

# "Universalizing Olympism: Japanese Memories of the Bid for the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games"\*

by Sandra Collins

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## *Introduction: The Importance of the Failed 1940 Olympic Bid*

During the recent 2008 Beijing Games, the Japanese media encouraged the constant comparison with the 1964 Tokyo Games.<sup>1</sup> For the Japanese, the Beijing Games were an opportunity to recall the first Olympics held in Asia, the successful 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. The 1964 Olympics were staged with much fanfare in Japan and ushered in a new era for both Japan and the Olympic Movement: Japan celebrated its entrance as a normalized member of the international community and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) commemorated the internationalization of the Olympic Games with the first Games to be hosted in Asia. The 1964 Tokyo Games was the first to make "visible" the grand historical narrative of the Olympic Movement as the natural progression of "Olympism" throughout the world.<sup>2</sup> For many Japanese, the 1964 Tokyo Games has served as such a fundamental turning point in national history that any mention of an Asian Olympic host - in 1988 Seoul or 2008 Beijing - necessarily evokes the 1964 Tokyo Games as the inaugural event that made possible all subsequent Asian Olympic hosts.

The 1964 Tokyo Olympics were the first of what have come to be labeled the East Asian Olympic Games (which also include the 1988 Seoul and 2008 Beijing Games) by recent academics and scholars.<sup>3</sup> In a sense, the East Asian Olympic Games are visual spectacles of the abstraction of the Olympic Movement made global. It is this indebtedness to the Japanese effort to secure not only the Olympic legacy within Japan but also in Asia that the Japanese media sought to underscore within Japan during the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

Within the context of the Beijing Olympics, there were also Japanese evocations of the earlier Tokyo Olympic Bid for the 1940 Games.<sup>4</sup> The 1940 Olympic bid was often discussed in conjunction with the Beijing Games, because Tokyo was vying to host the 2016 Olympic Games and was publicizing the 1940 Olympic bid during the crucial period of January 2008 until the October 2009 IOC Session in Copenhagen that decided the host of the 2016 Games.<sup>5</sup> The Tokyo 2016 Olympic bid organizers emphasized not only the realized legacies of the successful 1964 Tokyo but also the unfulfilled legacies from the failed 1940 Olympic bid. They saw both as a valuable indicator of Tokyo's abilities to host "a new Olympics informed by a new urban civilization."<sup>6</sup> For the Tokyo Governor ISHIIHARA Shintarō, the 2016 Olympic Bid was a sustained effort to jumpstart the Tokyo economy in order to reinvigorate the national economy of Japan. These numerous evoca-

tions of both the 1964 Olympic Games and 1940 Olympic Bid served as powerful "lieux de mémoire" for the city of Tokyo, as Pierre NORA has analyzed in another context, to consolidate the Japanese claims to the Olympic heritage in Asia. No longer fixed to physical sites associated with the Olympic Games, such as TANGE Kenzō's Yoyogi Stadium or even the bullet train, the symbolic status of being the first Asian Olympic host has garnered Japan the right to claim the Olympic heritage in East Asia.<sup>7</sup> Although the 1940 Olympic Games were never staged, along with the 1964 Olympics that were held in Tokyo, they have come to represent the consolidation of Olympic heritage in East Asia as belonging to Japan. This is why any mention of an Asian Olympics necessitates the reminder of how it was Japan that became the first Asian nation to bid for the Olympic Games of 1940 and then it was the first Asian nation to actually stage them in 1964.

The Japanese claim ownership of the Olympic heritage in Asia for several reasons. One is that it in 1936 Tokyo/Japan was the first Asian nation to receive the right to host the Olympic Games of 1940, well before South Korea and China. Although the 1940 Tokyo Games were cancelled, the unrealised plans for the 1940 Olympic Bid have come to represent for Japan a reminder of the fact that they were the first Asian nation to receive international recognition as a capable Olympic host. This acknowledgment was earned well before the other Asian nations of South Korea and China. In addition, Japan could point to the longest Olympic heritage in Asia. They had first taken part in the Games in 1912 in Stockholm. According to this logic, Olympism was introduced to Asia and simultaneously Asia was introduced to Olympism through Tokyo/Japan's inaugural bid. The bid rhetoric and development plans of the 1940 Olympic Games which never took place would come to inform not only the successful 1964 Tokyo Games, but also 1988 Seoul and 2008 Beijing as my recent work on the Olympic Games in East Asia has demonstrated.<sup>8</sup>

