under: Eitan M. Mashiah, „München gedenken: Erinnerungskulturen in Israel und Deutschland“, in: Robin Streppelhoff (Ed.), *München 1972: Olympische Spiele in Deutschland. Eine Bibliografie mit einführenden Beiträgen* (66-83). Bonn: Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft 2022.
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5 N/A (03.05.2001): "Olympia-Attentat: Grüne für humanitäre Geste", in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 May 2001, 49.
 6 Those allegations were made on the basis of historic crime scene pictures and misinterpreted autopsy reports. True is that Yossef Romano was fatally wounded through gunshots on his upper body as well as on his private parts. Still, nothing in the reports can lead to a purpose mutilation of the latter (comp. Kellerhoff, 2022, 190; comp. Bayerisches Staatsarchiv, Akte Polizeipräsidium 1406.)

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Weightlifter Zeev Friedman was the son of Polish Holocaust survivors who immigrated to Israel in 1960. He graduated from high school in Haifa, where a memorial was dedicated to him in 1975.

The Quest for a Logo: Ultimately (Almost) Everyone was Pleased

By VOLKER KLUGE

The graphic artist, designer, and lecturer Otl Aicher, who provided a vision for the 1972 Games as head of the visual design department in the organising committee. The sports pictograms, which were used by Montreal four years later, are in the background. The designers Gerhard Joksch and Alfred Kern played a major role in developing the designs.

Photo: picture-alliance



Nine weeks after the IOC's decision to award the 1972 Olympic Games to Munich, its organising committee (OCOG) was founded in the town hall of the Bavarian capital. According to its president, Willi Daume, the Games were to be "extraordinary ones".¹ Daume regarded the hosting of the Games, which were to convey a "new image of Germany", as his life's work to which he wanted to contribute fully.

But the passion that guided his vision also caused tension early on since the city of Munich, governed by the Social Democrat Hans-Jochen Vogel, and the state of Bavaria, ruled by the Christian Social Union (CSU), had their own ideas about how the event should be organised.

For Daume, the question of the event's image was the top priority. As a member of the educated class, he would have preferred to embed the sporting competitions in a "1972 art year" and reintroduce the Olympic art competitions that the IOC had removed

from the programme in 1950. Since this was not a realistic option, he devised the idea of staging auxiliary theatre and ballet performances, concerts, exhibitions, a symposium with notable writers, and even an "Olympic opera".

The concerned Munich press began to wonder whether there would be a 1972 Olympics or a "Daumiade". OCOG General Secretary Herbert Kunze reassured them by promising "German games with a Munich atmosphere",² which, in turn, sparked worry among left-wing intellectuals.

Daume's contact person for these types of questions was Munich's cultural consultant Herbert Hohenemser. The former head of the features section of a newspaper arranged a meeting between Daume and the designer Otl Aicher, known to be a "left-winger". In 1953 Aicher had founded the Ulm School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung/HfG), Swabia, together with his wife Inge Aicher-Scholl and the Swiss architect Max Bill.


Aicher shared with Daume, who loved details and had his letters typed in landscape format and italics, the secrets of visual design with its many possibilities. It was not mere ornamentation and external representation that the self-designated “communication designer” envisioned but a means of self-presentation that would visualise the spirit of the Games and align it harmoniously with the image of the host city. Daume understood this. Instead of the myriad cultural sensations he initially hoped for, he focused on realising the aura of the Olympics as a *Gesamtkunstwerk* (total work of art).

Already at the second meeting of the OCOG Board of Directors, Daume suggested collaborating with Otl Aicher, underscoring the importance of winning over “the best artistic professionals” for cooperation.³ Aicher was allowed to present his ideas, which were accepted by the entire board.

Aicher was first commissioned to put together a design committee under his leadership, propose an official logo, and develop an overall visual design scheme.⁴ In identical letters to Daume and Vogel, he stated that his goal was to “uphold our country’s international position in the area of design.” He confidently added: “I am not willing to satisfy the superficial interests of audiences in the short term.”⁵

In the spring of 1967, Aicher was hired as a design officer with the rank of a consultant. Some people voiced reservations about the eccentric Swabian, who had only studied for one semester at the Munich Art Academy to become a sculptor. Practice, however, spoke for him, especially the visual campaign he developed for the electric appliance company Max Braun (1955) and the airline Deutsche Lufthansa (1961). Aicher also brought in his own creative team and expressed no inflated expectations as to fees.⁶ Daume saw the fact that he was married to Inge Scholl, the eldest sister of the resistance fighters Hans and Sophie Scholl, who had been executed by the Nazis in 1943, as a protective shield against hostilities that might come from the socialist camp.⁷

Pressured by the board, Aicher first turned his attention to the logo. He consulted with the presidents of the art academies in Munich and Nuremberg, and they agreed to host a Europe-wide design competition. The intention was to have one to three participating designers per country, up to the age of 35 – especially from “Eastern Bloc” countries, in the name of political openness. Daume, seeking a good relationship with Moscow, liked the plan and immediately turned to the Soviet ambassador in Bonn.⁸ The jury was also international, including experts such as the British pioneer of corporate identity, Henri K. F. Henrion, the Frenchman Gerard Ivert, the Swede John Melin, and the Swiss Josef Müller-Brockmann, Karl Gerstner, and Max Huber.⁹



Ambiguous: the emblem presented by Otl Aicher in 1967 consisted of 18 white rays, combined with the Olympic rings and two vertical black lines on a light blue background. It symbolised a shining, youthful Munich. Below: an alternative displayed an abstracted “M” for Munich, in combination with the number 72. Source: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 185/3192



Otl Aicher, who opened his own design practice in 1948 without academic training in the field, founded the Ulm School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung) in 1953 with his wife Inge Aicher-Scholl and the Swiss architect Max Bill. It closed in 1968. Aicher moved his office to a factory hall, 18 km north of Munich, where he and his team developed the Olympic identity.

Photo: picture-alliance

Daume, however, began thinking in very large dimensions. The logo, in particular, should not be created by just any designer but a world-famous genius. Herbert Hohenemser, who chaired the Olympic Arts Committee, gave him promising news: "Picasso felt honoured and is thinking about accepting [the logo design task] as soon as he recovers from his recent operation. Miró is also expected to accept it."¹⁰ Chagall and Kokoschka were also under discussion.

The word was barely out when resistance was voiced at home – especially against Pablo Picasso, who joined the Communist Party during the Second World War and created the "peace dove" in 1949. Daume had hoped that precisely for this reason, he could go without a fee – estimated at 100,000 German marks (DM) – if he were invited to create another peace-related image for the Olympic Games.

The president of the German Athletics Association (DLV), Max Danz, raised fundamental concerns about involving foreigners: "In any case, this did not happen in Italy and Japan."¹¹ Without a definitive decision on the matter, Aicher was expected to submit his own design as well.

In search of a unique selling point

In the board's opinion, the 1972 Games were to be a bridge between East and West (and therefore "non-political"), a get-together for culture and sport, and contribute to welcoming the "Third World".¹² In Aicher's eyes, the new visual identity should contrast with that of the 1936 Games (which were still mainly positively connoted by the IOC and the German public):

There should be no national parades, no gigantism. Sports will no longer be seen as being close to military discipline or its training grounds. Pathos will be avoided, as well as solemn awe. Depth does not always express itself as seriousness. Lightness and non-conformity are also signs of respectable subjectivity. The Munich Olympic Games should have the character of informality, openness, lightness, and serenity. Obviously, this will lend them a distinctly festive character. Festivity, not in the sense of traditional sociability, but in the sense of playful innovation.¹³

What did this mean for a logo whose primary task was to signal "Munich 1972" and which had to hold its own alongside the ingenious symbol of the five interlaced rings, designed by IOC founder Pierre de Coubertin? What would be the unique selling point of the Munich Games that would distinguish them from all the others?

In a conversation with Lufthansa's advertising director, Aicher pointed out that Munich and West Germany generally had no focus on tourism, unlike France with Paris or England with London. Although the Rhineland had the image of German Romanticism, he felt it was much too anchored in the 19th century and therefore unsuitable for modern tourism.¹⁴

Studying the logos of the previous Games, which referred to the host country or city, did not help him



As the 50th anniversary of the Munich's Olympics coincided with Otl Aicher's 100th birthday, Deutsche Post dedicated a postage stamp to the head designer in iconic light blue. Aicher died on 1 September 1991 as a result of a traffic accident.

Source: Deutsche Post, Otl Aicher memorial stamp. Design: Frank Philippin, Brighten the Corners, Aschaffenburg

either. Only the red sun used for Tokyo 1964 was considered a sign of lasting quality. From a semantic point of view, other than the five rings, he saw only the Olympic flame and the olive branch as symbols with which the Olympic Idea could be advantageously represented.

Incidentally, Aicher was not a fan of ornate symbols. He preferred more abstract ones based on a circle or cross, or both. Describing the visual identity, he noted: "The rule of thumb: the simpler and geometric a logo, the more memorable and significant it is."¹⁵

Moreover, since Munich did not have a prominent building at that time – unlike Berlin, which referenced the Brandenburg Gate in 1936 – Aicher opted for a sun symbol, which he called a *Strahlenkranz* (wreath of rays) and which became known to the public as the *Lichtrad* (light wheel).

Inspiration for the design came from the famous writer Thomas Mann, who had lived in Munich from 1914 until his emigration in 1933. One year after publishing *Buddenbrooks*, for which he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1929, Mann had published an obscure novella in which he described Munich as a "northern Florence", beginning with the words: "Munich was shining" (*München leuchtete*).¹⁶

With a sun-like symbol consisting of 18 rays, or wedges, and preferably enclosed by two vertical black lines, Aicher sought to represent the aim of the Games: lightness, cheerfulness, and freshness. He chose light blue as the primary colour, which he regarded as the colour of peace and youth.¹⁷

But the "shining Munich" concept was not met with approval. Aicher had not reckoned with the "German tavern (*Wirtshaus*) mentality", as *Spiegel* magazine explained.¹⁸ Among the dissenters was the DLV president Danz, who recommended that Aicher instead use the ubiquitous *Münchner Kindl* (Munich child) featured on the city's coat of arms – a small monk in a black robe with red shoes. Support came from the treasurer of the organising committee and president of the Bavarian Landesbank, Rudolf Eberhard, who felt reminded of a "trouser button" by Aicher's design, while others rejected it as "provincial" and "amateurish."

Aicher had a hard time, not least because Vogel, the mayor himself, also rejected it, noting it lacked a connection to his city – whereupon Aicher advised him to leave the design on his desk for a while to become familiar with it:

Please consider this logo as an expression of our young, modern Munich as I have intended. If there is a godparent for this logo, then it is Thomas Mann, with his description of a shining Munich and the Institute for Social Research in Bad Godesberg, who was able to prove the unique recreational value of this city with its survey on moving to Munich.¹⁹

In fact, the city had experienced a boom since the late 1950s with 30,000 new immigrants per year, which caused considerable tumult in the housing market.

"Artistic subjectivity" vs. "universal objectivity"

Daume also had concerns about the logo, especially since he wanted something that could be copyrighted and marketed. This did not necessarily apply to the "wreath of rays", because stylised suns often appeared in advertising. "Rarely have I felt so insecure and divided", he wrote to Aicher. After testing the logo privately at home and abroad, Daume concluded that "the path taken until now cannot take us to our goal". In particular, he criticised the artistic quality, recommending that Aicher move away from smooth and linear solutions to concentrate instead on "Miró's poetic style".²⁰

Two views collided. While Daume envisioned a subjective "artistic" symbol with a unique style that could be copyrighted, Aicher proposed "an objective, neutral, and universal logo" whose quality would speak for itself and not derive only from the author's intention.²¹ His offer to submit his design to



"Has the Olympic symbol been found?" asked the Munich evening newspaper, displaying a photo of the industrial designer Gerhard Eisenmann, who won the first prize in the competition. The doubts were justified. "No design made the jury jump out of their seats," stated another headline.

Source: Abendzeitung, 6-7 April 1968

Collective solution: the 30-year-old designer Coord von Mannstein (right) and his colleagues at Graphicteam Köln developed a “spiral of rays” from the “wreath of rays” by Otl Aicher (left).

Photo: picture-alliance



internationally established experts such as Yūsaku Kamekura, the creator of the Tokyo logo and Masaru Katsumie, the art director of the 1964 Games, was in vain. The alternatives he subsequently submitted did not satisfy the board either.

That Aicher's design was a flop was supported by the results from two polling institutes (which Aicher himself had recommended). According to Daume, their random surveys proved that the “wreath of rays” was “not understood by wide sections of the public, which is important to us. “What he wanted was a logo that would “appeal to both New Yorkers and African bush n...”.²²

On the same day that the polling results arrived, Daume sent Aicher a letter declaring that the previous direction was wrong: “Abstraction yes, but it is neither your task nor mine to impose a conceptual model on the Olympic Games.”²³ Daume, who insisted on modern solutions, saw a different “spiritual attitude” in the “wreath of rays”. Nevertheless, he assured Aicher that his confidence in him had not been shaken in any way. “In fact, the opposite is the case!” His hope for the next meeting: “[...] then we smile. Agreed?”

“56,000 marks thrown out the window”

At its next meeting, the board visited an exhibition with 120 posters prepared by Aicher's creative team. Daume described it as impressive, while others criticised Aicher's monopoly on the process.²⁴ To solve the logo problem, Aicher and the visual design committee, which had now been set up, recommended a public competition limited to three months. The board agreed, giving German housewives a chance as well. The result was that 1,400 people, professionals and amateurs, submitted 2,332 designs. For the board, the response was proof of the growing interest in the Olympic Games.

The largest German tabloid, *Bild*, also took up the idea with its own call to readers to submit their designs. The array of proposals that flooded the editorial office was the embodiment of popular kitsch – from Olympic rings in the form of five Bavarian beer mugs to the rings suspended between the towers of the Munich Frauenkirche church and the *Münchner Kindl* raising the five Olympic rings. *Bild* selected the latter as the winner.

Even the official competition, in addition to many useless proposals, only brought in average results,

at least no design that won over the jury members, as Daume had to admit.²⁵ The first prize with an award of DM 20,000 went to the industrial designer Gerhard Eisenmann, whose sweeping stadium logo was described as “dynamic, a symbol of movement and lightness”.²⁶ Daume thought it could be developed further.

However, the visual design committee reached a different verdict. It did not consider any of the five nominated logos to be suitable. About the winning design, it stated:

The first prize seems too fashionable and is likely to be worn out quickly. It lacks sensitivity and quality of form, which is already expressed in the fact that the logo cannot be clearly positioned, neither alone nor in relation to the Olympic rings.²⁷

Since the board had reserved the right to independently select a logo that appealed to them, they were advised to return to Aicher’s “wreath of rays”. The reasoning was that its niveau was significantly higher than any of the designs from the competition. The renowned art and architecture critic Peter M. Bode provided journalistic support with his hymn of praise for Aicher’s work in a newspaper article titled “The Olympic emblem has found its master”.²⁸ The unsuccessful competition landed on the tables of Bavarian Biergartens, where people bemoaned Aicher’s “spiritual superstructure” and “interpretive pomposity”.²⁹

For Gerhard Eisenmann, the decision was a blow, the only consolation being that he was allowed to keep the prize money – as did the other nominees.³⁰ And the press taunted: “56,000 marks thrown out of the window”.³¹



From Olympic “wreath” to “spiral”


Daume, who wanted to use the final logo during the Olympic Games in Mexico City that autumn, commissioned a working group to submit new proposals in this confusing situation. Ultimately, 11 designs were submitted to the board on 15 June 1968. In addition to the five top-ranked proposals, Aicher’s original design was included at Vogel’s request. Munich’s mayor had undergone a change of heart and now sided with Aicher: “Every abstract logo must first be ‘established’ with the public. It does not get its meaningfulness by itself, but through convincing interpretation by the public.”³²

Arriving at a final decision was again difficult since, according to the articles of association, a two-thirds majority of the board was necessary. Once again, Aicher’s “wreath of rays”, supplemented by alternatives from his creative team, flared tempers, and the opinions remained mixed.

A group led by Berthold Beitz, the general representative of Krupp, who represented industry on the board, called for the inclusion of the letters “D” (for Deutschland) or “M” (for Munich) from the

The 1972 Munich summer was light blue. For Aicher, this was the colour of peace and youth, and – a coincidence? – also that of Bavaria.

Photo: Official Report, vol. 1




Finally, a winner: the “spiral à la Mannstein” consisted of three mathematically calculated basic figures – an inner and an outer circle, which were superimposed by an Archimedean spiral.

Source: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 185/3191

Arrival in the annals of art history: "Sigle Olympique" by Victor Vasarely, printmaking 1971.

Source: Edition Olympia 1972, Graphic Team Köln



alphabet by the Renaissance painter Albrecht Dürer, in combination with the number 72. Federal Minister of the Interior Ernst Benda opposed this, arguing that such a solution would not be understood abroad since "Germany" or "Allemagne" would be something too normal at the international level.³³

With the threat of a stalemate after hours of consultation and multiple voting rounds, the board decided to reduce the number of alternatives to three. Above all, the treasurer urged that a logo had to be chosen to solve the significant financing problems through marketing.

Among the works now selected was again Aicher's original design. However, it was eliminated in the first round. Designs IX ("wreath of rays with a superimposed spiral") and X ("Letter 'D' or 'M' from the Dürer Alphabet") made it to the final round.³⁴

In the end, with a vote of 8–3, a variation of the "wreath of rays" won. Designed by 30-year-old graphic designer Coordt von Mannstein, it was referred to by Daume as the "spiral à la Mannstein".³⁵ This logo

consisted of three basic geometric figures, an inner and an outer circle, superimposed by an Archimedean spiral rising evenly by 15 degrees each.³⁶ The mathematically calculated spiral form represented an "increased spring force", according to von Mannstein, which he saw as a symbol for the competition as an exciting event.³⁷ The logo became even more effective when it was rotated by 90 degrees on the advice of the Munich stage design professor Oswald Hederer.³⁸

As expected, there was no shortage of critical voices this time either. Some continued to complain about the lack of reference to Munich, others felt that the sign was too abstract, yet others felt reminiscent of a spiral staircase. Not to mention envy and resentment. It wasn't long before a dispute over copyright issues began. Among those who felt betrayed about their "intellectual property" was the Austrian Olympic speed skater of 1928, Dr. Otto Polacsek, who, however, would have been satisfied with a compensatory fee of DM 1,200, which he never received.³⁹

Four members of Graphicteam Köln, the Cologne-based design studio that Coordt von Mannstein was part of, also felt ignored. As with all the graphic elements created for the 1972 Games and usually associated only with Aicher's name, the "spiral of rays" was not the work of an individual but developed by a more or less large collective.⁴⁰

The *GlücksSpirale* spins on for the power of good

Despite the initial harsh criticism and suspicions of plagiarism, the Munich Olympic spiral, in combination with the Olympic rings, eventually became a huge success. The city coats of arms of Munich and Kiel, where the sailing competitions took place, were also included in the marketing campaigns. Atlas Werbung, an independent agency in Munich, was commissioned with the licensing, which concluded contracts for around 1,000 different items. The mascot "Waldi" was particularly popular, a dachshund,



The coat of arms of Munich and Kiel could be used as symbols with the official Olympic emblem and the Olympic rings. The *Münchner Kindl* (Munich child) depicts a young monk. The coat of arms of the sailing competitions venue shows the so-called Holstein nettle leaf as a symbol of fortitude and a medieval shield.

Source: OCOG Munich 1972, Richtlinien und Normen für die visuelle Gestaltung, BArch B 185-3197.

of which two million copies were sold in some 20 countries.⁴¹

Although the marketing agency worked independently, the organising committee did not give up overall responsibility. This was the case for both commercial exploitation and maintaining a uniform brand identity, which was monitored by Aicher like a watchdog. It had been agreed that all objects in which design played a role, from art to kitsch, could only go into production after his approval.

The use of the logo was also subject to a restrictions list ranging from political parties and religious communities to products. Among other things, alcohol except for bitters, potency enhancers, and stimulants, underwear, and other personal care products were forbidden to use the logo.

Aicher was not afraid to live up to his reputation as a “dictator”. When Kunze had a check carried out as to whether the logo could be used on door handles, Aicher answered yes, but with the note: “Modern architects of position would, however, refuse to mix the world of symbols and the functional world in such a way”. The secretary-general understood this to be “therefore, no”.⁴²

The legally protected “spiral of rays” started to winning over the hearts of German households as of 25 April 1970, when it first appeared on television in a weekly lottery show by ZDF (Second German Television channel) under the name *GlücksSpirale* (spiral of luck).⁴³ Promising cash prizes of up to one million marks and tangibles from cars to Olympic tickets for the winning 5 DM lottery tickets, the show became a major hit and flushed no less than DM 192 million into cash registers until 1972.