Not only would the 1940 Olympic bid by Japan provide a template for the 1964 bid strategy and subsequent East Asian Olympic journeys, it was also historic at the time. As the first bid by a non Western nation, it challenged many political and cultural assumptions that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had of Japan and Asia.<sup>9</sup> The Olympic encounter between the East and West demanded that Asian bid organizers engage in self-representational diplomacy and cultural representation that often affirmed western stereotypes of the East. From the political process that Japanese officials used to campaign for the 1940 Games to how Japan defined their culture in the Olympic Games, the 1940 Olympic Bid would set the terms for how the IOC regarded Asian candidates and how subsequent Asian nations would also define

their culture in future Olympic bids.<sup>10</sup> For Asian Olympic bids, their modernity is often showcased in specific cultural terms as differing from the West as a form of hybrid: modern enough to host the Games but still embedded within ancient, Asian traditions so as not to upset a perceived western monopoly of modernization. Asian Olympic bids also underscore how the Olympic Games have been held on in the West. Furthermore, the very strategies and tactics in which the 1930s Tokyo Bid organizers engaged were predicated by the fact that many IOC members had no direct experience of Japan or Asia. As such, the 1940 Olympic Bid necessitated a level of highly contentious politicking and paid trips to Tokyo that countered previous IOC protocols and customs in order to make the 1940 Olympic Bid viable in the minds of key IOC members. The 1940 Olympic Bid was the first internationally accepted reconciliation of the East/West dichotomy in culture and political terms. Although ultimately, the Games never took place as a result of the political situation of the time, this does not detract from the historical significance that the 1940 Olympic Bid would have on the East Asian Olympic Games of 1964 Tokyo, 1988 Seoul and 2008 Beijing.



#### *The 1940 Olympic Bid: The Rhetoric of Universalizing Olympism*

The Tokyo Olympic bid for 1940 began in 1932 Tokyo was duly awarded the games by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1936 in Berlin. In 1938 the Japanese Government had to hand them back. The 1940 Olympic bid by Tokyo had two contradictory goals that were never resolved upon their cancellation: the first was to receive international recognition as an expanding world power in Asia. The second aim was more nationalistic. They would mobilize the population at home to celebrate the 2,600<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Founding of the Japanese Empire (*Kigen 2,600nen*). Despite Japanese military aggression in Asia with the 1931 establishment of Manchukuo as a Japanese puppet state, the IOC awarded the 1940 Games to Japan in part because of the self-repudiated IOC claim that "sports is above politics."<sup>11</sup> Ultimately, the IOC supported the idea of Olympic Games in Tokyo in 1940 because of the most compelling bid rhetoric: a 1940 Tokyo Games would further universalize the Olympic Movement. From the perspective of the Japanese bidding campaign, in order for the Olympics to belong to the world and be truly universal, they would need to be hosted by a non-Western city and preferably an Asian city. Many Japanese argued passionately that the Olympic logo of the five interlocking coloured rings that symbolized the colors of all the flags of all the countries on five continents was a hollow symbol without a non-Western Olympic host. The IOC member in Japan, SUGIMURA Yōtarō, would tell the 1935 IOC Session in Oslo, "In order for the Olympic Games to be truly international in reality and not just in name, various nations from the Eastern hemisphere must also contribute to the Olympic Games."<sup>12</sup>

SUGIMURA was echoing the sentiment of the Japanese supporters of the Tokyo Olympic Bid for Tokyo that the Olympic Games would help provide an alternative forum of international diplomacy for Japan. In 1932 newly

elected Tokyo Mayor NAGATA Hidejirō recognized that he would need to plan for an event to be held in 1940 as the 2,600<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the accession of Emperor Jinmu (*Kigen 2,600nen*), the crowning national ceremony of imperial Japan. The Mayor's campaign would prove to be successful, notwithstanding the attractive economic, political and ideological aspects of the 1940 bid, because of the unique historical context of an internationally isolationist 1930s Japan. After Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 upon the conclusion of the Lytton Report condemning their role in the establishment of Manchukuo as a puppet government in 1931, Japanese diplomats, sports officials, bureaucrats and politicians realized the allure of "people's diplomacy" (*kokumin gaiko*) that could be achieved through the Olympics with the spectacular performance of Japan's Olympic athletes at the 1932 Los Angeles Games.