The logo’s success story did not end there. After the Olympic Games, the “spiral of luck” lottery was used to raise funds for the 1974 World Cup. After a year-long break, it was revived and spins and spins to this day. The large revenue it generates helps to fund German sports, social associations, and the protection of historic monuments. The logo has certainly proven its worth over the long term. ■



One turn to make a million out of five German marks. Josef Neckermann (left), Olympic champion in dressage from 1964 and 1968 and chairman of the German Sports Aid Foundation, made himself available as a “bearer of glad tidings”.

Photo: picture-alliance

1 *Olympisches Feuer (OF)*, vol. 15, no. 7, July 1966, 7.

2 *OF*, vol. 16, no. 4, April 1967, 1.

3 Olympic Organising Committee (OCOG), Munich 1972, minutes, 2nd EC meeting, 14 July 1966, 4.

4 *Ibid.*, minutes, 3rd EC meeting, 30 September 1966, 9.

5 Federal Archives (BArch), B 185-1388, Aicher to Daume and Vogel, 14 October 1966.

6 OCOG, minutes, 4th EC meeting, 2nd December 1966. Aicher’s service contract only began on 1 April 1967. He initially received an annual budget of DM 288,000, which allowed him to employ four graphic artists, two illustrators, and a secretary.

7 Willi Daume Archive (WDA), 549: Das visuelle Bild.

8 BArch, B 185/3193, Daume to Soviet Ambassador Semyon K. Zarapkin, 23 January 1967.

9 WDA, 74.1., memo, Büro Aicher, 9 December 1966.

10 OCOG, minutes, 7th EC meeting, 15 July 1967, 2.

11 *Ibid.*, 5.

12 BArch, B 185/3188, Büro Aicher, “Das Erscheinungsbild der Olympischen Spiele, München 1972”; OCOG, minutes, 8th EC meeting, 21 November 1967, 5.

13 *Ibid.*

14 *Ibid.*, Aicher to City Manager Hubert Apress, 20 January 1967.

15 *Ibid.*, Büro Aicher, “Das Erscheinungsbild der Olympischen Spiele, München 1972”; OCOG, minutes, 8th EC meeting, 21 November 1967, 17.

16 Thomas Mann, *Gladius Dei* (1902) in *Das Wunderkind. Novellen* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1914). The novella is about a monk who enters a Munich art shop and demands the removal of a Madonna painting for being sacrilegious.

17 Organising Committee of the Games of the XX Olympiad Munich 1972, *The Games, The Organisation (Official Report)*, vol. 1 (Munich: proSport, 1974), 269.

18 “Zank ums Zelt”, *Der Spiegel*, no. 8, 18 February 1968.

19 BArch, B 185/3188, Aicher to Vogel, 28 July 1967.

20 *Ibid.*, Daume to Aicher, 30 August 1967.

21 WDA, 74.1., Aicher to Daume, 1 September 1967.

22 BArch, B 185/3191, Daume to members of commission for visual design, 29 November 1967. The politically incorrect “N word” was dispensed with here.

23 BArch, B 185/3188, Daume to Aicher, 29 November 1967.

24 OCOG, minutes, 8th EC meeting, 22 November 1967, 12.

25 *Abendzeitung*, Munich, 6–7 April 1968.

26 Munich 1972, Olympic Press Department, 5 April 1968.

27 BArch, B 185/3191, Commission for visual design, 18 April 1969.

28 *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 24 April 1968. Bode (1937–2019) was the son of the painter and art teacher Arnold Bode (1900–1977), who founded the *documenta* in Kassel in 1955, which has since developed into the world’s leading exhibition of contemporary art.

29 WDA, 74.18, “Eine Art Hosenknopf und sein geistiger Überbau” (unknown source), 1968.

30 Volker Kluge, Interview with Gerhard Eisenmann, 13 May 2022. After working for many years as a designer for Württemberg Metallwarenfabrik (WMF), Eisenmann worked until 1968 for the well-known stamp company Hermann E. Sieger in Lorch (Württemberg).

31 *Abendzeitung*, Munich, 30 May 1968.

32 OCOG, minutes, 11th EC meeting, 15 June 1968, 11.

33 *Ibid.*, 13.

34 *Official Report Munich 1972*, vol. 1, 270.

35 WDA, 74.18, Daume to the Olympia logo working group, 9 May 1968.

36 BArch, B 185/3191, von Mannstein to Aicher, 30 May 1968.

37 *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 June 1968.

38 BArch, B 185/3191, Hederer to General Secretary Herbert Kunze, 1 July 1968.

39 BArch, B 185/3192, Otto Polacsek to OCOG, 21 May 1969.

40 BArch, B 185/3193, memo, logo copyright, Legal Adviser Dr. Walter Schätz, o.D. (end of 1969). Apart from Coordt von Mannstein, Hans Buschfeld, Siegfried Himmer, Winfried Holtz, and Heinz Lippert were members of Graphicteam Köln at the time.

41 *Official Report*, Munich 1972, vol. 1, 58–59.

42 BArch, B 185/3199, Aicher to Franz Pany, 5 January 1971.

43 German Patent and Trademark Office, no. 39838835. The trademark is owned by the German Olympic Sports Conference (DOSB) and expires on 31 July 2028. This can and will probably be extended by 10 years.

Three Seconds That Have Been Disputed for 50 Years

By DAVID WALLECHINSKY

A historic final: After seven consecutive Olympic victories and winning 54 games, the US team lost the gold medal in basketball for the first time.



The greatest controversies in basketball history took place in Munich in the early morning hours of Sunday, 10 September 1972. The United States entered the final match against the team from the USSR with a record of 62 wins and no losses in the Olympic basketball competition.

The game began at 11:45 pm. in order to accommodate US television. One of the American team's strengths was speed, but the United States coach, Hank Iba, chose not to exploit it, ordering his squad to play at a more cautious and deliberate pace instead. The USSR scored first, led 26–21 at the half, and was ahead by eight points with 6 minutes 7 seconds to play. But then the United States applied a full-court press, and the Soviet team began to crumble. Nonetheless, with six seconds to play, the Soviets had the ball and clung to a one-point lead. Then Soviet star Aleksandr "Sasha" Belov inadvertently threw the ball toward US guard Doug Collins. With three seconds left, Collins was fouled intentionally by Zurab "Sako" Sakandelidze. In fact, he was fouled so hard

that he momentarily lost consciousness. Dazed, he mechanically followed his free throw routine – "three dribbles, a little spin, and then shoot" – and coolly sank two free throws to give the United States its first lead of the game, 50–49. The Soviet team in-bounded the ball, but two seconds later, head referee Renato Righetto of Brazil noted a disturbance at the scorer's table and called an administrative time-out.

The Soviet coach, Vladimir Kondrashin, claimed he had called for a time-out after Collins's first shot. Indeed, the time-out horn had gone off just as Collins released his second free throw attempt. According to the rules of the day, a coach calling for a time-out in a free throw situation could ask that the time-out begin before or after the first shot. Kondrashin wanted his time-out after Collins's first shot. The German officials, in the excitement of the moment, apparently forgot about this option and, noting the Soviet players were going to the line for Collins's first shot, thought that Kondrashin had cancelled his request, and so they failed to inform the referees of a time-out. With one second on the clock, the USSR was awarded a time-out. When play resumed, they in-bounded the ball, and then the time ran out. The United States players began a joyous celebration.

But at this point, Great Britain's R. William Jones, the secretary-general of the International Amateur Basketball Federation (FIBA), intervened and ordered the clock set back to three seconds, which was how much time remained on the clock when Kondrashin originally tried to call time-out. Technically, Jones had no right to make any decisions, but he ruled FIBA with an iron hand, and hardly anyone dared to question his authority.

Kondrashin brought in Ivan Yedeshko, who threw a long pass to Sasha Belov. Belov caught the pass perfectly, pushed past two defenders, and scored the winning basket. The United States filed a protest, which was heard by a five-man jury of appeal. Jones appointed Ferenc Hepp of Hungary to chair the jury, and Hepp provided the deciding vote in favour of the USSR. He was joined by representatives of Poland and Cuba, while representatives of Italy and Puerto Rico voted to disallow Belov's basket.

The US team voted unanimously to refuse their silver medals. Coach Hank Iba felt doubly robbed: at

two am, while he was signing the official protest, his pocket was picked and he lost \$370.

The loss haunted many of the United States players for years to come, but others were able to put it in perspective. In 1992, team captain Kenny Davis told *Sports Illustrated*, "I went back to my room and cried alone that night. But every time I get to feeling sorry for myself, I think of the Israeli kids who were killed at those Games ... and compare that to not getting a gold medal. If that final game is the worst injustice that ever happens to the guys on that team, we'll all come out of this life pretty good." Nonetheless, Davis has included a clause in his will ensuring that his family never accept the silver medal.

As for Sasha Belov, he died of cardiac sarcoma on 3 October 1978. He was 26 years old.

In 2017, the film *Going Vertical (Dvizhenievverkh)*, told a highly fictionalised version of the match from the Russian point-of-view and won six Golden Eagle Awards in Russia. In 2019, David A.F. Sweet published the book *Three Seconds in Munich: The Controversial 1972 Olympic Basketball Final* from the US point-of-view. ■



Top: Jubilation for the "Reds". After FIBA Secretary-General Jones had the clock reset by three seconds, Ivan Yedeshko took advantage of the confusion. He passed the ball to Aleksandr Belov, who scored with a basket.



Bottom: A new "Sputnik shock" – the US team could not believe what had happened.

Photos: picture-alliance; Volker Kluge Archive

A Button That Fell Down

By VOLKER KLUGE

USSR vs USA 51–50: Anyone who thinks that after half a century, the debate about the 1972 Olympic men's basketball final is over is sorely mistaken. The views of the two sides are too far apart. So far, though, very little attention has been paid to the circumstances that caused the chaos.

It all started with the timekeeping, which was the responsibility of the Swiss watch company Longines.




51–50 to the USSR – sensation or scandal? There are still opposing opinions after 50 years.

From 1968 to 1975, its director of public relations and sport was one Sepp Blatter, later the general secretary and president of the International Association Football Federation (FIFA). Together with engineer Eric Burkhalter, the father of the future Swiss president, Blatter led the negotiations for 11 sports with Munich's organising committee.¹ The other 11 sports were handled by the German company Junghans.

Longines proposed to the organising committee that it could supply the same display and measuring system for the Olympic basketball tournament as it had provided for the European Championship in the autumn of 1971 in Essen. The latter had been a kind of dry run for the Olympics, and the International Amateur Basketball Federation (FIBA) had been pretty much satisfied with it. At a meeting, the only criticism was that the lights indicating time-out were very difficult to see.

According to the report by basketball consultant Peter Schliesser,² "Here it is requested that a bulb with a very strong, striking colour be used. If possible, it would be welcomed if an acoustic signal for the referee were to sound during the illumination. The wires to the time-out display should be attached to players bench using a hook."³

A month later, this request had not been implemented, and Schliesser was forced to warn Department X (Technology) responsible in the organising committee to make the system "fully functional" by 15 August.⁴



Emotions were charged in front of the impartial officials: Jury chair Dr. Ferenc Hepp in the red blazer flanked by the four German officials in green. US head coach Hank Iba is wearing the striped tie; at the far left is Bulgarian referee Artenik Arabadjan.

Photo: picture-alliance

The Olympic tournament took place without incident for the time being, and the final on 9 September 1972 between the two giants, the USA and the USSR, promised an exciting duel with a great deal of prestige at stake for both sides.

Surprisingly, 40 seconds before the end, the Soviets were leading 49–48. The drama increased when America's Douglas Collins was fouled on a fast break and was awarded two free throws, which he duly converted into 50–49. Soviet coach Vladimir Kondrashin pulled off a tactical masterstroke by requesting a time-out before the second free throw. Then came an accident that the German scorekeeper, the 24-year-old student Hans-Joachim Tenschert from Dortmund, described as follows: "At that time, the teams were still connected to the court with a wire and registered time-outs by pressing a button. The device seems to have slipped under the bench in the confusion, though, and the time-out request was registered too late."⁵

The referees – Artenik Arabadjan from Bulgaria and Renato Righetto from Brazil – had already released the ball for the second foul shot and did not allow the time-out. However, they interrupted the game because the Soviet bench protested the decision owing to the missing button.

At that moment, FIBA Secretary General R. William Jones, undeniably the great authority in the sport who had succeeded in bringing basketball to the Olympics in 1936, intervened. The 71-year-old Briton held up three fingers to signal to the referees and officials that there were three seconds of game time left.

While discussions were taking place on the court, the technicians tried to reset the clock, which proved to be

complicated. André Chopard, employed by Longines as the clock operator, had to bring in a mechanic, who opened the housing with a tool to correct the time.

Meanwhile, one of the referees handed the ball over to the Soviets, who were looking to finish quickly, but the timekeeper sounded the signal horn to make it clear that the game could not yet be continued.

The American players misunderstood the horn and, thinking that the game was over, started to celebrate. Confusion ran through the team, and the Soviets capitalised on this to make a perfect pass and a successful basket to make the score 51–50 after the third restart.

Chaos reigned. Energetic protests broke out, and the court was assaulted from both the front and back. The US players refused to participate in the upcoming medal ceremony, which was postponed, especially since the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) lodged a formal complaint after the game.

The FIBA's technical commission met during the night to hear out the referees and the four German table officials. The latter felt patronised by the intervention of Jones, sitting behind them. Tenschert was of the opinion that the secretary-general should not have intervened "since he had no function" in the match.⁶ At 4 o'clock in the morning, they wrote a statement they later issued to the US consulate in Dusseldorf as an affidavit.

The next morning, the jury d'appel dealt with the case in the second and last instance. The chairperson was the experienced Hungarian Dr. Ferenc Hepp, who in 1935 had graduated from Springfield College in Massachusetts – the birthplace of basketball. The other members were Adam Bagtajewski from Poland, Claudio Coccia from Italy, Andrés Keiser from Cuba, and Rafael Lopez from Puerto Rico.

After scrutinising television recordings of the last two minutes of the final game by ABC and the German broadcaster ARD, at 1 pm, they held a secret ballot and confirmed the final result, which was then announced to the media.⁷

That evening, Jones was given the opportunity to present his point of view to the IOC Executive Board (EB). As expected, he confirmed the jury d'appel's decision. President Brundage, who was present at the game, explained "that the crux of the protest was that the Americans claimed that the first bell for time was the proper bell and that they were the winners", to which Jones replied "that by putting the ball back into play from the sideline, the referee showed that the two seconds before had been nullified. Both the Russian and American coaches were aware of this and were in no doubt of the situation."⁸

USOC President Clifford Buck was heard afterwards and was deeply disappointed to learn that the IOC EB was unwilling to deal with the technical details of the



Award ceremony without a silver medal winner. Right: the bronze medal went to the Cuban team.

Photos: picture-alliance

case. They also showed no interest in the documents that Buck had brought with him. The EB was adhering to Rule 23 of the Olympic Charter, according to which the International Federations (IFs) alone are responsible for technical matters.⁹ The IOC only deals with compliance with ethical, i.e., non-technical, principles, such as the US team's refusal to appear at the medal ceremony.

Since Bucks understood that the players were still unwilling to accept their silver medals, Lord Killanin suggested that the USSR should be awarded gold, and Cuba and Italy, who had played for third place, ought to receive the silver and bronze medals, respectively, while the Dutchman Herman van Karnebeek preferred not to award a silver medal. In the end, this would have meant the US team having to qualify for the tournament in Montreal four years later, as only the three first-place teams from 1972 would be automatically eligible to participate. Finally, it was agreed that the award ceremony would be held following the handball final that evening, without the Americans.¹⁰

That was not the end of the story, though. It was on the agenda of the next two EB meetings, now under the presidency of Lord Killanin. The result remained the same.¹¹ The second time, it was merely noted that Jones had spoken on the phone with the new IOC technical director, Harry Banks. According to Banks, the FIBA secretary-general, who wanted to meet with representatives of Longines and Omega, "deprecated the official timekeepers at the match making controversial statements to the Press, television and diplomatic bodies, and would introduce a ruling on this matter. A new system of sound signals would be introduced, and he would discuss the question of the introduction of a new timing system which would

register tenths of a second. This, in his opinion, was all the more urgent, as FIBA had now experienced four such incidents similar to the one in Munich."¹²

Buck considered the defeat to be a conspiracy. As outgoing president, he recommended that the USOC not participate in any future Olympic basketball tournaments.¹³ Fortunately, however, the USOC did not heed his recommendation, and the United States was able to win gold again in 1976 – this time in the final against Yugoslavia.

The wish to amend the result from 1972 never came true. Even with the 50th anniversary around the corner, it is not to be expected. All that remains are 12 Olympic silver medals in a Swiss safe, still waiting to be picked up. However, this would mean accepting realities, and Olympic history. ■


- 1 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BArch), B 185/3168, review note, 14 April 1971. Former Olympic swimmer Hermann Lotter and Günter Fial negotiated on behalf of the organising committee (Department X Technology).
- 2 Peter Schliesser (*1939) was the director of Berlin's Olympic Stadium from 1978 to 2004 and an official at FIBA Europe for many years.
- 3 BArch, B 185/3168, test event, 11 July 1972.
- 4 Ibid., 7 August 1972.
- 5 Marc Grosnitz, "1972: UdSSR vs USA", in: *DBB Journal*, no. 26, April 2012, 29.
- 6 Ibid., 30.
- 7 FIBA, Jury d'Appel, communiqué, 10 September 1972, Press conference 1:50 pm.
- 8 Minutes, IOC EB meeting, 10 September 1972, 49–50.
- 9 IOC, Olympic Rules and Regulations, Provisional Edition 1971, "Supreme Authority, Rule 23: The International Olympic Committee is the final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement. It delegates, however, to the International Federations the technical control of the sports which they govern. In all other respects the powers of the International Olympic Committee are paramount." The 1972 version quoted directly from the rule.
- 10 Minutes, IOC EB meeting, Munich, 10 September 1972, 52–53.
- 11 Ibid, Lausanne, 2-5 February 1973, 35-36.
- 12 IOC EB meeting, 22-24 June 1973, Annex V, 57, Note of a meeting between Mr. Jones and Mr. Banks, 27 April 1973.
- 13 "Buck to Seek U.S. Pullout From Olympic Basketball", *New York Times*, 20 September 1972.

Show Me the Art: Photographers as News Gatherers

By ANTHONY EDGAR

Doug Mills's timeless image of Michael Johnson as he celebrates his win in the men's 200 m final in a world-record time of 19.32 seconds at the Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games.

Photo: AP/Doug Mills



The critical importance of sports photography within the sports ecoculture and the need to strongly defend a free and independent press at the Olympic Games and sports events.

In 2007, the Australian Football League (AFL), or Aussie Rules, granted one organisation, Slattery Media Group, exclusive rights to establish and run AFL Photos, the new official photo agency of the AFL, and then subsequently sought to limit the supply of photos of AFL matches to third parties by news agencies. News Ltd and Fairfax were still able to accredit photographers, in part because they were also commercial partners of the AFL, but the Australian Associated Press (AAP), Reuters, Associated Press (AP), Agence France Press (AFP), and Getty Images were denied accreditation to take photos of AFL matches for international distribution by not agreeing to what they believed were restrictive accreditation

and photographic terms and conditions. The agencies were informed they would have to pay AFL Photos a fee to reproduce images or pay for photos from domestic newspapers *Melbourne Age* or the *Sydney Morning Herald*, which had been granted accreditation.

It was reported at the time that what Australian sports organisations were seeking was stricter limits on the reporting of their sports by news organisations, particularly on “new” platforms such as the internet and mobile phones.

To address the ongoing dispute, which had also occurred in cricket, the Australian government

Anthony Edgar is well known to the media and sports industries, having been involved in the delivery of every Olympic Games since 1997. As head of Media Operations at the IOC (2002–2020) and chair of the IOC Press Committee (2015–2020), he was the direct link between the IOC and the senior management of the world's press and global television news organisations for almost two decades. He was the creator and curator of the Best of the Olympic Games photographic exhibitions for the Olympic Museum and ran the Olympic Golden Rings Awards for the best television coverage of the Olympic Games. He no longer represents or speaks for or on behalf of the IOC. Email: anthony@oneshot.sport

The visual legacy is one of the most powerful and lasting legacies of hosting the Olympic Games or any other major event for the host city, yet too many organising committees and event organisers get so caught up with pulling weeds they miss the sunset. The “post card” shot of Barcelona 1992 with the Gaudi’s Basílica de la Sagrada Família as the backdrop.