As new mayors of Tokyo came and went, Olympic bid rhetoric was unwavering in its argument of how a Tokyo Olympics would universalize the Olympic Games, "Despite the fact that Olympism must be spread to all races of the world, the Olympic Games have only been held in Europe and the United States. The Olympic Games must be held in Asia, which has the world's largest population in order for Olympism to become truly universal."<sup>13</sup> As such, the significance of the 1940 Tokyo bid was elevated to be not just a Japanese but also an international concern. If Tokyo were to win the 1940 Olympic Bid, they would become the first non-western host city, and as such, the Tokyo Games were seen as an important vehicle for spreading Olympism in Asia and thus the world.

Accordingly, the 1940 Tokyo Bid offered to enrich the Olympic Games in two ways. First, the Tokyo Games would make the Olympic Games truly universal by having the Games held in the East. Secondly, the Tokyo Olympics would infuse the Olympic Games and the West with the 2,600 year old culture of Japan, making the 1940 Olympiad truly epoch-making.<sup>14</sup> These two claims – of universality and of a harmonious blending of cultures – would be repeatedly emphasized in the bid materials in the upcoming years as appeals to the unique culture would be used by Japan to differentiate the Tokyo bid from other candidates. The founder of the modern Olympic Movement, Baron Pierre de COUBERTIN, wrote to the Mayor of Tokyo to congratulate Tokyo on its successful Olympic bid for 1940. COUBERTIN had written the following about the contemporary notion of a harmonious blending of the East and the West:

"The task of celebrating the XIIth Olympic Games will be the greatest ever given to a country, for it does not mean merely to pursue the Olympic Torch through the universe and to unite the whole of Asia with the modern Olympism in the most cordial manner, but also to combine Hellenism, the most precious civilization of ancient Europe, with the refined culture and art of Asia."<sup>15</sup>

This notion of grafting Japanese ancient civilization onto Hellenism was a key concept of the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Bid. Even as the Japanese were about to hand the games back in 1938, KASAI Jiuji, a member of the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet addressed the American

radio public from NBC Studios in New York. He proclaimed that the 1940 Tokyo Games would be staged and would create a new "world" civilization. He stated:

"As sponsors of the Olympic Games, we are thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the ancient Olympiad so nobly interpreted by the late Baron COUBERTIN. We are now making preparations with a sincere desire to enhance the spirit of modern Olympism in the Orient. Thus, by combining Hellenism, which is the most precious heritage of ancient Greece, with the civilization and culture of the ancient East, we are hoping to make our contributions to the advancement of world civilization."<sup>16</sup>

The 2,600th anniversary festival in this proposal was not just a nationalistic one to be celebrated only by the Japanese, but was portrayed as a unique event that would also contribute to the Olympic Games and the entire world was to be invited to participate.

The Tokyo campaign for the 1940 Olympic bid actively challenged the universalistic claims made by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by emphasizing that the Games had never been held outside the United States or Europe and it argued that the Olympic Games would never be truly universal until they were held outside the west. The alluring image of Japan that was being conjured up by Japanese ideologues through the 1940 Tokyo Olympics – as the unique embodiment of the east and the west and of the traditional and the modern – attracted global support. Many within the international community accepted the fashioning of a Japanese modernity that differed from the West as a sign of the enduring difference between the East and the West. Japanese proponents of the Tokyo Olympics knowingly glamorized the economic unevenness that differentiated Japan from the west in cultural terms in order to secure the 1940 Olympiad. The quaint traditions of Japanese culture and countryside unspoiled by modern influence were presented by the Japanese as representative examples of the attractiveness of Japan as a host nation to the Olympics. The international community, as represented by the IOC, responded by selecting Tokyo to be the inaugural Asian Olympics, the first held outside Europe and the United States. Despite some perceived weaknesses of the Tokyo bid, IOC members believed that Japan would eventually host the Olympic Games, so they supported the Tokyo candidature for 1940.<sup>17</sup> The success of the Tokyo bid for the 1940 Olympic Games was ultimately predicated on the fact that for both Japan and the world in the 1930s, modernity – as represented by the Olympics – could no longer be considered solely as a Western monopoly.

sation that erupted from the surprising performance of the Japanese athletes, members associated with the 1940 Tokyo bid began to emphasize that the Olympic Games were an effective channel of "people's diplomacy."<sup>18</sup> So they began to emphasize the Olympic Games as a form of "People's Diplomacy" (*kokuminteki gaikō*).<sup>19</sup>

The perceived 'misunderstanding' of Japan by other nations was based on the increased international alienation that Japan encountered since its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933. That is, "people's diplomacy" came to be read as a channel of informal diplomacy, in which the shortcomings of formal diplomacy could be overcome through the interaction of national citizens in different forums. The success of Japanese competitors at the Los Angeles 1932 Olympic Games and the attendant positive international media coverage helped persuade national bureaucrats and politicians of the power of the Olympics.