Photo: Simon Bruty/Sports Illustrated



to the news site. “In the last few months, more than half of the visitors to the *New York Times* have come from mobile,” he said.

By March 2015, it was reported that Facebook was delivering “half to two-thirds of their [news site] traffic right now.”

Sports photography was also under attack in Europe and Southeast Asia. In 2007, at the same time as the above-mentioned AFL/agency dispute in Australia, a similar battle was taking place on the rugby fields of France. In the week leading to the opening match of the 2007 Rugby World Cup, Reuters, AP, AFP, European Pressphoto Agency, and Getty Images suspended all coverage of the tournament. They believed the International Rugby Board (today World Rugby) introduced onerous restrictions and



News photographers lay their cameras on the ground and turn their backs on a New Zealand rugby team training session in Marseille, southern France, 6 September 2007. Photo: Reuters/Boris Horvat/Pool

controls on the use of photographs from the event. These included placing strict limits on when and even how many photographs could be distributed to clients by news organisations, and how many photos could be posted online.

AFP Chairman Pierre Louette said at the time: “Under no circumstances can we accept the violation of our rights and the rights of our clients, whether it concerns the freedom of the press or the right to freedom of information.” Reuters issued a statement explaining that the suspension of coverage was to “defend editorial integrity”. The standoff was ended just hours before the first match, returning to business as usual.

In 2014 there was a similar boycott of the Indian Premier League T20 cricket competition due to photo restrictions, with Reuters, AFP, and AP each deciding to send no reporters or photographers to the tournament “as a protest against the IPL’s limit on editorial freedom”. This dispute continued for some years.

There were even demands being made on photographers and media organisations to hand over the copyright of their photographs to the event owners.

On 6 April 2009, Mr. Gosper and I presented in person before the Senate Standing Committee in Melbourne, Australia. Our submission, which is a matter of public record, contained four key elements:

1. *Editorial Independence of the Press in Covering Sporting Events*
2. *Sports Events Are Matters of Public Interest*
3. *New(s) Frontiers – Digital Media and the Internet*
4. *The IOC Position on Photographers and Photography*



Bob Martin's extraordinary World Press Award-winning image of Xavier Torres at the Athens 2004 Paralympic Games.

Photo: Bob Martin/Sports Illustrated/Getty

In his opening statement, Mr. Gosper stated that he considered that the freedom and independence of the press was a fundamental principle with respect to the reporting of the Olympic Games, going on to say:

When organisations attempt to influence or constrain media reporting by introducing restrictive statements or conditions – such as not reporting anything that may bring the sport into disrepute, placing limits or restrictions on the use of still photography, or to place commercial interests ahead of the public’s right to know the full story leading up to, during, and beyond a sporting event – this runs contrary to public expectations in a democratic society.

The free and independent coverage of the Olympic Games and related activities by the media is enshrined within numerous IOC documents and agreements, we explained, drawing attention to a clause used in the IOC Media Technical Manual of the day (today called the Olympic Games Guide on Media), the IOPP and NOPP agreements with the news agencies, and the IOC Internet Guidelines: “Nothing contained within these guidelines is intended as limiting either the freedom of the media to provide an independent news and pictorial coverage of the Olympic Games and related events or the editorial independence of the material photographed and published by the media on their websites.”

Addressing the contentious topic of still photographers and photography, we simply stated the IOC position: “Still photographers are news gatherers,

and their photographs are to be considered and treated as news.”

This position was first presented to the IOC Press Commission by Gary Kemper, Photo Chief of Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000, and long-term photo representative of the Press Commission. It was a position fully endorsed and minuted by the commission.

We explained that the IOC placed no restrictions on how and when accredited photographers’ images are used, released, or published by the media, for editorial purposes. That accredited photographers and news agencies retain the copyright of the images they take at the Olympic Games, with the IOC having no usage or copyright claim to such images unless specifically arranged. There was no clause regarding “not bringing the Olympics into disrepute”. No arbitrary number was placed on how many photos could be published on news websites. We also explained to the inquiry that the IOC actively promoted the use of field of play and in-venue cabling to photo positions for the express purpose of assisting news agencies, newspapers, and accredited photographers in distributing the images they take of the Olympic Games to as wide an audience as possible as quickly as possible, in line with the Olympic Charter. Instead of trying to contain and restrict the distribution of photos, the IOC encouraged and actively supported it.

During questions in the hearing, Senator Birmingham said, as detailed in the Hansard, that there were two sides of the ledger in the inquiry for some form of

David Burnett's World Press Award-winning photo of Mary Decker (USA) after her fall in the 3000 m semi-finals at the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics Games.

Photo: David Burnett/Contact Press Images



increased legislation or regulation, one coming from the media like the AAP, asking for a legislated right to access, and the other coming from sporting bodies like the AFL, asking the government to define what news content is in an online environment.

Mr. Gosper replied that he did not think the Australian government should regulate in respect of press freedom and press independence, but that, if there was any dispute, there could be a body or an ombudsman arrangement to which the parties could resort.

I replied that I would like to answer the question with a question: "If, in the Beijing Olympic Games, the Chinese government had told the world, 'We will not accredit any photographers; we will supply all the photographers and we will supply you with photographs which you are

free to use,' would that have been acceptable?" To which Senator Birmingham answered that he was sure there would have been an outrage.

"Why should it be any other position for sporting organisations?" I asked.

Mr. Gosper reiterated to the inquiry that it was very important – for a sports-loving audience – to be well informed of all matters relating to the sport they love, on and off the field of play. The public relied on free and independent reporting by the media to bring colour and objectivity to sport, he said. Any lesser position for the reporting of sporting events should be considered unacceptable, he said.

In closing, we quoted Agence France-Presse's submission to the inquiry:

Sports are much more than just a commercial venture for organisers. In most countries, they are fundamental cultural phenomena, transcending politics and the economy and clearly outranking individual commercial interests. Sports events are by their very nature public, especially in a country such as Australia where they are intrinsic to the very fabric of society and to national identity.

Photographers are critically important to the sports ecoculture. Their visual reporting captures sport and an athlete's performance in a way no other medium can. It freezes a moment in time, in history, for history. It is a single image of Tommie Smith and John Carlos standing on the podium, heads lowered, gloved



Kevan Gosper, Olympian and long-time chairman of the IOC Press Commission, has been a strong global defender of a free and independent press at sports events. Mr. Gosper with IOC President Jacques Rogge. Photo: Getty Images

fists raised, that still today defines the Black Power movement. Bob Beamon's immortal jump in Mexico '68 and the Mike Powell image of the moment are inextricably linked. A solitary Cathy Freeman, sitting on the track, running shoes and socks off, completely alone, yet surrounded by 112,000 applauding spectators standing as witness, the eyes of the world upon her, that define an Olympic Games.

As the great AP sports editor Terry Taylor would always say to me: "Show me the art."

Sporting organisations should take all necessary steps to ensure their events welcome photographers with open arms and encourage great photography by providing the photo positions, considered Look and sense of place elements, and the technology infrastructure needed so photographers can do their job, without hindrance.

There have been attacks on the rights and access of photographers over the years, under one guise or another, as is covered above. I would not be surprised if some of the COVID-19 access 'restrictions' introduced at some sports events over the last two years will remain in place in future access rules and regulations. In such circumstances, it is important that photographers speak with one voice. As Thomas Jefferson famously said, "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance."

THE results of the Senate Enquiry was that a 'Code of Practice for Sports News Reporting' was established in Australia, which guaranteed publishers and agencies could produce journalism, including photography, for any print or digital platform.



Tommie Smith and John Carlos (USA) standing on the podium, heads lowered, gloved fists raised, with Peter Norman (AUS) during the now lauded 200m medal ceremony in Mexico City on 16 October 1968.

Photo: AP File

Signatories from the media included News Limited, Fairfax Media, Australian Associated Press, Getty Images and Agence France-Presse. Signatories from the sports bodies included Cricket Australia, the AFL, National Rugby League, Australian Rugby Union and Tennis Australia.

Kevan Gosper was appointed as the head of a new committee to oversee the code. Mark Hollands, chief executive of the Newspaper Publishers' Association at the time, was appointed the secretary. ■

- Senate Standing Committee 2008: https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/senate/environment_and_communications/completed_inquiries/2008-10/sportsnews/index
- NYT Innovation Report 2014: <https://www.niemanlab.org/2014/05/the-leaked-new-york-times-innovation-report-is-one-of-the-key-documents-of-this-media-age/>
- One Shot: Photographing the Olympic Games: <https://olympics.com/en/video/one-shot-photographing-the-olympic-games>

The next World Olympic Collectors Fair (WOOF) will be held in Paris on 23-25 June 2023. The organiser is the Association Internationale des Collectionneurs Olympiques (AICO). The WOOF is to be integrated into the programme of the Cultural Olympiad of Paris 2024 and will take place at the Sébastien Charléty stadium and at the Maison du Sport Français, headquarters of the French NOC.

What Agnes Saw, a short film created as part of the IOC's Stronger Together campaign, has been honoured at the Sports Emmys, taking home the award for Outstanding Public Service Announcement. Featuring the oldest-living Olympic champion, 101-year-old Ágnes Keleti, and Sky Brown, the

youngest Olympian representing Team GB in Tokyo, *What Agnes Saw* was showcased at the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games Tokyo 2020. The film was directed by Academy Award-winning Travon Free and Martin Desmond Roe and produced by Olympic Channel Services and Dirty Robber.

Ninety-two percent of permanent venues used for the Olympic Games in the 21st century, and 85 percent of all permanent venues since 1896 remain in use. This number was revealed by the report "Over 125 years of Olympic venues: post-Games use", released at the 139th IOC Session. The report is the first official inventory of the post-Games use of 817 permanent and 106

temporary Olympic venues across 51 Games editions, from Athens 1896 through to PyeongChang 2018. The Executive Summary highlights the key conclusions of the research, while connecting the past with the future. It shows that, of the 817 permanent venues, some 85 percent are still in use, a proportion that rises to 92 percent for the 206 permanent venues used in the 21st century. Out of the 32 permanent venues used at the Athens 2004 Games, for example, 75 percent remain in use. This percentage rises to 83 for Sapporo 1972 (out of 12 permanent venues used), 93 percent for Rio 2016 (28), 94 percent for Barcelona 1992 (35), and 100 percent for Vancouver 2010 (12) and Salt Lake City 2002 (12).

(IOC/JOH)

Objects Tell Stories: A Visit to the 3-2-1 Qatar Olympic and Sports Museum

By **MARCIA DE FRANCESCHI NETO-WACKER**

The 3-2-1 Qatar Olympic and Sports Museum in Doha.

Photos: OOSM



Recently the international press reported on the opening of the 3-2-1 Qatar Olympic and Sports Museum, inaugurated on 31 March 2022. Apart from the opening ceremony, the international news has focused on the museum architecture, which Barcelona architect Joan Sibina designed. Some media also mention the journalists' experience of visiting the museum.

The architecture introduces visitors to the world of sport. The building is a cylindrical glass structure with five rings inspired by the Olympic symbol. Because of its dark facade, the black ring has been replaced by a white one.

The museum occupies a 19,000 square-metre site next to Khalifa Stadium in Doha, Qatar, one of the eight stadiums for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The museum includes eight exhibition rooms, including one for temporary exhibitions. It also holds a congress hall, a thematic library, restaurant, café, and gift shop. The so-called Activation Zone is an experiential space for visitors of all ages.

The museum was 14 years in the making, including the development of its concept, historical research, and the acquisition of objects, documents, and literature. This meticulous care is one of the unique characteristics of the museum, which prides itself on

its philosophy of collecting, preserving, interpreting, and documenting sporting events.

The 3-2-1 Qatar Olympic and Sports Museum is one of the largest sport museums and the second-largest Olympic museum in the world, not only in terms of its physical size but also in the scope and quality of its collection of artefacts and documents. The collection currently holds approximately 17,000 items; 1,300 of which are on display. Another particularity of the collection is that many of its holdings were donations by athletes and sports enthusiasts.

As published in the press, visitors can see a shirt of football legend Pelé, a Ferrari that Michael Schumacher drove, and boxing gloves from Muhammad Ali. Further objects that may draw the attention of sports historians and fans include the ball from the FA Cup final match of 1888 or the first booklets by Sheffield FC, founded in 1857, which state the original rules.

Beyond the artefacts, multimedia presentations reflect how the curators have interpreted sport themes – one of the great challenges for curators of sport and Olympic museums. “The conflict of interpretations”, as philosopher Paul Ricœur puts it,¹ is always very complex, particularly in the area of sport. The curators of the 3-2-1 Qatar Olympic and Sports Museum have succeeded in finding an

interesting approach based on documentary research, particularly the oral histories used to reconstruct the history of sport in Qatar and the region.

The curators have opted for an approach in which controversial themes of various historical moments are presented and addressed in temporary exhibitions. In my opinion, this is a thoughtful approach that avoids sensationalism.

Museum tour

Visitors can immediately experience the museum's innovative concept right after entering. The photo installation *Hey'ya* by the photographer Brigitte Lacombe presents Arab women in sport and questions the Eurocentric vision of the world of sport. This sense of questioning can be felt throughout the entire museum, showing that the world of modern sport is not restricted to Europe alone.

The first exhibition space is called "World of Emotion" and greets visitors in the lobby. The next room, titled "A Global History of Sport," takes visitors on a trip through time, where over 100 objects and reproductions from the 8th century BCE to the early 1920s are displayed. When I visited the museum, I chose "swimming" on the multimedia touch screen in this space; one of the topics it leads to is pearl diving in Qatar, demonstrating the concern for context.

"The Olympics" space is dedicated to the ancient Games and the modern Olympics. The ancient Games are presented in a very didactic way, especially in the installation depicting the various disciplines that were practised. The archaeological site of Olympia is also addressed but may be difficult to understand for visitors unfamiliar with it.

A film in the Olympic Theatre presents milestones in the history of the Games in a dynamic and emotional way. It includes complex themes such as the 1936 Games in Berlin and the massacre at the 1972 Munich Games, among others. The film remains objective without passing judgment, leaving the final interpretation to the visitors.

After leaving the film-screening room, visitors are confronted with an exhibition of torches from all Winter and Summer Games since 1936, when the torch relay was first introduced. The torch gallery has a special scenography. All torches are originals, except for one, which is an authorised copy. There are also spots reserved for the torches from Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 2022. For me, the scenography of this space successfully conveys the mysticism of the original torch lighting ceremony in Olympia. After the torches, visitors enter an area presenting the modern Games. Mascots, medals, posters, photos, and multimedia, among others, tell its history.



Gallery of Olympic Torches.

My personal critique of this space is that the installation, "Shaping the IOC", only identifies four presidents: Pierre de Coubertin, J. Sigfrid Edström, Jacques Rogge, and Thomas Bach. In my opinion, every one of the presidents have shaped the IOC, and Dimitrios Vikelas, Avery Brundage, and Juan Antonio Samaranch should not be missing. Samaranch, for example, was a chief proponent of upholding the cultural memory of sport and encouraged the creation of sport museums around the world. Of course, the curators have all the freedom to make their conceptual choices, but in this case in particular, either the installation's title should be changed, or the other presidents included.

The next space is "The Hall of Athletes", where 90 athletes from different sports, disciplines, and countries are presented. The choice of athletes is very interesting, as it reflects the rich diversity of the world of sport. Kudos to the curators for taking care not to idolise anyone but to present them as human beings, as "main actors and actresses of the world of sport". I think this space is where visitors can identify most with the museum.

In the space dedicated to "Qatar – Hosting Nation", visitors can revisit mega sporting events held in Qatar over the years and learn about the history of Qatar's commitment to national and international sport. One of the things that makes this installation interesting is that the various events are presented inside structures reminiscent of traditional desert tents.

During my visit on 27 April 2022, the last room on "Qatar Sports" was still under construction. Panels in front of the space provided information on its planned content – whetting appetites for a future visit once this area is ready.

The last exhibition gallery in the museum is called the "Activation Zone". It greets visitors with personal testimonies from six physically active Qatari residents. The interactive installation aims to promote the culture of a healthy lifestyle.

Undoubtedly, the 3-2-1 Qatar Olympic and Sports Museum is a new cultural landmark in the sport and Olympic museum scene. ■


1 Paul Ricœur, *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays on Hermeneutics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

Additional information:
The director of 3-2-1
Qatar Olympic and Sports
Museum is Mr. Abdulla
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www.321qosm.org.qa

Olympic Television: The IOC Moves to Center Stage

 Part 6

By RICHARD W. POUND



The rights to Calgary cost ABC Sports a record \$309 million, but after that they passed the torch over to NBC. Olympic swimming champion Donna de Varona, who made her TV debut in 1965, did not make it to Seoul, and did not appear in front of the camera again until 1996 in Atlanta, with Carl Lewis (cover).

Photo: Peter J. Sutton, TV Guide/courtesy Everett Collection

While the Los Angeles Games in 1984 were a breakthrough from both technical and revenue perspectives, the IOC remained behind the curve with respect to taking full proactive charge of Olympic television from the very outset of each Olympic cycle, rather than constantly playing catch-up in relation to arrangements negotiated by the OCOGs with broadcasters.

IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch was determined to change that paradigm, beginning with the 1988 Games in Calgary and Seoul (and thereafter). The IOC would henceforth be involved, as an identified party, from the beginning and would direct the negotiations, initially jointly with the OCOGs. The transition was not easy since the OCOGs still clung

to the convenient notion that, despite the Olympic Charter and the host city contracts, the Olympic television rights belonged to them and that, on a zero-sum basis, from their perspective, anything received by the IOC was considered as their loss.

Complete IOC control, however, could be achieved only in stages: negotiations for 1988 were to be joint; for 1992 and 1994 and, indeed, until 2000 and 2002, they would be negotiated in consultation with the OCOGs, but the IOC had the right to take the final decision. After that, the IOC would be solely responsible for the negotiations and simply advise the OCOGs of the outcomes and (importantly) the amount they would receive from the television rights.

As early as Sarajevo in 1984, a proposal had been made to undertake a feasibility study as to whether the IOC itself should act as host broadcaster for future Olympic Games and ultimately contract one or more broadcasting organisations to produce the international signal.¹ It was, in the circumstances, too early for the IOC to consider assuming such a role, but the seed was planted, even though it had not yet germinated. Samaranch simply noted that the IOC did not wish to become involved in technical matters at that time. In the meantime, the IOC had much to learn and absorb regarding the realities of Olympic television as more and more of the world embraced the phenomenon, including a generally increasing appetite for sports coverage.

The IOC's education was not so much from a technical perspective (which was on its own developmental path) as it was from having to understand the contractual complexities involved and establish working relationships with the television broadcasting community, previously the purview of the OCOGs. The direct engagement of the IOC suited both the broadcasters and the IOC better than the previous arrangements: the broadcasters now had direct relationships with the organisation responsible for the Games as a whole, rather than with OCOGs concerned only with the set pieces of their own Games, uninterested in the continuum of Olympic broadcasting, and the IOC could better understand broadcaster concerns and issues, as well as ongoing developments within the communications medium.

Early issues regarding the Calgary Winter Games

An early issue regarding Calgary was a change in the timing of the negotiations. Samaranch was convinced that, unlike the traditional negotiation cycles, in which the rights for succeeding Games had not been negotiated until after the current Games were finished, the US television rights contract should be negotiated even before the Sarajevo Games took place. Two elements, in particular, led him to that conclusion: first, he did not think that the US team would perform particularly well at those Games and second, ABC had been promoting Sarajevo as, in effect, "Miracle on Ice II" – referring to the improbable gold medal won by the US men's ice hockey team at Lake Placid in 1980. That was not going to happen again. Disappointing results would likely dampen the enthusiasm of both US audiences and broadcasters and result in lower rights fees. Better, therefore, to negotiate before the Games, especially since ABC would likely not want to risk losing the next Games (to be held in North America) immediately before putting the Sarajevo Games on the air. Such a change was not without problems.

Behind all this were some interesting off-screen considerations in and around Samaranch's decision to appoint me as chairman of the IOC Television Negotiations Committee. Part was that, in 1983, I had become a member of the IOC Executive Board following the New Delhi IOC Session in 1983 and had some relevant accounting and legal skill sets (notwithstanding knowing nothing about television contracts); part was that the 1988 Winter Games were in North America; and part was Samaranch's increasing dislike of Monique Berlioux, the IOC General Director since 1971, whose authority he wanted to curtail. He also knew that Berlioux and I did not get along particularly well, so I would be a further thorn in her side.

Another subplot was that the negotiations were to be "joint," which meant the IOC and the Calgary OCOG (OCO'88) had to negotiate together, and neither party could dictate to the other. OCO'88 hired IMG/TWI (Mark McCormack and Barry Frank) as its television consultants, whose view was that negotiations should be held as late as possible, closer to 1988, on the somewhat close-fisted view that the longer one held onto the rights, the more valuable they would become. OCO'88 adopted that view and did not want to negotiate early. There was a stalemate. Finally, we asked OCO'88 how much TWI thought the rights would be worth if they waited. They said that the estimate was \$208 million. I said, fine, if they would guarantee the IOC its share of an amount of \$208 million, they could have

the negotiations whenever they wanted. OCO'88 said they were unable to assume such a financial risk. I said they could not have it both ways: either they trusted their advisors enough to wait, or they had to negotiate when the IOC wanted. With considerable ill-grace, OCO'88 agreed to negotiate early.

A further problem was the firmly-held (and perhaps not altogether unfounded) suspicion of the other networks that ABC always seemed to have the inside track in Olympic television negotiations. I assured them that, now that I was involved, the playing field would be completely level, which was one of the reasons I wanted to have a single contract so that the networks, which would all be given identical contracts, could be assured that there were no side deals. We developed a draft contract for consideration by the broadcasters, inviting their comments and suggestions, which we considered before circulating a final version. Before the networks could participate in the negotiations, they had to sign the contract and deliver it to me, together with a letter authorising me to fill in the negotiated amount if the network was the successful bidder. There could be no complaint that any network received any preferred or undisclosed treatment.

A further television issue was a request I made on behalf of OCO'88 at the suggestion of the television broadcasters to increase the duration of the Winter Games to the same 16 days of competitions as for the Summer Games, which included three weekends.² In addition, I asked that short track speed skating, freestyle skiing and curling be added either as regular



Before the divorce judge: Even after Coubertin's advice to think of the children, it was no longer possible to cement the marriage between IOC General Director Berlioux and IOC President Samaranch.

Source: DERO Caricature, 1985

TV blockbuster: In the "Battle of Carmens", Katarina Witt not only presented the freestyle in a better way, she also had the better nerves. Confident of victory, she watched the performance of Debi Thomas, who was the last to run and was not up to the pressure. In the end, the US athlete only won bronze.



events or as demonstration sports, mentioning, in particular, the television appeal of the first two.³ As to extending the duration of the Winter Games, Samaranch moved the proposal forward by stating that the US television rights for Calgary could be reduced if the Games did not take place over three weekends. The proposed rule change was approved for submission to the Session, where it was adopted.

Record contract with ABC

The negotiations were held as proposed in Lausanne. CBS dropped out relatively early, but ABC and NBC engaged in a spirited contest lasting throughout the evening into the early morning, the dramatics of which deserve a separate story, culminating in a record contract for US \$309 million, won by ABC. The complaints by OCO'88 regarding the timing of the negotiations ceased. When I woke up Samaranch, as he requested, to advise him of the outcome of the negotiations, his only comment before hanging up was that the amount was "too much."

The IOC continued to deal with traditional networks, and only after 1988 with cable television.⁴ The networks at the time were vehemently opposed to Olympic coverage being available on cable television and were filled with dire and diffuse predictions should cable television become involved, a position, not surprisingly, opposed by the cable television industry. The world did not come to an end with the entry of cable television, and, indeed, with the amount of coverage available for Olympic programming, it was

soon very much integrated into the Olympic television world.

When Calgary reported, it was agreed to extend the schedule to 16 days, to accept curling as a demonstration sport, to accept short track speed skating and freestyle skiing as demonstration events, and that FIS be asked to apply officially for the inclusion of men's and women's Super G.⁵

As chairman of the negotiating committee for television rights, I reported to the Session, giving details of the telex sent to members by Samaranch on 25 January 1984, advising them of the contract with ABC. The amount of the contract was an all-time record not only for the Olympic Games but also for any single event in televised sports and surpassed (for Winter Games) even the previous Summer Games



Calgary 1988: Summer or Winter Games? As a result of the "Chinook" wind, temperature differences of 38 degrees Celsius arose overnight, leading to irregular conditions in some competitions. The shift to the morning hours failed due to ABC's advertising customers. Photo: Idrottsboken Calgary 1988

world record for Los Angeles. Also, since the IOC was gradually getting more adept in its dealings with the OCOGs, the overall percentage of the television rights accruing to the IOC was 26.67% of the total rights fees (compared with 14.6% of the 1984 revenues) due to prior negotiations with Calgary as to the percentage of revenues to be allocated to the host broadcaster expenditures.⁶

The multiple challenges of Seoul

Seoul presented a series of quite different issues than those in a North American Games context. First, they were Summer Games, significantly bigger and more complex than Winter Games. Second, there were inherent political challenges, both domestically and globally (including successive Olympic boycotts in 1976, 1980, and 1984). Third, the time differences between Korea and North America and Europe were problematic with respect to athletes, competition schedules, and the impact on potential television revenues, particularly in several of the major television markets.

Early discussions centred on the timing of US negotiations. The IOC wanted the contract to be signed by the end of 1984. For that purpose, broadcasters needed to have a final sports schedule before that date. Such a schedule was required for broadcasters' operational purposes as well as estimating the potential advertising revenues, which would vary depending on the availability of prime time, daytime and weekends. This gave many of the major IFs, including the IAAF (athletics), FIG (gymnastics) and FINA (swimming), some leverage, which they were not slow to recognise and utilise. Some issues were positioned as traditional, such as the timing for evening finals in the host city (which would be inconvenient to North American and European audiences). SLOOC (the OCOG) had reached agreements with most IFs. FIG wanted to have afternoon or evening finals, while SLOOC wanted morning finals. FINA agreed to have diving finals in the morning but still wished to have the heats and finals of swimming events on the same day. These were discussions in which the IOC had very little direct influence other than to urge that a satisfactory outcome be achieved.

Negotiations for Seoul were discussed. The dates of the Games were fixed for 17 September–2 October 1988. The second round of negotiations would be in Lausanne, but prior to any such negotiations, the schedule of events and the timetable had to be approved by the IFs.⁷ There were some observations, including that some of the IFs were very strong and did not need the television rights money from the Olympic Games. There was a definite need for good



The International Broadcasting Centre in Seoul, from which 127 companies Broadcasting Centre in Seoul, temporary home to 127 companies from 64 countries. NBC paid \$302 million in TV rights of the \$407 million in total.

Photo: Official Report Seoul 1988

relations and acknowledgment of the additional support obtained from the IFs and NOCs in response to the non-participation of certain boycotting NOCs at Los Angeles.

The three major US networks were not prepared to engage in final negotiations until they knew the exact events timetable for the main sports, again owing to the problem of the time difference between Korea and the US. Finals would have to be held in the morning in Seoul in order to be broadcast at peak viewing time in the US. If this was achieved, preliminary estimates were that the contract could amount to \$400/500 million, otherwise, the figure was likely to be in the region of \$200 million. The most important IFs, like athletics, were emphasising the tradition of holding finals in the afternoon and evening, plus citing conditions affecting the athletes and other factors, so Samaranch emphasised that it was essential to reach a mutual agreement and maintain good relations, especially with the IAAF President.⁸

Primo Nebiolo's ambitions

This marked the beginning of an elaborate dance, principally centred around the IAAF, by now coming off a reasonably successful 1983 World Championships in Helsinki. Its president, Primo Nebiolo, had overwhelming personal ambitions to become a member of the IOC, and Samaranch engaged in an effort over several years to try to find a way to get him appointed, which was resisted by most of the IOC members. There were already two Italian members



Map of the INTELSAT communication network used by the IBC.

Photo: Official Report Seoul 1988

(neither of whom was willing to resign in favour of Nebiolo), so Samaranch was trying to get approval to have a form of *es-qualités* membership established.⁹ Nebiolo used many means to demonstrate his importance, one of which was to be resolutely coy about approving the schedule of events in Seoul. He eventually extracted something in the order of \$20 million from the Koreans for a foundation to support athletics as the price for signing off on the schedule so that television negotiations could begin.

The first Executive Board meeting following Los Angeles was held in Mexico. Seoul reported progress with FIG, FINA, and IAAF and hoped for a compromise solution with the support of the IOC.¹⁰ In my portion of the meeting, I reaffirmed that, prior to proceeding with further negotiations, the detailed schedule for events would have to be finalised by SLOOC and the IFs and approved by the IOC. We could not afford to be out there negotiating for hundreds of millions of dollars if the event schedule could be changed at will by the IFs, giving the networks the chance to reduce their commitments. Once the final schedule was confirmed (which was not expected before January or February

1985), the networks would require another month of study and preparation prior to recommencing negotiations. The joint negotiating committee (IOC and SLOOC) agreed that until the schedule was finalised, no further action would be taken, and no speculation on any aspect of the negotiations would be made in the press.

Each of the US networks had been attempting to communicate (through the press) that the market value of the rights was significantly less than the amount expected by either the IOC or SLOOC. In addition, comments in the media by members of the IOC regarding the many uncertainties surrounding the Seoul Games were detrimental to the progress of the joint negotiating committee. While the success of ABC with the Los Angeles Games was encouraging, Samaranch cautioned that the IOC should not be overly optimistic as there were still problems of politics, time, and technology. The US networks would not be allowed to dictate the schedule of the Seoul Games. However, the fact remained that the more prime time events there were, the greater the amount a US network could pay for the exclusive television rights.¹¹

One of the ongoing issues Samaranch had regarding television was that there were to be no "agents". He had seen examples of the agents taking 15% or more of what were negotiated as rights fees and did not want that to happen to the IOC. He never liked IMG/TWI and, in particular, its main sports television guru, Barry Frank, and there was bad chemistry between them. It was TWI that urged a delay in the Calgary negotiations, which would have been disastrous for the IOC, and Frank was the principal representative of SLOOC. Samaranch never acknowledged that access to the knowledge of and experience with the US networks was a valuable asset and would not even consider a fixed-fee arrangement, as opposed to a commission. I had to deal with the problem as early as late 1983, and when reporting at the Mexico Executive Board meeting, I made it clear that while Frank had not participated in the actual negotiations (in fact, he had), his knowledge in this area was of great assistance.¹² The way through the jungle was to have the OCOGs retain him and then pick his brain without the IOC having to pay for the advice and to retain a level of deniability regarding anything he said or did.

The final element was to note that there could be divergent interests between the IOC and OCOGs when negotiating television rights. As the value of the rights was rising so dramatically, there was a philosophical difference between the goals of the OCOGs, whose only objective was to receive the highest amount for their particular Games, and those of the IOC, which had to continue to look to the future and ongoing relations with all the networks.

More negotiations with the IFs in Lausanne

The second round of negotiations for the Seoul rights was expected to take place in Lausanne, as provided in the agreement signed with SLOOC. We were not optimistic that the major IFs would be prepared to organise finals during the mornings. Once finally agreed to, the schedule would be the one with which we would be required to negotiate. As to the place for the negotiations, SLOOC did not believe it would necessarily be in Lausanne (and preferred it not to be), and it was clear that the networks did not want to negotiate them in Lausanne, but Samaranch was emphatic on that point.¹³ From time to time, we would have questions about whether the idea of the Olympic Games was only to make money – an interesting change of perspective for an organisation that, only a decade ago, had been on the brink of financial oblivion. Both Samaranch and I responded to say that this was not the point. OCOGs were active only for the preparations for their own Games, and the revenues from the television rights helped to defray the tremendous cost of organising the Games and, while the IOC also needed money, there were other considerations.¹⁴

The Korean television rights were also discussed. The same IFs (FIG, FINA, and IAAF) were still a problem since the US networks had a particular interest in those sports. The IAAF Council had just met in Canberra and decided to maintain the traditional timetable of main finals in the afternoon, as in 1964 in Tokyo. Samaranch said that the IOC's position was very delicate as it had to consider the IFs' advice which had taken the athletes' health into consideration. Much of the IF hesitation was, however, complete

posturing. I heard Nebiolo say that the athletes would run whenever they were told to run (talking specifically about the Oslo Mile, which started sometime around midnight) for television purposes.

Samaranch was also obsessed about world championships, especially for athletics, which he feared might challenge the popularity of the Olympic Games. Nebiolo tried to keep him as a hostage by threatening to have such championships every two years. My advice to Samaranch was that the best outcome for the IOC would be for Nebiolo to have world championships every year. In short order, no one would care about them. This turned out to be true. NBC had no interest in broadcasting them, and Samaranch, at Nebiolo's urging, had to beg NBC to provide US coverage, which NBC reluctantly agreed to do but stated that it would reduce its Olympic bids by whatever it paid for the IAAF world championships. US audiences care deeply about athletics only as part of the Olympic Games.

The IOC did not want it to be said that it was only concerned about money, but at the same time, it had to realise that, by accepting the IFs' "advice", the IOC and all its stakeholders would perhaps be relinquishing as much as \$300 million.¹⁵ Though it was not pleasant to waive the additional rights, the IOC should accept the IFs' decision but make it clear that the rights would be less than expected and thus put the financial ball in the IFs' court, where it belonged. As for the Olympic Movement, according to the agreement signed with Seoul, the IOC's share was greatest when the total rights reached up to \$400/\$500 million. I recommended agreeing to the IAAF schedule and confirming this to SLOOC. I did say, however, that I suspected that the IAAF was seeking



One of 13 cameras belonging to the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) on the Han River, where the rowing and canoeing competitions were held. On the far left: seen and being seen: "Hi Mom!" signalled the entry of the US team.

Photos: *Official Report Seoul 1988*, *Sports Illustrated*, 1988, no. 14

Homeworking: the MPC press also received a complete overview of what was happening at the venues via 24 monitors.

Photo: Official Report Seoul 1988



a special financial arrangement that would “enable” it to change the schedule. Samaranch disagreed with the latter point. He had received official notification of the decision, and the IAAF had even proposed to send a delegation to Lausanne to explain the reasons. He replied that the IAAF’s decision was accepted, and there was no need to give any explanations. He went on to say that he expected relations with SLOOC to be more difficult in the coming months. With the main finals in the afternoon, SLOOC might question its agreement with the IOC on the distribution of the rights since it would have expected a higher amount. It was necessary to be firmer with the OCOGs in the future.¹⁶

The networks needed four to six weeks after the schedule was finalised before beginning negotiations so that if it were finalised by the end of 1984, we could re-open the negotiations at the beginning of 1985. Samaranch did not think the timetable would be ready by the end of the year. Either way, we were in no particular hurry. As time went on, particularly if there was progress on the co-hosting discussions between the two Koreas, the position of the American networks might become more positive.¹⁷

A special 89th Session of the IOC was held following the Los Angeles Games in Lausanne on 1 and 2 December 1984. Los Angeles Games and television were not on the agenda, which was focused on the difficulties arising from past and anticipated boycotts. Although much clearer in retrospect, we witnessed the beginning of an IAAF strategy to extract additional funds from SLOOC in exchange for adjustments to the competition schedule, which was apparent from comments made by Samaranch in a summary of issues facing the IOC. Schedule concerns were wrapped in apparent preoccupation with the health of

the athletes, which would disappear almost magically once a significant donation was made to a foundation established by the IAAF.

The Executive Board met in Calgary in February 1985. The IAAF had still not presented its final schedule, and the IOC requested that it do so as soon as possible so that television negotiations could proceed by the end of the summer of 1985 at the latest.¹⁸ Calgary was to sign the contract with CTV for Canadian rights on 28 February 1985.¹⁹ Samaranch wanted the international signal to be provided for the entire Olympic Village to enable all teams to watch their own members competing. In addition, a large screen should be provided in the IOC hotel and Olympic Village fed by the international signal.²⁰ There was a report by the standing committee of SISMO (Symposium International Sport, Medias, Olympisme).²¹

The Executive Board met again in Lausanne and then in East Berlin immediately prior to the 1985 Session. The matter of competition schedules was still unsettled. Samaranch wanted the contracts to be signed by July 1985, but many IFs had still not reached agreements with SLOOC. The IOC did not wish to interfere but reiterated that the final schedule was needed for negotiations with the television networks. SLOOC indicated that it hoped to obtain written agreements from all of the IFs during the meetings in Lausanne and Berlin. Once obtained, the final schedule could be conveyed to the networks, and it was hoped to start negotiations in July; 24 July 1985 was tentatively set aside for that purpose. Samaranch noted that there were problems amongst the IFs themselves since, at present, all IFs received the same amount of revenue from the television rights, regardless of the “importance” of their sport. It was now proposed that the larger federations receive a greater proportion than the smaller ones. Samaranch did not want to raise the subject at the forthcoming meeting with the IFs, and it was not opportune for the IFs themselves to deal with the matter.²²

Insurance of the Calgary television rights was discussed. The proposed premium was 2.5%, compared with 3.25% for Sarajevo. I questioned the need for spending \$600,000 on a very low risk and thought it would be more judicious to await the outcome of the Seoul negotiations. Optimistically speaking, if the contract amounted to twice as much as Calgary and the sum was insured, the IOC would be easily covered. If the Seoul rights were lower, insurance for Calgary could be reconsidered. As time progressed, the risk lessened. The IOC could even wait until one year prior to the Winter Games. We decided to wait until the end of the year to decide since Seoul could not be insured at this time in any event. SLOOC was aware of the insurance problems,



Battery-powered vehicles with cameramen at the top of the marathon field.

Photos: *Official Report Seoul 1988, Sports Illustrated, 1988, no. 14*

and that discussions were being held whereby the Korean Government Bank would guarantee the risk through the US. The ABC contract for Calgary had been drafted to make it very difficult for ABC not to pay the full amount. A reduction in the sums due would only be possible if less than seven of the top ten teams in Sarajevo participated in Calgary. There had been only three East Bloc teams in the top ten. It was proper to wait, but also important not to give the insurance brokers an idea of when or if the policy would be concluded.²³ This was also the Executive Board meeting during which Berlioux's contract as director of the IOC was terminated.²⁴

A long night of failed negotiations

The official negotiations for Seoul were finally held in Lausanne in early September 1985. They were, not to put too fine an edge on it, a disaster. SLOOC was wedded to an unrealistically high rights figure, and its negotiators were not authorised to accept a figure lower than \$500 or \$550 million. NBC had the highest bid at \$325 million, and the others were lower and/or a mix of assorted revenue-sharing with no guarantees. The SLOOC negotiators said nothing. The Korean sports minister, who said he had experience with negotiations, thought the networks were deliberately lowering their bids because Korea was an Asian country. He would not accept any explanations regarding the weakened state of the US television market nor that the broadcasters were not acting in concert (which was illegal under US law). The negotiators slept in their chairs. No responses could be given to the networks, who remained in their rooms at the hotel, growing increasingly impatient with the lack of communications. It finally became apparent

that the negotiators needed permission from Korea to consider bids lower than they were authorised to accept. By then, it was the middle of the night in Seoul. Seemingly no one was prepared to take the risk of waking the SLOOC president with such bad news, so they simply did nothing and waited until a reasonable hour in Korea.

Samaranch and I decided to call Roh Tae Woo, the SLOOC president, to assure him that the offers received reflected the fair market value of the rights and that there was no anti-Korean bias involved. We recommended that the NBC offer be accepted. He accepted our advice. Unfortunately, by that time, NBC had lost patience, withdrawn its offer, and was no longer prepared to discuss anything. The other networks felt the same. We scrambled about and put together a meeting ten days or two weeks later – this time in New York. NBC reduced its bid by \$25 million. ABC reiterated a revenue-sharing proposal. CBS said its senior executives were on a plane, travelling to some meeting, and would not be available. We cobbled together an agreement with NBC for a range of rights fees, depending on advertising sales, that ran from a minimum of \$300 million (the amount of the new offer) to a maximum of \$500 million. That was essentially for show and to enable the Koreans to save face by at least having their \$500 million figure identified in the contract, even though there was no possibility whatsoever that it could be achieved.

The Executive Board met in Lisbon in October 1985. I described the negotiations in Lausanne and New York regarding the Seoul television rights. It was hoped that NBC, SLOOC, and the IOC would sign the contract on 6 December 1985. A guaranteed payment of \$50 million would then be made by NBC and divided between the IOC and SLOOC.²⁵



The IOC urged the SLOOC representatives to accept offers made in Lausanne, as delay could result in lower offers. This, in fact, was the case: NBC reduced its offer and insisted upon the addition of radio rights.²⁶ The relationships became almost toxic in nature, and negotiations leading to a formal contract were dragged out over months, especially after NBC produced a draft contract heavily weighted in its favour. This caused problems with SLOOC, which was outraged.

The press presented a very negative view of the situation. However, the agreement was nevertheless positive for the Olympic Movement, particularly as it was agreed to limit payments for technical facilities to the amounts allocated for the Los Angeles Games. Samaranch thanked those involved and noted that negotiations proved so difficult that for 1992, the IOC was considering the stipulation that television rights negotiations were to be concluded primarily by the IOC and not the OCOG.

A bigger share for the USOC

The final meeting of the EB in 1985 was in Lausanne. At this meeting, the IOC had to deal with the first formal demand of the USOC to share in television rights, an issue that had been raised informally before. The USOC claimed it was entitled to 10% of all television revenues derived from the US. This amounted to \$61 million for 1988. The situation was complicated due in part to the history of IOC/USOC relations and because

of provisions of US law that did not conform with the Olympic Charter. Historically, there had never been any formal claim for a share of the television rights revenues. In discussions with the former secretary-general of the USOC, Col. Don Miller, the latter had indicated that there would be no problems with the USOC regarding the television rights. Col. Miller was now retired and been replaced by Lt. Gen. George Miller (no relation), who, not having been present at any of the past discussions, claimed rightly that he had no knowledge of these. Col. Miller no longer had any recollections of giving the former assurances, and it was not in his interest to intervene with any claim by the USOC. The IOC was also upset that the USOC waited two years following the awarding of the US rights for Calgary to make its claim.

A further problem was that, over the last 18 months, SLOOC lawyers had been trying to obtain a reaction from the USOC lawyers, but to no avail. There was another problem: draft legislation had been presented to the US Congress, which would impose a 10% claim on all television revenues relating to the Olympic Games, not just on the US-sourced television. This 10% would go to the USOC, although the USOC, incredibly enough, claimed to have no knowledge of this proposed legislation in its favour. I said that ABC and NBC, the rights holders for Calgary and Seoul, would lobby against this legislation and suggested that the Korean government be requested to do the same. I doubted there would be any opposition from the American public, which had no interest in the

matter. Attempts were made to resolve the issue in meetings with Robert Helmick, the USOC president, and the USOC lawyers. The legal situation remained unclear because a US domestic law adopted in 1978 (the Amateur Sports Act) purported to give the USOC complete control over the use of the Olympic Symbol and other Olympic-related designations and terminologies within the US. There was a distinct degree of conflict between this law and the Rules of the Olympic Charter. My view was that the IOC (as a Swiss-based non-US litigant) would have little chance of success in any legal action brought against the USOC in the US courts on this question.

In the end, it was agreed that OCO'88, SLOOC, and the IOC would each contribute \$10 million to put the matter (temporarily) to bed, but it was now a live issue that would continue to dominate and poison IOC-USOC relations for several years.²⁷

The big picture

From the perspective of Olympic television rights, however, the IOC was now in the driver's seat. It controlled the negotiations, assured the ongoing technical and artistic quality of Olympic broadcasts, and limited NOC claims for shares of television revenues to the US and to the value of the US rights only, as opposed to the total value of worldwide rights. Much acrimonious negotiation remained to be endured, to which was added those matters pertaining to the international marketing programme (TOP) being designed by the IOC, in respect of which the USOC would claim a share for itself equal to the total revenues attributed to all other NOCs in the world combined. All these negotiations were exacerbated by a bewildering series of leadership changes in the USOC at both presidential and executive director levels.

That said, the television war had been won, despite having to deal with the disagreeable residual underbrush in the USOC relationship. The IOC created a new television paradigm in which it was increasingly comfortable. It had been very successful in conducting television negotiations in which the networks were assured that no side deals existed and were satisfied that their business concerns were both heard and understood by the responsible organisation – now the IOC, not the OCOGs.

The usual Olympic organisational issues would continue – the world remains a complicated puzzle – but the television aspects were now managed by a disciplined, consistent technical and business philosophy, able to weather the occasional storms while ensuring an increasingly sophisticated coverage of the Games. ■

- 1 IOC Session, 1984 (Sarajevo), p. 21.
- 2 IOCEB 24–25 November 1983, p. 9. In fact, given the increased size of the ice hockey tournament, 12 days (the period of the Winter Games at the time) was not enough and matches in Sarajevo had to be started even prior to the Opening Ceremony of the Games. The existing concern had been that, with only six sports, the Winter programme was a bit thin in comparison with the Summer Games.
- 3 IOCEB 24–25 November 1983, pp. 29–30. This would have addressed, at least in part, the "thinness" of the Winter programme if we were to move to 16 days. The Programme Commission, then headed by Vitaly Smirnov, resisted [see p. 46]. Somewhat to everyone's surprise, curling turned out to televise particularly well. Calgary would also be permitted to have a demonstration event for handicapped athletes, provided OCO'88 agreed [see p. 48].
- 4 IOCEB 2–18 February 1984, p. 31 and Annex 47 [pp. 183–185]. An Olympic Television symposium was held in 1987. Its proceedings have been published by the IOC. It is an interesting "period piece" on television as perceived by various stakeholders at the time.
- 5 IOCEB 2–18 February 1984, p. 36.
- 6 IOC Sess., 1984 (Sarajevo) Annex 16, at pp. 61–62. By then, we knew that ABC had probably bid too much, and I concluded the report with a call to assist the broadcasters as much as possible without compromising the integrity of the Games.
- 7 IOCEB 28 May–1 June 1984, pp. 8–9. See, for example IOCEB 28 May–1 June 1984, p. 29 and Annex 32 (re Nebiolo and Mario Vasquez Raña, whom nobody else wanted as IOC Members).
- 8 IOCEB 21 July–13 August 1984, pp. 18–19. He did not want to have the Session reject the proposal once again. I was against the idea, especially tying it to television funds. See also p. 49.
- 9 It was not until Albertville in 1992 that Samaranch was able to create the additional class of IOC membership and make Nebiolo an IOC member, along with, for balance, Olaf Poulsen (NOR) from the winter sports federations.
- 10 IOCEB 7–8 November 1984, pp. 8–9. By then, according to SLOOC, 20 of 23 IFs had agreed.
- 11 IOCEB 7–8 November 1984, pp. 23–24.
- 12 IOCEB 7–8 November 1984, p. 24.
- 13 IOCEB 7–8 November 1984, p. 24. The networks definitely did not want to come to Lausanne; it put them in the wrong time zone in case they needed further decisions from senior management. Roone Arledge used to refer to Lausanne contemptuously as "the television capital of the world". We were also to get a real-life example of the dangers of being out of touch with those in authority once we got to the Seoul negotiations in Lausanne, but, of that, more later ...
- 14 IOCEB 7–8 November 1984, p. 25.
- 15 IOCEB 30 November–1 December 1984, p. 11. The health issue was, of course, complete nonsense; the real issue was institutional testosterone and leadership ego, mixed, in the case of the IAAF, with its own efforts to extract money from the Koreans. During the FIFA World Cup in Mexico in June 1986, the matches were played at noon and 4 pm when it was extremely hot, but the Europeans were paying a great deal for rights. No comment on this health issue in Mexico appeared in the press.
- 16 IOCEB 30 November–1 December 1984, p. 12. I think I was unduly influenced by the numerical estimates made by Barry Frank and had not yet got the signals from NBC that, in the current US television market, the SLOOC estimates were wildly unrealistic. The public expectations of SLOOC were the result of an off-the-cuff extrapolation by Frank based on the amount realised by Calgary. It had started as a historical issue (normal Summer rights as a multiple of Winter rights) that found its way into a memo at SLOOC and, as it worked its way up the structure, gradually became more and more definitive. The resulting difficulties added to Samaranch's dislike of Frank.
- 17 IOCEB 30 November–1 December 1984, p. 12. It was clear, although never publicly stated, that while the schedule and technical aspects were matters of some concern, the real elephant in the room was the political uncertainty on the Korean peninsula. The bidding context was well short of propitious.
- 18 IOCEB 25–28 February 1985, p. 1.
- 19 IOCEB 25–28 February 1985, p. 23. No decision had yet been taken as to when negotiations with EBU and Asia would begin.
- 20 IOCEB 25–28 February 1985, p. 24.
- 21 IOCEB 25–28 February 1985, p. 35. Annex 17. See also IOCEB 28 May–6 June 1985, p. 17 and Annex 16.
- 22 IOCEB 28 May–6 June 1985, pp. 6–7. FIFA had withdrawn from GAISF and ASOIF and did not agree (see *supra*) with the distribution of the rights. It was a matter for the IFs to decide amongst themselves, with which Samaranch agreed, unless asked by the IFs to intervene. At the Executive Board meeting in October 1985, the issue regarding claims by FIFA to a portion of the ticket revenues was again raised. IOCEB 15–18 October 1985, p. 31.
- 23 IOCEB 28 May–6 June 1985, p. 10. Reference to the matter was to be deleted from the Finance Commission report. [p. 44]
- 24 IOCEB 28 May–6 June 1985, pp. 51–52. (1 June 1985) Also p. 69 and p. 71. It was reported during a later meeting that, by the time Raymond Gafner (appointed as Administrator to replace Bertioux) got back to Lausanne from Berlin, Bertioux's office had been completely emptied and it was possible that several important and relevant documents were missing. [IOCEB 5–6 December 1985, p. 24]
- 25 IOCEB 15–18 October 1985, pp. 52–53.
- 26 IOCEB 15–18 October 1985, p. 53. This description was little more than the tip of a large, unattractive iceberg. NBC had been the only effective player at the resumed negotiations and played hardball, to the point that we would happily have taken somewhat less from any other network, just to make a point. ABC was still reeling from Calgary and would offer only a revenue-sharing deal. CBS had no senior executives "available" to make decisions; they were all on a plane somewhere. The SLOOC report was neutral in referring to the agreement, giving only the amounts involved [Annex 25, pp. 173–ff.].
- 27 IOCEB 5–6 December 1985, pp. 35–44. Many believe that the tensions between the USOC, the IOC, and the rest of the Olympic Movement, many of which continue to this day, contributed significantly to the IOC's summary rejections of the US candidacies for the 2012 and 2016 Games. See also Annexes 24 and 25.

Bringing the Olympics Back to Los Angeles

By ANN OWENS with BARRY A. SANDERS

Double pass: IOC President Thomas Bach and the mayors of Paris and Los Angeles Anne Hidalgo and Eric Garcetti in Lima on 13 September 2017, where the locations to hold the 2024 and 2028 Olympic Games were awarded.



Photo: picture-alliance

On 13 September 2017, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the 2028 Olympic Games to Los Angeles. Winning the Games for the third time was the reward for decades of hoping, planning, working, and dreaming by Angelenos, including the work of the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games (SCCOG).¹

SCCOG is the only private local civic organisation whose sole purpose is to serve the Olympic Movement and bid for the Olympic Games. After its founding in 1939, SCCOG bid a dozen times before winning the 1984 Games. SCCOG laid the groundwork for the 2028 Games by bidding for 2012, 2016, and 2024. Unsuccessful bidding efforts – critical for future victory – are often lost to history. Drawing on interviews with SCCOG leaders, observations at key meetings, and document analysis, this article provides an account of the decades-long process of winning the 2028 Olympics. The story of SCCOG highlights lessons for bidding: perseverance and patience; collaboration and partnerships across public, private, and civic sectors; building local support; cultivating relationships with the United States Olympic Committee (USOC²) and IOC; and a commitment to serving and innovating the Olympic Movement.

Comeback with a bid for 2012

Following the 1984 Games, SCCOG went dormant, knowing that the Olympics were unlikely to return to Los Angeles for some time. SCCOG re-emerged in the Olympic Movement by winning the 1991 US Olympic Festival, which demonstrated Los Angeles's organisational abilities and existing venues and brought SCCOG members into collaboration with USOC officials.

In 1997, the USOC indicated its intent to bid for the 2012 Olympic Games.³ The IOC would award the Games in 2005 after a two-year international competition. The USOC took several years before the international phase to consider whether to bid and which city to propose. When the chance to bid for 2012 arose, John C. Argue, long-time SCCOG chair and key player in the 1984 Games, reorganised and enlarged its board of directors. He asked David Simon, 1984 Games vice-president for Government Relations, to serve as president of the SCCOG. With the Los Angeles city council's support, SCCOG would represent the city in the bidding process.

The USOC instituted a formalised domestic bidding process for 2012 to mimic the international competition. The first requirement was a proposal due in September 1998 to demonstrate each city's feasibility to host the Games. The USOC then invited some of these cities to submit complete bids by December 2000. Before the press release naming these cities, a USOC source tipped off Simon that Los Angeles was not on the list. Argue pled Los Angeles's case, and the USOC agreed to add Los Angeles, but SCCOG inferred that 2012 would be an uphill battle.

The Los Angeles 2012 bid committee was internal to SCCOG and run on a small budget. Simon served as bid committee president, and SCCOG Director Richard Perelman, author of the 1984 Games final report, was the primary author. As required for the international competition, the complete bid had to include venues for each sport, plans for the athletes' village, media centre, and transportation, financial plans including a government guarantee against deficits, and a theme and a rationale for choosing that city.

SCCOG's bid touted Los Angeles's experience in hosting two previous Games while at the same time emphasising that the 2012 Games would not be a repeat of 1984, knowing novelty was valued.⁴ Iconic



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venues like the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum were proposed again, but new venues were identified for nearly all sports other than athletics and football. Construction of only one new permanent structure was required. Existing venues and temporary installations would satisfy all other requirements. The bid promoted a low-risk, high-quality Games with a projected financial surplus due to low construction costs and strong sponsor and ticket revenues. Los Angeles was “dedicated, dependable, and primed to perform.”

The USOC provided feedback to bid cities in February 2001, with revised bids due in June. The USOC Evaluation Commission then visited each city, coming to Los Angeles as its final stop in August 2001. This three-day visit did not go well from SCCOG’s perspective. Some commission members did not make the trip, and those who did asked questions reflecting an outdated and inaccurate view of Los Angeles. When SCCOG addressed questions, the commission appeared unimpressed. SCCOG leadership felt that the USOC had already decided Los Angeles was out.

In October 2001, the USOC narrowed the field to four: Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Washington/Baltimore. Los Angeles did not advance, despite what SCCOG felt was an excellent technical bid, the purported criterion for the first cut.

Lessons from the early loss

SCCOG took several lessons from this failed bid. First, using college dorms to house athletes and existing venues to avoid construction costs were at that time thought to be unpopular with IOC Members. Historically, the IOC prided itself as a catalyst for urban renewal in host cities. This has changed recently, and the IOC’s Olympic Agenda 2020 reflects SCCOG’s preferred model of primarily using existing facilities.⁵ But at the time, the USOC may have thought the IOC would reject a smaller footprint bid.

Second, Los Angeles was not offering a full guarantee against a financial deficit, as required in the host city agreement.⁶ California governments had never given such a financial guarantee, and the 1984 Games had proceeded without one.

Third, relationships between the USOC and Los Angeles needed further cultivation. Only 17 years had passed since 1984, and Los Angeles was the only US city that had hosted the Summer Games twice. The USOC may have felt it was another city’s turn. Tensions also lingered between SCCOG, which included many 1984 veterans, and some USOC staff following the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee’s (LAOOC’s) successful but unusual independence from USOC oversight.

SCCOG knew from experience that losing is part of the long-term strategy to win. By re-entering the bidding process, SCCOG had taken the first step towards the Games’ return to Los Angeles.

Major changes leading to the 2016 bid

Following the 2012 race, SCCOG underwent major changes. Argue died in August 2002, and Barry A. Sanders, international attorney and principal outside counsel for the 1984 Games, became chair. Sanders invited new people into the organisation to allay criticisms that SCCOG was only 1984 veterans. One figure Sanders brought in was sports executive Casey Wasserman, who became board vice-chair in 2003.

SCCOG fortified relationships with IOC Members when Simon was elected to the World Union of Olympic Cities Executive Committee. In February 2003, an IOC Member approached Simon and inquired whether Los Angeles could host the 2004 Games if Athens was not ready. Simon indicated that Los Angeles would be ready, as it always is. The IOC inquiry demonstrates Los Angeles’s reputation in the Olympic Movement – that of a capable and ready host. However, this may lessen the urgency to choose Los Angeles in a bid process since it is always an option.



On the blocks! Barry Sanders (left) and David Simon at the start of the 2012 USOC bidding process.

Photos: Bringing the Olympics Back to Los Angeles, 2021

On 6 July 2005, the IOC awarded the 2012 Olympics to London. New York, the US bid city, lost following a last-minute stadium issue. Moreover, several factors made any US city unlikely to win. First, IOC Members might have thought it was too soon to return to the US after Atlanta in 1996. Second, the 2002 Salt Lake City bid bribery scandal had emerged. While the Organising Committee was ultimately exonerated, the scandal potentially damaged US bids among IOC voters. Finally, there was an unresolved debate between the IOC and USOC over revenue sharing from US television rights and The Olympic Partner Program (TOP) sponsorships.

A city built for the Olympic Games

New York's 2012 defeat meant that the USOC would likely mount a 2016 bid, and SCCOG sprang into action. In September 2005, SCCOG sent a letter to the USOC expressing interest in bidding for the 2016 Olympics, including support from Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, who proclaimed that "Los Angeles is a city built for the Olympic Games."^{7,8}

SCCOG also launched a public relations campaign, working with the city council to pass a resolution supporting SCCOG's bid efforts and publishing an op-ed by Sanders in the *Los Angeles Times*, arguing, "our chances of success are good, and the potential benefits are great."⁹ Sanders emphasised Los Angeles's diversity, consistent local support, existing infrastructure, and possibilities for surplus revenues, proclaiming, "The Olympics are in our DNA."



Kickoff to 2012 Bid at the LA84 Foundation with Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and the Olympic champions Rafer Johnson (1960) and Janet Evans (1988).



SCCOG was trying to make a first strike on 2016 before the USOC put out a call for bids, both to show its readiness and to see if the USOC would forego the lengthy domestic bid process. The USOC did not respond, and new chair Peter Ueberroth (former LAOOC president) indicated the decision to bid would not occur until after the IOC meeting at the 2006 Turin Winter Games.¹⁰ Ueberroth articulated potential barriers to a US bid, including lack of a federal government financial guarantee and an impasse in the revenue negotiations between the IOC and USOC. The domestic bid process proceeded informally as USOC began conversations with potential bid cities.

In May 2006, the USOC officially launched the domestic candidature process by visiting Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. On 18 May, USOC representatives met at Los Angeles City Hall with SCCOG leadership, Mayor Villaraigosa, and prominent business community members. Two days prior, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors had gone on record in support of the bid.¹¹ At the meeting, USOC representatives articulated the domestic bid process, which would again require cities to put together extensive bids

as if they were bidding internationally. SCCOG began to make the case for Los Angeles, drawing on its experience to anticipate criticisms, correct wrong impressions, and reframe critiques as assets. SCCOG also presented polling that showed 89% of Los Angeles County respondents favoured bidding to host the Olympics.^{12,13}

The USOC left each city's bid committee with a list of compulsory requirements ("non-starters") and 15 questions to be answered by June 2006.¹⁴ The non-starters included: a 75,000-seat Olympic Stadium, an Olympic Village to accommodate 15,000 athletes and officials, media centre(s), \$20 million to be paid to the USOC from the chosen city to finance the international competition, an operating budget that included no public infrastructure construction or major capital investments, favourable public opinion, price controls over hotel rooms and government services; supportive labour agreements, and government support. The 15 questions requested additional detail on venues, capital investment, organisation chart, and legacy.

Securing broad private and public support

SCCOG went to work on the bid. SCCOG Director and public relations executive Rhonda Brauer led messaging efforts around a theme suggested by Mayor Villaraigosa: "Where the Whole World Comes Together". SCCOG members spoke to civic groups and appeared on radio and television frequently to fortify public support for the Games. Many individuals and groups offered their services, mostly pro bono, to SCCOG. Among others, private corporations, state and local government officials, educational institutions such as UCLA and the University of Southern California (USC), countless venues, athletes, and local residents would support the bid.

On 26 July 2006, the USOC cut the list of potential host cities to Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.¹⁵ The decision was based on evaluations of the cities' site plans, financial support, and international appeal by the USOC and a poll of 100 international sports leaders.

In November 2006, the USOC hosted a seminar for bid cities at its annual Olympic Assembly. Each city had to operate a booth with videos and brochures and deliver a preliminary oral presentation to USOC board representatives. As this was happening, San Francisco's bid collapsed when the 49ers NFL team announced they would not build a new stadium in San Francisco. Only Chicago and Los Angeles were left.

During the Assembly, SCCOG launched Ready, Set, Gold! (RSG!),¹⁶ a programme that places Olympians and Paralympians in Los Angeles public schools to coach students on health and fitness. Following London

2012's emphasis on the Games' legacy for youth, Sanders suggested this programme to capture that same spirit while capitalising on Southern California's unique asset as the home of more Olympians than any other region on the globe. RSG! continues today as the only legacy in the world, to date, of a bid (as distinguished from legacies of the Games).

Sustainable Games concept with little construction

In January 2007, SCCOG formally submitted its bid book to the USOC.¹⁷ The bid emphasised "a return to the original concept of the Olympic Games, strictly focused on the athlete rather than on construction." Los Angeles's experience and need to build very little would allow the organising committee to focus on the athletes' experience and the storytelling around it rather than on capital projects. Existing venues would also allow unique opportunities for pre-Olympic training, competition, and test events. The competition venues would be in three clusters around the city, athletes would be housed at UCLA, and media and Olympic family would stay at USC, all connected by expanding rapid transit.

The Los Angeles bid planned a "living legacy" rather than urban renewal. RSG! was a legacy for future generations. There were also legacies for the Olympic Movement: reorienting the movement to the Los Angeles model of financial surplus and little construction; reinventing the Olympic Cultural Program via a two-month cultural festival; and overhauling the Opening and Closing Ceremonies with ideas from Los Angeles's creative community. Finally, the 2016 Games would "set a new standard for a pollution-free, sustainable Games." There also would be some sports infrastructure legacies, notably a renovated rowing and canoe/kayak stadium and new shooting ranges, as well as two Olympic Training Centres for use before and after the Games.

One significant aspect of the 2016 bid that differed from 2012 (and 1984) was that SCCOG had secured city and state agreements and financial guarantees, never before offered. The city council had recently given a guarantee for a (failed) World Cup bid, which paved the way to obtain guarantees against the Olympic financial deficit of \$250 million from both the city and state.¹⁸ In addition, SCCOG secured offers from two insurance companies for an additional \$750 million in private guarantees. In contrast, the Chicago bid only offered a state guarantee against construction cost overruns. In SCCOG's view, the most important guarantee was that Los Angeles would engage in very little construction, so financial and on-time delivery risks were low.

The USOC requirements for the domestic bid process were onerous. In addition to the May

2006 meeting, the follow-up questions, assembly presentation, and comprehensive bid book, USOC required an advertising campaign. SCCOG produced and ran on local radio public service announcements featuring local Olympians and Olympic hopefuls.¹⁹ SCCOG also produced TV commercials and responded to USOC's late-stage requirement for promotional posters and a written promotional campaign outline.

USOC evaluators were not impressed

On 1 March 2007, the USOC Evaluation Commission visited Los Angeles, beginning with a panel presentation at UCLA, the proposed athletes' village site, where SCCOG and local officials elaborated on the bid's themes.²⁰ The short film *Why Los Angeles?* premiered, featuring Governor Schwarzenegger, Mayor Villaraigosa, and local Olympic champions, produced with Disney executive Dick Cook.²¹ SCCOG hosted a dinner at the Getty Center with local politicians, business leaders, and local sports celebrities.



Why Los Angeles? video at Universal studios with Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Mayor Villaraigosa.

The following day, the delegation was bussed to the proposed venues. SCCOG began to see signs that, like for the 2012 bid, this visit was not going well. When the delegation was taken to the Coliseum, they declined to get off the bus. SCCOG pressed on and hosted a party aimed to give a taste of Los Angeles's "celebrity" side at Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen's home, including the premiere of a promotional film, *Battle Olympia*, produced with Dave Stewart of the band the Eurythmics.²² Despite these efforts, the USOC evaluators told some SCCOG members they were not impressed with the bid. Afterwards, the USOC requested that additional details on nearly all the bid book's themes be provided in writing within two weeks.²³

SCCOG continued to develop enthusiasm around Los Angeles in advance of the final presentation in April through media and personal appearances by releasing a report showing the expected positive economic impact of the Games²⁴ and announcing a

renovation to the Home Depot Center,²⁵ which would host multiple sports.

The final step was the presentation to the USOC on 14 April 2007, in Washington, DC. The night before, the USOC board met privately with consultants who had graded the bids based on criteria expected to be required by the IOC. SCCOG felt their bid had some assets that the Chicago bid lacked: high political and public support; an existing athletes' village; the required guarantees against financial deficit; low construction costs; and more Olympic experience, including relationships with IOC voters. However, SCCOG got word that the consultants scored Chicago higher on every criterion, even before the oral presentation. SCCOG felt the decision had already been made.

The bid committee soldiered on to make its pitch the following day. Sanders closed by addressing legacy – that SCCOG's purpose is "to leave the Olympic Movement better than we found it." He said:

We can help the Olympic Movement overcome some of its greatest challenges and realise its greatest dreams. Los Angeles has transformed the Games before: with the first Olympic Village in 1932; and new financial model in 1984. Now the challenges to the Movement are different, and we will respond again.

Reasons for the second straight loss

The USOC then conferred and chose Chicago. The USOC decision process was private, so the reasons for the decision may never be known. However, SCCOG drew some broad lessons for the future.

First, the Chicago bid was the "urban renewal" type, still viewed as preferred by the IOC. As for 2012, Los Angeles did not need to build new infrastructure for the Games – and in any event, the Los Angeles public would resist such plans. Future Los Angeles bids would either need to coincide with a change in attitude at the IOC or reframe the idea of urban legacies.

Second, as in the 2012 process, SCCOG perceived that the USOC wanted a new host city. Despite London's recent selection as a three-time host, the USOC still may have thought a third time for Los Angeles was too many. Any Los Angeles bid must emphasise differences from its past Games.

Finally, Chicago had greater financial resources. While the Los Angeles bid pulled together pro bono resources from across sectors, there was less corporate financial support compared to Chicago, home of major USOC sponsors. The Los Angeles bid relied on a small in-house team of SCCOG members compared to Chicago's larger bid staff, including employees of Chicago-based sponsors like United Airlines and McDonald's.

In making it to the final two cities of the domestic process, SCCOG had gone one step further than in bidding for 2012. The Los Angeles 2016 bid once again prepared SCCOG to be a highly-skilled bidder, establishing crucial building blocks for later bids.

Third time's the charm: the 2024 bid

In 2009, Chicago was eliminated on the first ballot in the 2016 Olympic Games selection, an embarrassing defeat for the USOC. In 2010, Lawrence Probst became USOC chair, and Scott Blackmun became USOC chief executive. Resolving revenue negotiations with the IOC was their priority. Blackmun announced the US would not bid for the 2020 Games, which brought the IOC to the negotiating table.²⁶ A new USOC–IOC revenue-sharing agreement was reached.²⁷ Probst was elected to the IOC, ending the unusual situation of the USOC chair not being an IOC Member. With this burst of cooperation, it seemed that the Games might soon return to the US.

Had Chicago prevailed, the opportunity for Los Angeles would have been indefinitely postponed. Looking at four years before the next bidding process, SCCOG did serious introspection, engaging Boston Consulting Group (BCG) for a strategic planning process. Extensive research into successful bids and interviews with dozens of SCCOG stakeholders resulted in a report that targeted the 2024 Games as a promising bid opportunity.

As chatter about 2024 increased, SCCOG increased its activity in the Olympic Movement, sending a large delegation to the 2010 World Union of Olympic Cities summit. SCCOG also hosted the 5th IOC World Conference on Women and Sport in 2012.²⁸ Anita DeFrantz, IOC Member and SCCOG and USOC director, was instrumental in the event, the first IOC-sponsored event in the US since the Salt Lake City Games in 2002. It put SCCOG directors in contact with USOC and IOC Members who would later be bid voters.

By mid-2012, SCCOG looked toward a 2024 bid in earnest. In August, the city council passed a unanimous resolution delegating SCCOG to pursue the opportunity on behalf of the city.²⁹ As for 2016, SCCOG wanted to be first off the line. In January 2013, Mayor Villaraigosa wrote to the USOC at SCCOG's request to communicate Los Angeles's interest in bidding.³⁰ This letter was signed by Olympic, entertainment, business, and community leaders to demonstrate wide enthusiasm and support for a bid.

On 19 February, the USOC sent a letter to 35 cities – those that had expressed interest in bidding and/or the 25 largest markets in the US – that outlined the bid requirements for 2024.³¹ The USOC signalled a streamlined, economical, and efficient bidding

process, beginning with informal discussions with interested cities. The USOC also offered the services of its consultants so that cities would not spend money on advisors. This process was in line with what SCCOG directors Brauer, Simon, and Chairman Sanders had recommended in a 2011 meeting with Blackmun – a more streamlined process than for 2012 or 2016 to reduce the effort and money expended in the domestic bid competition.

Summer 2013 marked the beginning of intense activity to prepare a 2024 bid. In July 2013, at Sanders's request, newly-elected Mayor Garcetti wrote to the USOC as "one of [his] first official acts as mayor", confirming the city's continuing enthusiasm; this was followed by another city council resolution of support.³² SCCOG reflected on elements of its prior bids that could be deficiencies and sought to address them. The 40-year period from 1984 to 2024 (and the 28 years since the last US Summer Games) could minimise the sense that it was too soon to return to Los Angeles. Still, Los Angeles had to deal with lingering criticisms of its airport, traffic, air quality, and preference for using existing facilities. There were answers for most complaints: the airport and the rail systems were already being transformed by public works projects; air quality had improved and was expected to only get better. However, SCCOG needed to satisfy the IOC's taste for urban legacy. Using existing facilities was always the best way to do the Games, in SCCOG's opinion, but such proposals could be seen as lacking excitement, even as the IOC proclaimed under its new Agenda 2020 that it wanted less expenditure.

An urban legacy project to please the IOC

The athletes' village was seen as a potential opportunity to propose an urban legacy project. The USOC had rejected the offer of newly-built UCLA dorms in the 2012 and 2016 bids and seemed to favour a village plan that "transformed" the city. SCCOG obtained a letter from UCLA chancellor (and SCCOG director) Gene Block offering the UCLA dorms again³³ but, in a new strategy, SCCOG had also found potential sites and obtained schematic plans for three to-be-built alternative villages: (1) near Boyle Heights, (2) on land used as a Union Pacific rail yard in downtown Los Angeles (Piggyback Yards), and (3) several city blocks near Staples Center. The Boyle Heights site fit into the redevelopment of the Los Angeles River and the planned rebuilding of the Sixth Street Bridge. Meetings with city officials and planners confirmed the city's enthusiasm and support for redeveloping this land. The redevelopment of the Piggyback Yards was also part of the Los Angeles River Revitalization Master Plan.³⁴ Westfield Corporation provided a proposal for



IOC World Conference on Women and Sport, February 2012: (from left) Barry Sanders, IOC Board Member Anita DeFrantz, IOC President Jacques Rogge, David Simon, and USOC Chairman Larry Probst.

the space near Staples Center.³⁵ All locations would be developed privately off the Games operating budget and sold as mixed-use facilities after the Games.

In September 2013, SCCOG hosted USOC leaders for a preliminary meeting. Discussion topics included the village site, public transit, messaging, and venues. On the village, the pros and cons of developing a new site versus using dorms were discussed, weighing the importance of built legacy and urban redevelopment to the IOC. A key tactic in the development of SCCOG's venue and village plan was to offer choices to the USOC and the IOC. Los Angeles has so many existing facilities that it could let decision-makers choose among them. SCCOG offered an initial plan that called for no construction of permanent venues, with six temporary venues and two renovations. About three-quarters of the venues were new since 1984. If this plan did not suit, the USOC or IOC could mix and match the alternatives described. SCCOG would work collaboratively with the USOC to build the best bid.

Representatives from the LA mass transit authority explained how the ongoing development of the transit system dovetailed with the bid. SCCOG spoke about resounding support from civic leaders and the public and provided letters of support from organisations and governments all over the region. Finally, the group discussed messaging and the role Los Angeles's entertainment and creative communities could play. One potential theme emerged – "the new LA" – to emphasise both why the IOC would want to be in Los Angeles and why Los Angeles would want them there – an opportunity to impel ongoing development. The presentations concluded with a brief visit from Mayor Garcetti to express his continuing commitment to SCCOG's work.

SCCOG felt this meeting went very well, evincing a more open and positive tone from the USOC than in prior bids. SCCOG was cautiously optimistic about its chances. There was a growing feeling, according to the USOC, that with the controversy surrounding the 2014 Sochi Winter Games' enormous expense and the human rights issues concerning the Beijing, Rio, and

Welcome to the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, where the Olympic Games will be held for the third time from 26 July to 2 August 2028, after 1932 and 1984.

Photo: picture-alliance



Sochi Games, the Olympics would “return to the West” and to the US sooner rather than later.

Following the meeting, SCCOG continued to develop its bid. The small SCCOG working group was enlarged with designers and construction and real estate experts. The venue plan required the most development, with debate about the cost-benefit of temporary venues versus permanent venues and the need to emphasise differences from 1984. While the IOC, USOC, and SCCOG were all now aligning around the desirability of minimizing building new venues, the bid still needed to be seen as innovative and new.

SCCOG continued to strengthen its relationships in the Olympic Movement. In October 2013, members attended the annual USOC Olympic Assembly in Colorado Springs, and in December, four directors travelled to IOC headquarters for the opening of the IOC’s Olympic Museum and the World Union of Olympic Cities summit.

In December 2013, USOC leadership returned to Los Angeles for a second visit. Together, the USOC and SCCOG tackled the tension between using existing facilities – but needing to emphasise that they were newly built since 1984 – versus new construction. The USOC advised SCCOG that the IOC was looking for a bid that would be both a catalyst for a city and a boost to the Olympic brand. All agreed that Los Angeles had iconic existing venues that should be centrepieces, like the Coliseum for athletics, Rose Bowl for football and rugby, and Staples Center for gymnastics and basketball. The group discussed the use of creative facilities like the Hollywood Bowl and the Walt Disney Concert Hall for events and celebrations. The group also discussed the idea of a “heart” of the Games – a centre of energy, including a venue cluster and a place for spectators and the general public without tickets to gather. Other ideas around innovation included ways to make tickets less expensive, building the Olympic brand among broader and younger audiences. SCCOG felt the meeting went well and was excited to push on. The USOC again indicated that there was a sense that the IOC wanted to move away from inexperienced hosts with enormous budgets like Rio and Sochi to a more experienced committee with a more practical approach.

SCCOG had never sought or received government funds for any bid and relied entirely on pro bono contributions of services and personal donations from its directors. To support continued bid efforts, Sanders solicited Advisory Committee co-chairs, who would each make a donation of \$100,000. Within several months, eight prominent Angelenos from the private and public sectors agreed to participate, providing the funding to get through the domestic competition. This broad support was a testament to SCCOG’s near-constant efforts to build support across sectors.

On the home stretch

In February 2014, the USOC laid out the next steps in the selection process. The USOC reduced the field to six cities to visit in April and planned to choose finalist cities by June and a candidate city by the end of 2014. SCCOG immediately set to work to produce a “sketch book” (a draft bid book) to present at the April meeting that would reflect all the work on themes, messaging, and venues that had been done to date. Offering the USOC a multiplicity of choices, the sketch book described Los Angeles as “a canvas upon which to paint a custom-made, collaborative and winning American bid.”³⁶

The city wanted to explore all approaches to winning the Games. Former SCCOG Vice-Chair Tim Leiweke had convened a meeting between Mayor Garcetti and Blackmun (Leiweke’s former employee) in late January. Blackmun felt that to win, Los Angeles needed a “face of the bid” internationally known in sports business, like Sebastian Coe for London 2012. The mayor discussed this with Sanders in February, and they considered various individuals. The mayor asked SCCOG to continue its ongoing work. After a few weeks of consideration, the mayor tapped former SCCOG Vice-Chair Wasserman to carry the bid forward.

SCCOG’s mission remained to support Los Angeles in the Olympic Movement and to return the Olympic Games to Los Angeles. SCCOG leadership facilitated a smooth transition, sharing the Sketch Book with Wasserman’s LA24 team and offering its services as advisors. SCCOG was fully invested in LA24’s successful bid, building on its decades-long efforts to bring the Games to Los Angeles for a third time. The LA24 team completed the Los Angeles 2024 bid, tracking closely to SCCOG’s sketch book and suggesting the Piggyback Yards for the athletes’ village.³⁷

Unconventional road to winning the Games

One of SCCOG’s principles is perseverance, knowing that repeated bids and consistent involvement in the Olympic Movement is required for victory. These principles were reflected in the unconventional road

to Los Angeles becoming the 2028 host city. First, in January 2015, the USOC chose Boston over Los Angeles as its 2024 Candidate City, despite Boston's proposal for costly construction. By July 2015, public opposition in Boston grew to the point that Boston withdrew its bid. The IOC's deadline for bid cities was September 2015. The USOC had to scramble. As SCCOG had proven over decades, Los Angeles is always ready and able to host. The USOC entered negotiations with the mayor's office. To cut costs and assure city council approval for the required financial guarantee, the athletes' village proposal was shifted back to UCLA. Los Angeles became the US 2024 Candidate City.

Second, during the two-year international bidding phase, the field narrowed to just Paris and Los Angeles, as others dropped out in the face of popular opposition. Fearful that rejecting either city could result in no bidders for 2028, the IOC amended its rules and, on 13 September 2017, announced that it awarded 2024 to Paris and 2028 to Los Angeles.

Over 80 years after SCCOG's founding, the Olympics will return to Los Angeles for a third time. Securing each of Los Angeles' Olympic Games required consistent involvement in the Olympic Movement and perseverance, principles of SCCOG. After William May Garland convinced the IOC to award Los Angeles the 1932 Games in 1923, he had to overcome many obstacles in the tumultuous intervening years to ensure the Games occurred.³⁸ In 1979, after the challenges of the 1976 Montreal Games, Los Angeles was the only city bidding for the 1984 Games. The IOC, with no alternative, awarded the Games to Los Angeles reluctantly after months of negotiation. Los Angeles won the 2028 Games after first losing the domestic contest to Boston and then proving to be an ever-ready and willing host city. Again, waning interest from bid cities led the IOC to make its historic double award to Paris and Los Angeles. Underlying Los Angeles's presence in the Olympic Movement and its perseverance and persistent readiness is the work of the SCCOG. SCCOG uniquely facilitates Los Angeles to bid again and again. Repeated bidding produced venue and facilities plans ready to be adopted for the 2024 bid. SCCOG's years of building public support meant Los Angeles faced less organised public opposition than other cities, though opposition groups have emerged in recent years. SCCOG's continuous work strengthened relationships across the Olympic Movement.

The IOC's selection process is changing, considering diminishing public support for the Games and its taxpayer expense. In 2019, the IOC enacted reforms to the bid process, dispensing with the elaborate competitive process.³⁹ Instead, the IOC Executive Board and Future Games Selection Committee plays

a more active role in encouraging cities and entire regions to bid, seeking places with public support, existing facilities, and relationships with the IOC. Milan/Cortina for the 2026 Winter Games and Brisbane for the 2032 Summer Games were chosen through these processes. The new process only underlines the relevance of an organisation like SCCOG in future hopes to host the Games.

Perhaps history will repeat itself. Following the success of the 1984 Games, the IOC had a surfeit of bidders to choose among for every subsequent Olympiad until public enthusiasm again flagged in the bidding for the 2022 and 2024 Olympic Games. Following another athletic and financial success in 2028 in Los Angeles, the IOC could again find itself with an abundance of bid cities. Whether or not this competitive environment resumes, hosting the Games after 2032 will require sustaining the most important objectives of a permanent civic group such as SCCOG – perseverance to encourage public support, close ties to the Olympic community, and ever-ready hosting capacity. These are the keys to victory. ■

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The Biographies of All IOC Members

Part XXXIX

By VOLKER KLUGE



514. | María de la Soledad Casado Estupiñán | Spain

Born: 11 October 1956
in Madrid
Elected: 12 February
2010
Attendance:
Present: 19, Absent: 0



Marisol – a shortened form of María de la Soledad, a title given to the Virgin Mary – studied at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (1974–1979), where she received a Bachelor of Arts in Spanish Language. In 1991, she earned a Master of Business Administration at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

During her studies, she played field hockey and participated in running competitions. She was among the first Spanish women to compete in the inaugural Madrid Marathon in 1978. In 1983, she participated in the first Spanish triathlon in Guadalajara, which she won.

Marisol Casado co-founded the Spanish Triathlon Federation in 1989, serving as its secretary-general (1989–1994, 1997–2008) and later its vice-president. From 2002 to 2009, she headed the European Triathlon Union.

In November 2008, she became the first woman and the second person (after Canadian Les McDonald (1933–2017)) to be elected president of the International Triathlon Union (ITU, now World Triathlon). She previously served as ITU Treasurer (1992–1994, 2000–2008).

Marisol Casado was a member of the Spanish National Olympic Committee from 1992 to 1994. After her re-election in 2000, she became a member of the Executive Board in 2010. She was also a council member of the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF, 2011–2015) and has been a member SportAccord (previously GAISF) without interruption since 2011. She has held the position of SportAccord's treasurer since 2016.

At the IOC, she has been appointed to various commissions, including Women in Sport (2015–) and the Coordination Commissions for the Olympic Games in Paris 2024 (2017–) and Los Angeles 2028 (2019–). Since 2021, she has been a member of the Future Host Commission for the Olympic Games.

515. | Dagmawit Girmay Berhane | Ethiopia

After attending Nazareth School in Addis Ababa, Dagmawit Girmay studied at the Commercial College of Addis Ababa University from 1993, earning a Bachelor of Science in Business Education in 2000. This was followed by an Executive Masters in Sport Management in Lyon, France (2004) and in Educational Planning and Management in Addis Ababa (2005). In 2007, the mother of three became the director of DKT International–Ethiopia, one of the world’s largest non-profit organisations in the field of family planning, HIV prevention, and maternal and child health products and services.

Since 1998, the former track and field athlete, basketball player, and taekwondo fighter has been involved in sports administration. She was vice-president of the Ethiopian Martial Arts Federation (1998–2000) and general secretary of the Sport for All Committee (1999–2000). She was president of the Ethiopian Badminton Federation (2000–2016) and Badminton Confederation of Africa (2011–2013), and vice-president of the Badminton World Federation (BWF, 2013–2018).

She was elected first vice-president of the Ethiopian Olympic Committee in 2000. From 2004 to 2008, she served as president and, from 2009 to 2013, as general secretary. Following that, she joined the NOC as a board member.

In ANOCA, she served on the Executive Board (2009–2013) and the Women and Sport Commission (2006–2017). In the ANOC, she was also a council member (2009–2016). Since 2019, she has been an executive council member and chair of the Finance and Audit Commission.

Twice she was elected to the IOC: in 2010 as an NOC representative and in 2013 as an individual member. She was appointed to the Coordination Commissions for the Olympic Games of Paris 2024 and Brisbane 2032.



Born: 27 July 1975
Elected: 12 February 2010
Second term:
Elected: 9 September 2013
Attendance:
Present: 18, **Absent:** 0

516. | Yang Yang | People’s Republic of China

Yang Yang was one of the most successful short track skaters in the world. She was the first Chinese winter sports Olympic champion, winning two gold medals, two silver medals and a bronze medal at the three Winter Olympic Games between 1998 and 2006. From 1994 to 2005 she also won 23 World Championship titles, including 18 in individual disciplines. She won seven times at the Asian Games and took two first-place spots at the Universiade.

To differentiate herself in the press from a fellow Chinese athlete of the same name, she referred to herself Yang Yang L (Large), while her teammate, one centimetre shorter, was named Yang Yang S (Small). She later changed this moniker, placing the letter "A" at the end of her name as a reference to her birth month, August.

Yang started skating at the age of 11 at Qitaihe Sports School in her home province of Heilongjiang. She won her first national championship at the age of 15 and was called up to the national team in 1993.

Yang’s interest and involvement in sports politics began while she was still an active athlete. She was a member of the Athletes’ Commission of the International Skating Union (ISU) from 1999 to 2002 and of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) from 2003 onwards. In 2006, after retiring from sports, she was elected to the Executive Committee of the Chinese NOC and became a member of the IOC Women in Sports Commission.



Born: 24 August 1976
in Jiamusi City,
Tangyuan
Elected: 12 February 2010
Resigned: 25 February 2018
Attendance:
Present: 11, **Absent:** 0

After studying business administration at Tsinghua University in Beijing, where she graduated with a Bachelor's degree in 2007, Yang began her professional career as Director of AGTech Holdings Ltd. In 2008, she served as the first Olympic torchbearer to carry the Olympic flame in mainland China; that same year, she founded the Champion Foundation to promote sports in Chinese schools.

After twice running for the IOC Athletes' Commission in 2002 and 2006, she was elected as a member of the IOC in her capacity as an active athlete in 2010. She was also a member of the Athletes' Commission from that time onwards. In 2017, she became a member of the so-called Schmid Commission (IOC Disciplinary Commission) in her capacity as Athletes' Representative on the IOC Ethics Commission; however, she did not stand for re-election as an IOC Member, which would have been due in 2017.

In 2015, Yang played an important role in Beijing's successful bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics, serving on the Organising Committee as chair of the Athletes' Commission. In 2019, she was elected vice-president of WADA for a term of three years.

517. | Angela Marie Ruggiero | USA

Born: 3 January 1980
in Panorama City,
California
Elected: 12 February
2010
Resigned: 25 February
2018
Attendance:
Present: 10, Absent: 0
EC member no. 96
Elected:
4 August 2016 –
25 February 2018



Angela Ruggiero's glittering career as an ice hockey player made her an American sporting legend. To date, she is the all-time leader in international appearances by any female or male, with 256 games for Team USA. She competed at the Winter Olympics on four occasions, earning gold (1998), silver (2002 and 2010) and bronze (2006) medals. Along with her team, she also won four gold and six silver medals at ten World Championships. In recognition of her achievements, she was inducted into the US Hockey Hall of Fame in 2015 and into the IIHF Hall of Fame two years later.

As a child, seven-year-old Angela Ruggiero was one of the few girls in her native Southern California who chose to devote her free time to ice hockey training. She was called up to the US junior team at the age of 15 and made her debut in the national women's team just one year later.

Later, while studying political science at Harvard University, Ruggiero played 127 games for Harvard Crimson. When she was signed by the Minnesota Whitecaps in 2007, she commenced further study at the University of Minnesota, graduating with a Master of Education in Sports Management in 2010. Ruggiero retired from sports in 2011 due to a shoulder injury.

During the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, she was elected to the Athletes' Commission with the second highest number of votes (605). This was followed by her admission to the IOC, where she was particularly active in promoting women's sport and gender equality. Ruggiero was elected to the IOC Executive Committee as chair of the Athletes' Commission in 2016.

She was a founding member of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA, 2014–2016) and a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) from 2010 to 2018.

When she left the IOC after eight years, President Thomas Bach expressed his sadness at losing one of the committee's greatest campaigning members. "In the previous two years, as Chair of the Athletes' Commission, she has really been a great voice of the athletes. She tackled this task with great dynamism, new ideas, and an active, positive and constructive approach."

Ruggiero then served as chief strategy officer for the successful Candidature Committee for the Los Angeles Olympic bids for 2024/2028. In 2018, she became CEO of the Sports Innovation Lab, a technology-powered market research firm that provides empowering insights to industry-leading sports brands, of which she is also a co-founder.

518. | Adam Laird Pengilly | Great Britain

Adam Pengilly, who graduated from Birmingham University in Sport and Exercise Science in 2000, dedicated five years to bobsledding. He spent time as an assistant coach following graduation, working with the British women's team at the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City.

Pengilly then returned to active sport in November 2002 – this time the skeleton. He took 13th place at the IBSF World Championships in 2004, won a silver medal at the 2005 Universiade and finished eighth at the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin. He achieved his best results at 2008 European Championships, where he finished third, and at the 2009 World Championships, where he won the silver medal. At the 2010 Winter Olympics, he was injured and finished 18th. In 2012, he retired and became a youth coach.

Pengilly became a member of the British Bobsleigh and Skeleton Association in 2003 and of the British Olympic Association in 2005. He was admitted to the IOC after receiving the highest number of votes (615) in the IOC Athletes' Commission elections at the 2010 Winter Olympics. At the 2016 Winter Youth Olympic Games in Lillehammer, Pengilly served as the head of the British team's mission.

Following the publication of the McLaren Report, as a member of the WADA Foundation Board Pengilly argued for Russia to be completely barred from the 2016 Olympic Games. At the 129th Session, he was the only IOC Member to vote against the Executive Committee's decision to exclude the whistleblower in this case from Rio 2016, seeing this as harming the fight against doping.

Pengilly's eight-year IOC membership ended in PyeongChang in 2018 with an untimely departure. After getting into an altercation with a security guard, he apologised but ultimately left the event early.



Born: 14 October 1977
in Taunton, Somerset
Elected: 12 February
2010
Resigned: 25 February
2018
Attendance:
Present: 10, Absent: 0

Alex Gilady and François Carrard passed away

Israeli IOC Member Alex Gilady has died of cancer in London on 13 April 2022 at the age of 79. The journalist, who was born in Tehran to Polish Jews fleeing World War II, began working in Israeli sports television during the late-1960s. A pioneer of television at the Olympic Games, he was first a sports commentator (1968), then head of sports (1975) and of Special Operations (1977), vice-

president (1981-1996) and senior vice-president of NBC Sports, the longstanding Olympic Rights-Holding Broadcaster in the United States of America.

Recently, as vice-chair of the IOC Coordination Commission for the Olympic Games Tokyo 2020, Gilady established excellent relationships with some of the key members of the Organising Committee. This paved

the way to finding solutions for the many issues that had to be addressed, particularly around the unprecedented postponement of the Games.

The IOC also paid tribute to the death of its long-time Director General François Carrard, who died at the age of 83. He led the IOC administration from 1989 until 2003, and served Presidents Juan Antonio Samaranch and Jacques Rogge. (IOC/JOH)

OBITUARIES



The statue depicting John Landy ensuring the then junior world record-holder Ron Clarke is un-injured after falling in the 1,500 m trials for the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games. Sculptor: Mitch Mitchell, June 2002

Photo: Ian Jobling

John Michael Landy (AUS), *12 April 1930 in Melbourne; †24 February 2022 in Castlemaine, Victoria. I first watched John Landy as a lad growing up in Geelong. When I was about 12 years old, I saw him run with the Geelong Guild during half-time of the Victorian Football League matches. I was one of many in the crowd who tossed coins into a blanket carried by John and other Guild runners. So, I can now claim to have assisted him in getting to the 1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki, where he was inspired by the famous Czech distance runner, Emil Zátopek.

Two years later, Landy was the first Australian to break the 4-minute mile and was a world-record holder for both the mile and 1,500 m. After running second to Great Britain's Roger Bannister at what was regarded as "the Mile of the Century" at the 1954 Vancouver British Empire and Commonwealth Games, the trials for the 1956 Melbourne Olympics marked Landy as a true champion. In the third lap, young Ron Clarke fell; Landy stopped and went back to ensure Clarke was not badly injured, then continued and won the race. The Sport Australia Hall of Fame acknowledged it as the sporting moment of the century. A statue commemorating the moment was erected in the Olympic Park Precinct in Melbourne.

Landy gained a bronze medal at the 1956 Olympics. He also was granted

the honour of reading the Olympic Oath on behalf of all athletes.

Following his athletic career, John, a former teacher at Geelong Grammar's "Timbertop" school in the Victorian Alps, devoted much of his efforts to the environment, serving on the Victorian Land Council for many years. He returned to Vancouver as commissioner general for the Australian Pavilion at Expo '86, where there is a statue of him and Bannister depicting the 1954 Miracle Mile when both athletes ran under 4-minutes.

In 2001, Landy became governor of Victoria, which ended in April 2006. The previous month of that role, he was the final runner in the Queen's Baton Relay, entering the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) for the 2006 Commonwealth Games and presenting the baton to Queen Elizabeth.

Landy was honoured with a State Memorial farewell, and the Australian sporting legend and former governor of Victoria had tributes from all over the world following his death on 24 February. The prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, stated: "Landy was an incredible Australian whose name was synonymous internationally with sportsmanship."

Upon his death, World Athletics President Sebastian Coe said Landy "lit the spark that led to the legendary chase for the four-minute mile and inspired athletes everywhere". (IJ)

Jüri Tarmak (URS), *21 July 1946 in Tallinn (EST); †22 June 2022 in Tallinn. Tarmak's father, Aadu (1914–2000; born Aleksander Tomberg), was the Soviet discus champion in 1943 and 1944 (42.09 and 43.15 m), arriving directly from the front during the Second World War. His son also had a talent for the throwing sports, but he was initially more interested in basketball and volleyball until world-record holder Valeri Brumel sparked his interest in the high jump.

Tarmak's career began in 1965 in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg, his father's birthplace), where he studied political economy and joined

the Dynamo sports club. His coach was Pavel Goichman, who in 1957 had produced Yuri Stepanov, the first Soviet world-record jumper (2.16 m). While many athletes switched to the "flop" after Dick Fosbury's 1968 Olympic victory in Mexico City, Tarmak stayed true to the straddle style. After a second and third place at the European Indoor Championships in 1971 and 1972, he came to Munich as the annual world best (2.25 m), where he won the gold medal at 2.23 m. He was the last men's Olympic champion to jump with the straddle.

Two years later, Tarmak ended his athletic career. He finished his studies, receiving his doctorate in 1985. After five years as a lecturer at the University of Leningrad, he returned to Estonia in 1990, where he founded an investment company and became a vice president and consultant for the Tallinn Stock Exchange. (VK)

Bernd Bransch (GDR), *24 September 1944 in Halle/Saale; †11 June 2022 in Halle. Bransch played for SC Chemie Halle and Hallenser FC (HFC), and for FC Carl Zeiss Jena in the 1973–74 season. He made 317 league appearances and scored 43 goals. As part of the East German national football team, he made 72 appearances between 1967 and 1976. He was captain of the team from 1972 to 1975, including in the 1–0 victory against the later world champion, West Germany, at the 1974 World Cup.

After Bransch won the bronze medal at the 1972 Munich Games, he also became a member of the 1976 Olympic team. However, he was only sent in as a substitute in the final against Poland (3–1) four minutes before the final whistle. This was done as a "farewell gift", as otherwise he would not have received a gold medal. He went on to study engineering economics and became a city councillor for youth and sport in Halle before becoming the chair and later manager of the HFC. (VK)

Ismail Oğan (TUR), *5 March 1933 in Macun; †26 April 2022 in Antalya. Oğan was a Turkish freestyle wrestler, winning the silver at the 1960 Rome Olympics and the gold medal four years later at Tokyo in the welterweight class. He also earned three medals at World Championships: silver in 1957 and two bronzes in 1959 and 1963. He died of multiple system organ failures in 2022. *(WR)*

Egon Franke (POL), *23 October 1935 in Gleiwitz (now Gliwice, POL); †30 March 2022 in Chieri (ITA). Franke was born German, but after World War II, his family decided to stay in Gleiwitz, which was now part of Poland. The foil fencer started his career at Legia Warsaw army sports club and went back to Gliwice, where he trained with Antoni Franz, who had competed in the 1936 Berlin Olympics.

Franke participated in three consecutive Olympic Games from 1960–68. He earned the individual gold medal in 1964 and a team silver the same year, added by a team bronze in 1968. At the 1963 World Championships in Gdańsk, he suffered a serious injury when his opponent's foil pierced his mask. In the end, he won a bronze medal in the individual competition. At the World Championships, he won one team gold, one team silver, and four team bronzes. He later worked as a fencing coach in Italy, where he lived with his wife, Elżbieta Franke-Cymerman, who also was an Olympic fencer. *(WR)*

Sergey Yashin (URS), *6 March 1962 in Penza (RUS); †12 April 2022. Yashin began his hockey career with Dizelist Penza in 1978 and joined Dynamo Moscow in 1980, playing there until 1990. With Dynamo Moscow, he won a Soviet title in 1990. In 1990, he joined Dynamo Berlin and then SKA St. Petersburg in 1992, before playing for EC Wilhelmshaven-Stickhausen from 1994–2001, except in 1997–98, when he had a short spell with Neftekhimik Nizhnekamsk.

He was a member of the Soviet national team that won an Olympic gold medal in Calgary in 1988, was a world champion in 1986 and 1989, and a European champion in 1985–86 and 1989. He also won bronzes at the 1985 World Championships and the 1984 Canada Cup. After his playing career, Yashin worked as a coach with EC Wilhelmshaven-Stickhausen. *(TK)*

Isaac Berger (USA), *16 November 1936 in Jerusalem (ISR); †4 June 2022. "Ike" Berger (on the photo right) was born in Israel, the son of a rabbi. At age 13, he emigrated to the United States, where he became a naturalised citizen in December 1955. His weightlifting career took off in the early 1950s when legendary "father of the American weightlifting", Bob Hoffmann, discovered him.



Berger immediately began winning weightlifting titles for the USA. In addition to his three Olympic medals (gold in 1956, silver in 1960 and 1964), he was world featherweight champion in 1958 and 1961 and was the runner-up for that title in 1957, 1959, and 1963. His 1961 World Championships victory avenged his 1960 Olympic defeat at the hands of the Soviet, Yevgeny Minayev.

At the 1957 Maccabiah Games in Tel Aviv, he won a gold medal in featherweight and broke a world record in press lift. He also won two gold medals at the Pan American Games (1959 and 1963) and was an eight-time national champion. Berger was inducted into the US Weightlifting Hall of Fame in 1965 and the International Jewish Sports Hall of Fame in 1980. *(BM)*

Aleksandr Sidorenko (URS), *27 May 1960 in Mariupol (UKR); †20 February 2022 in Mariupol. Along with fellow Ukrainian Sergey Fesenko, Sidorenko was one of the top individual medley swimmers in the world in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During his career, he won the 1980 Olympic 400 IM gold, World Championships 200 IM gold (1982) and bronze (1978), and a European Championships 200 IM gold (1981) and bronze (1977). He also set the 200 individual medley world record when he clocked 2:05.24 at the 1978 Soviet Championships. Domestically, Sidorenko won 11 Soviet titles, seven in the 200 individual medley (1978–79, 1981–85), two in the medley relay (1982, 1984), one in the 100 backstroke (1979), and one in the 400 IM (1979).

After finishing his sporting career, Sidorenko worked as a swimming coach in his native Mariupol. From 1987–97, he was head coach of the Illichivets Mariupol water polo team and, in 1997, became their manager. In 1982, he married Yelena Kruglova, who won bronze in the 1980 Olympic medley relay. *(AC)*

Charlie Greene (USA), *21 March 1945 in Pine Bluff, Arkansas; †14 March 2022 in Lincoln, Nebraska. Greene won an Olympic gold in the relay and a bronze in the 100 metres. In 1968 he also had some memorable battles with Jim Hines, winning three of their six meetings but losing the biggest one of all at the Olympics.

After retiring as a sprinter, Greene had a career in the US Army, serving for over 20 years and retiring as a major. He worked at the US Military Academy, where he coached sprinters. After retiring, he worked with Special Olympics International. He eventually returned to coach at Northeast High in Lincoln, Nebraska, and worked for the University of Nebraska in the UNL Life Skills programme, as well as teaching a course on the History and Impact of the Olympic Games for the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute. *(BM)*

Maria Ivanova Gusakova (URS), née Kudimova, *6 February 1931 in Simoshkino, Ryazan (RUS); †8 May 2022 in St. Petersburg. The Soviet cross-country skiing champion came to Leningrad after World War II. In 1946, Gusakova learned the trade of carpenter from her father and later worked as a seamstress. In the mid-1950s, she began skiing, ice skating, rowing, and track and field at Spartak Leningrad. She made her international debut at the 1958 World Championships, where she was sixth in the 10 km.



At the 1960 Winter Olympics, Gusakova was not considered the top Soviet skier. Still, in the 10 km, after being 23 seconds behind the leader at the halfway point, she won the event with a very strong finish, surprisingly defeating her more famous team members, Lyubov Baranova-Kozyreva, Radiya Yeroshina, and Alevtina Kolchina. This was the first medal sweep at the Winter Olympics for the Soviet Union. Gusakova added a silver in the relay at the same Olympics and a bronze in the 10 km at the 1964 Winter Olympics in Innsbruck.

At the 1962 World Championships, she added a full set of medals to her collection, winning a gold in the relay, placing second at 10 km, and winning a bronze in the 5 km. Domestically Gusakova won six Soviet titles: 5 km in 1961, 10 km in 1960 and 1961, and in the relay in 1958, 1962, and 1966.

Her husband, Nikolay Gusakov (1931–1991), whom she married in 1957, competed in the Nordic combined, winning a bronze at the 1960 Winter Olympics. *(TK)*

Bernhard Germeshausen (GDR), *21 August 1951 in Heiligenstadt; †15 April 2022 in Erfurt. The Thuringia native began as a hurdler and decathlete until 1973, when he moved to the Oberhof Army Sports Club, where a bobsleigh department had been set up for the first time. From 1975, he was Meinhard Nehmer's brakeman on the bobsleigh, with whom he became a sensational Olympic champion in both events in Innsbruck in 1976.

In 1980, he won the Olympic silver with Hans-Jürgen Gerhardt as a driver in a two-man bob, and his third Olympic gold on the four-man bob. He was also a member of the East German Olympic team from 1984, but he did not take part. In 1981, he participated at the Olympic Congress in Baden-Baden as an athlete's representative.

Germeshausen studied at the Teacher Training College in Erfurt. He then worked as a career advisor at the Olympic Base in Thuringia and as a boarding school director at a sports secondary school. *(VK)*

Dean Woods (AUS), *22 June 1966 in Wangaratta, Victoria; †3 March 2022 at the Gold Coast. Dean, brother of Olympic mountain biker Rob Woods, was a three-time track cycling Olympian. He won the gold medal with the Australian pursuit team in Los Angeles in 1984 and two more bronze medals in 1988 and 1992. He also earned the silver medal in the individual pursuit in 1988 at Seoul. At the Commonwealth Games in 1986 and 1994, he earned three gold, one silver, and one bronze. He later owned a bicycle shop and died after a long battle with cancer at the young age of 55. The Australian cycling legend, who had lived in Queensland in recent years, had always wanted to have his final resting place in Wangaratta. *(WR)*

John Emery (CAN), *4 January 1932 in Montréal; †21 February 2022. Encouraged by his brother Vic, John Emery joined in founding the Laurentian Bobsledding Association

in 1957. He already had a long history of athletics: from an early age, he competed in track and field, boxing, and skiing and excelled in all of them before taking up bobsledding.

The Emery brothers were forced to practice in Lake Placid, New York, with starts in dry gymnasiums. At Innsbruck in 1964, they only had four practice runs, far less than other teams who had been testing the run for weeks but nevertheless won the gold at those Winter Games.

A doctor by trade, Emery became a well-known plastic surgeon in San Francisco before retiring. He remained active in athletics, running the Boston Marathon in 1979 and participating in the Ironman Triathlon the following year. He later lived on a ranch in Sonoma, California, where he launched his own wine label. *(PT)*

Ivanka Hristova (BUL), *19 November 1941 in Osikovitsa; †24 February 2022 in Sofia. The shot putter competed at four consecutive Olympics starting in 1964, winning gold in 1976 and bronze in 1972. She also competed at four European Championships, placing fourth in 1969 and 1974. At the European Indoor Championships, Hristova won in 1976 and took silver in 1967 and 1969 and bronze in 1975. She was Balkan Games champion in 1966–73 and 1975 and Bulgarian champion in 1961–66 and 1968–74. Hristova set two world records during her career: on 3 July 1976, less than a month before the 1976 Olympics, she threw 21.87 m, and two days later, improved that mark to 21.89. *(BM)*

Alevtina Pavlova Kolchina (URS), née Leontyeva, *11 November 1930 in Pavlovsky, Perm Kray (RUS); †1 March 2022 in Otepää (EST). Alevtina Kolchina was the most successful female Soviet cross country skier of the 1950s. With her husband, Pavel Kolchin (1930–2010), they still are the most successful cross-country skiing pair. They are also the only husband and wife pair to win the Holmenkollen Medal (1963).

Alevtina Kolchina won her first medals at the Soviet championships in 1954 and her last medals in 1970. Throughout her career, she earned 13 Soviet titles. Internationally, besides her five Olympic medals, Kolchina won seven World Championships. She also won 10 km (1961–63) and 5 km (1966) races at Holmenkollen.

In 1973, the Kolchins moved to Otepää, Estonia, where they later worked as cross-country ski coaches, also serving the Estonian skiing team in various administrative positions. Before obtaining Estonian citizenship, they had to take a compulsory language exam. Their son Fyodor also competed at the Olympics, placing 15th in Nordic combined in 1980. *(TK)*

Kathleen Nord (GDR), *26 December 1965 in Magdeburg; †24 February 2022 in Elmshorn. The East German swimmer specialised in the 400 m medley individual. After becoming World's runner-up in 1982, she won the European Championships in 1983 and 1985 and the World Championships in 1986. After this, she concentrated on the 200 m butterfly and became Olympic champion in 1988 and European Champion again in 1987 and 1989.

She moved to the United States in the early '90s, where she studied marketing. Married Feldvoss, she worked for some time as a coach at the Florida Gold Coast swimming club in Palm Beach. She returned to Germany in 2013. *(VK)*

Karol Divín (TCH), *22 February 1936 in Budapest (HUN); †6 April 2022 in Brno (CZE). Born in Budapest under the name Finster, he was adopted after the end of the war by his Slovak grandmother and given the surname Divín. His first coach was his father, Anton Finster.

Divín was the Czechoslovak champion 11 times in a row from 1954 to 1964. In 1954, he participated in the European Championship for the first time, where he finished third when making his début. He won the

title in 1958 and 1959. He won the European Championship twice (in 1957 and 1962).

Divín competed at the 1956 Winter Olympics, finishing in fifth position. His greatest success was winning the silver medal at the Olympics in Squaw Valley in 1960, followed two years later by silver at the World Championships. He retired in 1964, with fourth place at the Winter Olympics in Innsbruck and bronze at the World Championships. Following his period as an active athlete, he worked as a coach, including in Finland and Canada, where he was a figure training coach together with Brian Orser. *(VK)*

Jonny Nilsson (SWE), *9 February 1943 in Filipstad; †22 June 2022. As a 19-year-old, the Swedish speed skater made his international debut at the European Allround Championships in 1962, where he finished 15th. Two weeks later, he won the 10,000 m at the World Championships and was second in the 5,000 m. His weakness was the 500 m race, but he made up for it at the 1963 World Championships in Karuizawa with two victories in the 5,000 m and 10,000 m races in world-record times. He also set a world record in the big combination.

At the 1964 Winter Olympics in Innsbruck, Nilsson came in at a disappointing sixth place, but two days later, he became Olympic champion in the 10,000 m. He ended his international career coming in at seventh place in the 5,000 m and at sixth place in the 10,000 m at the 1968 Winter Games in Grenoble. He also earned 17 Swedish titles in total across the 1,500, 5,000, 10,000, and all-around events. Nilsson had been suffering from prostate cancer. *(VK)*

Anthony Nash (GBR), *18 March 1936 in Amersham, Buckinghamshire; †17 March 2022 in Cullompton, Devon. Tony Nash, a director of his family's engineering factory, was one of the key figures in the technical

developments behind the resurgence of British bobsledding in the 1960s. He was also a brilliant driver, and with Robin Dixon (now Lord Glentoran) as his brakeman, they won the Olympic title in 1964 and the world title in 1964 and 1965. Nash and Dixon were such an outstanding partnership that their names are seldom mentioned separately. 25 years later, no British pair has come close to matching their achievements. *(HE)*

Christina "Stien" Baas-Kaiser (NED), *20 May 1938 in Delft; †23 June 2022. Stien Kaiser was the first world-class Dutch female speed skater. She won six national championships in the combined event (1964, 1965, 1967–69 and 1971) and was twice world champion (1967 and 1968) and second in 1969 to 1972. Curiously, as a 25-year-old in 1964, she was considered "too old" for the team; by the standards of the time, a woman of that age was expected to be married and have children.

So, Stien Kaiser had to wait four years before she got another chance for the Olympics. She won bronze medals in the 1,500 m and 3,000 m but was overshadowed by Carrie Geijssen and Ans Schut, who were Olympic champions. Subsequently outclassed by Atje Keulen-Deelstra of the same age, she was again considered a write-off, especially after an 11th place at the 1972 European Championships. As a result, she was only included as a reserve in the Olympic team in Sapporo. However, after Trijnie Rep's disappointing performance in the short distances, she was nominated for the long distances. She finished second in the 1,500 m and achieved a grand conclusion to her skating career as the 3,000 m Olympic champion. *(VK)*

AC = Andrey Chilikin, BM = Bill Mallon, HE = Hilary Evans, IJ = Ian Jobling, PT = Paul Tchir, TK = Taavi Kalju, VK = Volker Kluge, WR = Wolf Reinhardt



The ISOH offers the families of the deceased its sincere condolences.

BOOK REVIEWS



Roman Deininger / Uwe Ritzer
Die Spiele des Jahrhunderts
Olympia 1972, der Terror und das neue
Deutschland
(The Games of the Century: Olympia 1972,
Terror, and the New Germany)
dtv, München 2021, in German
25.00 EUR, 528 pages, ISBN 978-3-423-28303-8

Reviewed by Volker Kluge

First of all, I have to confess something. After reading this book's first chapter, titled "Hitler's Games – Berlin 1936", I felt a strong urge to put the book aside again. Essentially none of the myths that have long been dealt with and disproved for years were left out. And even more mistakes and misinterpretations were added.

So as not to bore anyone, I will give only one example: on page 81, the authors claim that 25 (!) rounds of voting were necessary for the 1952 IOC presidential election until Avery Brundage defeated David Burghley. How could this have been possible with only two contenders? In fact, there was only one round, which Brundage won by 30–17 with two abstentions.


Despite this and other conundrums, I did not regret my decision to continue reading. The book is written by two prominent journalists from the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and it's quite interesting and entertaining. Not only do they write about the 1972

Olympics in Munich, which were supposed to be a counter-project to Berlin in 1936, they also link events and episodes to the political events of the time and everyday life. As clever reporters, they use the American model of the linguistic present tense, making the book sound more contemporary.

On a journey through time, readers can experience the Cold War, the division of Germany, race and student riots, the Vietnam War, and the rise of global terrorism. You learn a lot about people's attitude towards life at the time and their spirit of optimism, especially young people in Germany, who identified with their Social Democratic Chancellor, Willy Brandt. Munich's so-called *Heitere Spiele* (Cheerful Games) stood for this political and spiritual climate. But the outcome is well known. What was planned as a unique event – described by the authors as "Games of the Century" – ended up in a catastrophe that the world still talks about today.

Undoubtedly, the authors have done intensive research and brought to light much of what has long been forgotten. The story behind sensational news, such as the course of the terrorist attack and the failed attempt to liberate the Israeli hostages, was not to be expected from the outset since relevant files – for whatever reason – are still inaccessible. Nevertheless, the amount of knowledge this book conveys is particularly informative for readers who did not experience these Games personally, especially since a number of contemporary witnesses get a chance to have their say.

On the other hand, serious historians will be less satisfied – despite an extensive list of cited archives and literature. Unfortunately, exact references were omitted, which is detrimental to the value of the book. It closes with an epilogue that mentions further events in the lives of some of the protagonists. An index of persons provides additional orientation.



Andreas Maier
Franz Stampfl
Genius Coach and Citizen of the World:
A Biography
SportImPuls, Vienna
£8.02, \$9.99, €9.52, 192 pages, e-book available
on Amazon, ISBN: 978-3200033665

Reviewed by Olaf Brockmann

An updated version of the biography of the Austrian-born athletics coach Franz Stampfl is now available in English as an e-book. Author Andreas Maier tells a still largely unknown chapter of transnational sports history of the 20th century.

Stampfl, born in Vienna in 1913, lived and worked as an athlete and coach in Austria, Great Britain, and Australia. He celebrated Olympic victories and world records with his athletes. The most outstanding success was the first sub-four-minute mile on 6 May 1954 by the Briton Roger Bannister.

Stampfl trained Bannister and his two pacemakers, Chris Brasher and Chris Chataway, in the months leading up to this groundbreaking race. Chataway set a 5,000 m world record that same year. Brasher won Olympic gold in the 3,000 m steeplechase at the 1956 Games, while Ralph Doubell, an Australian also coached by Stampfl, was 800 m Olympic champion in Mexico City in 1968.

But the sporting successes are only a part of this story. Stampfl, like many other people, experienced the brutal force of war, the collapse of certainties, and the life-changing effect of political decisions on personal lives. As the

assistant coach of the Austrian team at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, he saw first-hand the spectacle organised by Nazi Germany.

He left Vienna for London of his own free will in 1937, where he was considered an “enemy alien” after the outbreak of the Second World War. Together with 2,500 other people, he was shipped to Australia and interned for almost two years.

Stampfl served in the Australian Army, made his way back to Europe, and started coaching in Northern Ireland before Roger Bannister’s legendary mile race made him a celebrated coach. In the run-up to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, he accepted a job offer to coach in Australia, the home country of his wife, Patricia.

Stampfl was a gifted motivator, sought new coaching approaches and methods, led jogging groups for affluent people as early as the 1960s, and managed to get into the heads and hearts of his athletes. He had his rough edges and did not avoid conflicts, but he was able to transfer his visionary goals to others and had an unconditional drive to persevere in difficult situations. He especially needed this ability for the last 14 years of his life after a car accident paralysed his arms and legs. However, he remained active as a coach, stating, “As long as I have my eyes and my voice, I can coach.”

Stampfl died in Melbourne in 1995. In his native Austria, here remained almost completely unknown, although he was in Vienna several times privately for family visits. In 2019, the World Athletics Federation posthumously awarded him the World Athletics Heritage Plaque for being a “legendary and pioneering coach”. The Austrian Athletics Federation accepted the plaque on his behalf.

This English biography is based on the German-language book *Franz Stampfl: Trainergenie und Weltbürger*, published in 2013. The text was updated by the author in several places and supplemented with

contributions by the London-based translator Andy Edwards.

Andreas Maier researched this biography through conversations and contacts with athletes and contemporaries in Austria, Great Britain, and Australia, taking into account the existing historiography and conducting archival research in cooperation with historians. Anton Stampfl, Franz Stampfl’s son, also provided extensive interviews and personal material.



František Kolář & Kolektiv
**Encyklopedie olympioniků:
Čeští a českoslovenští sportovci na
olympijských hrách**
**(Encyclopedia of Olympians:
Czech and Czechoslovak Athletes
at the Olympic Games)**

Universum, Prague 2021, in Czech
699 CZK (USD 29.94), 440 pages
ISBN 978-80-242-7474-4

Reviewed by Sirko Wahsner

After the Czech Olympic Committee celebrated the 100th anniversary of its foundation in 1899 by publishing an abundantly illustrated picture book (*JOH*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 79–80), it followed up with an encyclopaedia of the Olympians for its 120th birthday.

This opulent and attractive work builds on the *Who’s Who of Our Olympians*, in which the biographies of all Czechoslovak and – beginning with Lillehammer in 1994 – Czech athletes were published for the first time. The author was again ISOH member František Kolář, who was supported collectively by six colleagues.

Detailed descriptions were provided for all medal winners up to and including the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic Winter Games, as well as those athletes who placed in the top six in individual disciplines. All the others were statistically recorded with their biographical data and Olympic results. For the first time, those participating in the art competitions were also included.

Further notable officials and athletes are also included, such as Jiří Guth-Jarkovský, who was one of the founding members of the IOC in 1894, and the Jewish marathon runner Oskar Hekš, who finished eighth in Los Angeles in 1932 and played an important role in the boycott movement against the 1936 Olympics in Berlin. He was murdered at the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1944.

This new encyclopaedia is a significant contribution – remarkable for a small country that can point to great Olympic successes.



Sven Felix Kellerhoff
**Anschlag auf Olympia
Was 1972 in München wirklich geschah**
**(Attack on Olympia:
What Really Happened in Munich in 1972)**
wbgTheiss, Darmstadt 2022, in German
25.00 EUR, 240 pages, ISBN 978-3-8062-4420-5

Reviewed by Volker Kluge

The 1972 attack by Palestinian terrorists on the Israeli team in Munich is undoubtedly one of the most dealt-with events in Olympic history.

Three years after the event, it was addressed by the French journalist Serge Groussard, husband of the then IOC director Monique Berlioux. He also provided the material for the 1976 TV drama *21 Hours at Munich*, directed by William A. Graham. Since then, a dozen other books and films have been published, including Arthur Cohn's Oscar-winning documentary *One Day in September* (2000) and Steven Spielberg's feature film *Munich* (2005).

In view of celebrities like these, what can be expected of German journalist Sven Felix Kellerhoff, who gave his work the bold subtitle "Was 1972 in München wirklich geschah" (What really happened in Munich in 1972)? Does this not denigrate the previously published interpretations? I say "No".

Firstly, Kellerhoff is known as a successful "frequent writer" of historical topics, and secondly, the 40-page appendix, which includes a precise list of sources and explanatory endnotes, proves how seriously he approached this undertaking. The relatively thin, unpretentious volume, whose publication was made possible by members of a scientific book community, packs a punch. If you want to know what really happened on 5 September 1972, you can find it here in this book, but with the caveat that some of the explosive archived material is still subject to a blackout clause.

The research that Kellerhoff undertook must have been enormous. In addition to evaluating contemporary press publications, he conducted a series of eyewitness interviews and searched through a great deal of archival material, including documents that the East German secret service left behind. This includes a 13-page protocol by three sports journalists, now also accessible on the internet, who observed the events on behalf of the East German team management from a balcony of a building opposite the crime scene.

Kellerhoff structured the book in a way that is easy to understand. After the introductory chapter, he describes the security situation, which was considerably exacerbated in the late 1960s by bomb attacks by the Western German terrorist organisation, the Red Army Faction (RAF), and hijackings by Palestinian terrorists. It shows that the Bavarian police did not underestimate the danger in any way. However, the security staff were faced with the dilemma of, on the one hand, using a more tolerant method, known as the "Munich Line", to ensure order while, on the other hand, dealing with accusations of wanting to organise "police-controlled festivals". To maintain the "Heitere Spiele" (Cheerful Games) atmosphere, the police – dressed in Otl Aicher's light blue costumes and mainly unarmed – concentrated on protecting prominent figures and dealing with expected disturbances, above all by the radical left-wing scene, which could not be prevented from carrying out street battles due to the "Law on Keeping Peace during the Olympic Games" that entered into force on 1 July 1972. This stormy weekend was followed by a quiet Monday, which proved to be a deception.

Kellerhoff documents the dramatic events of 5 September that took place from 5:25 am to 10:34 pm strictly chronologically in five chapters: "Demand", "Negotiation", "Saving time", "Deception", and "Trap". The account draws primarily on the sports schedule of the Munich special police commission (Soko), the investigation files of the public prosecutor's office, and the meticulous protocol by the East German journalists, who were mobilised at 6 am and arrived at the Olympic Village unhindered without valid identity cards.

Based on this and other material, Kellerhoff describes the nerve-racking hours in which apparently nothing happened, during which 31 Israeli hostages were held in their blood-smear flat at

Connollystrasse. You learn of the boredom that spread amongst those watching and the clumsy attempts by undercover police officers to enter the building unnoticed while the terrorists watched them live on TV until the broadcasts were finally interrupted. One ultimatum after the other passed without any decisive action, until finally, at 10:30 pm, the hostages and their guards were transported in buses to Fürstfeldbruck Air Base, where they were supposed to be flown out with a Boeing aeroplane.

The last two chapters – "Disaster" and "Shock" – reveal the missteps of the overwhelmed security staff, who were entirely unprepared to deal with this exacerbated situation. Above all, they show the ineptitude of the political decision-makers, who decided from the outset that the ready but only half-fuelled aeroplane should, under no circumstances, take off. The subsequent false report stating that all of the hostages had been liberated, announced by a government spokesman before being verified, was the culmination of a total failure in which the media were also complicit. Here, however, the author is mistaken if he thinks there is no evidence for this.

The book closes with an epilogue that includes the funeral ceremony for the 11 killed Israelis and the Munich policeman who died in the exchange of fire, a speech by IOC President Brundage shortened – as usual – to one sentence, as well as the retaliation by Mossad and the efforts of the victims' families to ensure a worthy commemoration by the IOC and adequate compensation by the German government. A satisfactory solution for all sides is still not yet foreseeable.

This book is not an artificially flatulent "political thriller", although the advertising on the back cover uses this term. Instead, its content is limited to verifiable facts about what actually happened and avoids speculation and false rumours. And that is recommendable.

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NEW MEMBERS

REDNER Gregg Mr. *25 March 1961, *e-mail address:* greggredner@rogers.com; *address:* 49 Byron Ave, Dorchester, ON N0L1G2, CANADA; *occupation:* university professor; *Olympic/sports publications:* The Canadian Philatelist, The Journal of Sports Philately; *specific Olympic research interests:* Winter Olympics through 1960, 1920 Antwerp Olympics.

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Jim Thorpe as Sole 1912 Gold Medallist

The IOC will henceforth display the name of Jim Thorpe as the sole gold medallist in pentathlon and decathlon at the Olympic Games Stockholm 1912. This development has been made possible by the engagement of the Bright Path Strong organisation, supported by IOC Member Anita DeFrantz. They contacted the Swedish

NOC and the surviving family members of Hugo Wieslander, who was named as the gold medallist in decathlon when Thorpe was stripped of his medals in 1913. They confirmed that Wieslander himself had never accepted the Olympic gold medal allocated to him, and had always been of the opinion that Jim Thorpe was the sole legitimate Olympic gold medallist.

The same declaration was received from the Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and

Confederation of Sports, whose athlete, Ferdinand Bie, was named as the gold medallist when Thorpe was stripped of the pentathlon title.

IOC President Thomas Bach said: "We welcome the fact that, thanks to the great engagement of Bright Path Strong, a solution could be found. This is a most exceptional and unique situation, which has been addressed by an extraordinary gesture of fair play from the National Olympic Committees concerned." (IOC/JOH)



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