After the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Bid employed unprecedented bidding tactics. The IOC had an established protocol for such matters by implication, a concept that was not necessarily appreciated by the Japanese. The 1940 Tokyo Olympic Bid included aggressive tactics, including unprecedented diplomatic negotiations with the Premier of Italy as well as travel subsidies for key IOC members to visit Tokyo. The unprecedented state-to-state negotiations threatened the very authority of the IOC to control all aspects of any decision regarding the Olympic Games. Nonetheless, the Tokyo Bid Committee employed yet another unprecedented tactic: the IOC President was invited on an all-expense paid trip to tour Tokyo and Japan in 1936 and returned to Europe a strong and vocal supporter of Tokyo. Ultimately, the Japanese Olympic state-to-state negotiations, which resulted in the withdrawals of both the Rome and London candidatures, startled the world, and the Tokyo bid gained instant international visibility and notoriety.

Advocates of the Tokyo bid elicited the advice of diplomats and ambassadors, who were hitherto considered to be outsiders to the Olympic community. In the past, most Olympic campaigns had focused on IOC members during IOC Sessions, and the move by those affiliated with

### *The 1940 Tokyo Olympic Bid (II): Bidding Politics*

The 1940 Tokyo Olympic Bid was a sensational confrontation between the customs of the East and the West. For an increasingly isolated nation after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, the Olympic Games were heralded by many Japanese ideologues as a forum of people's diplomacy (*kokuminteki gaikō*) especially in the 1932 aftermath of the Japanese Olympic athletes' performance in Los Angeles. Exploiting the media sen-

the Tokyo bid to bring the campaign directly to nationally appointed ambassadors, outside the framework of the IOC, was extremely novel.<sup>20</sup> The tipping point that determined the success of the Tokyo campaign was also the most controversial for any host candidature in the history of the IOC bidding process. The City of Tokyo commissioned the IOC members in Japan, SUGIMURA Yōtarō and Count SOYESHIMA Michimasa, to meet Italian dictator Benito MUSSOLINI before the start of the Oslo IOC Session in 1935.<sup>21</sup> It was highly controversial for any member of the IOC to actively canvas any politician, let alone a head of state outside of the Olympic community. Nevertheless, the Japanese delegate SOYESHIMA was sent to Rome in January 1935 to join SUGIMURA. They asked MUSSOLINI to withdraw the candidature of Rome for the 1940 Games in favor of Tokyo. The three met on February 8<sup>th</sup> in Rome. SOYESHIMA explained why Rome should step aside in favour of Japan. Soyeshima pleaded with MUSSOLINI that "if the Olympics were held in Tokyo it would help to bind together in close bounds of amity the East and West, thus contributing to the peace of the world."<sup>22</sup> The Duce surprisingly agreed.<sup>23</sup>

The aggressive Japanese campaign activities, culminating in the successful negotiations with MUSSOLINI, forced the Olympic community to articulate many of its unspoken assumptions about the received traditions and protocols of the Olympic Games. First, the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI) and the IOC delegate Alberto BONACOSSA in Italy protested against the decision made by MUSSOLINI to put the candidature of Rome on hold. Italian Olympic officials openly opposed the Japanese assertion that the fate of the Rome candidacy was to be decided not by CONI but by MUSSOLINI. Secondly, the IOC President was unhappy that behind-the-scenes negotiations with political officials were to be used to decide any Olympic matter. Ultimately, the inability of the IOC to resolve many issues during the 1935 Oslo IOC Session forced the postponement of the selection of the host for the 1940 Olympiad. At the Oslo IOC Session, the negotiations between Italy and Japan concerning the Tokyo candidature became a controversy which threatened the IOC control over the Olympic Games.<sup>24</sup> The discussions on the 1940 host city between Japan and Italy at government level were the first of their kind. The IOC President was now confronted with the problem of how to resolve this unprecedented issue during the IOC Oslo Session at which the final vote for the 1940 Olympiad was to take place.<sup>25</sup> IOC Chairman BAILLET-LATOUR stated that "The vote for the 1940 Olympic Games will be postponed until next year in light of the fact that recent outside political interference created this impossible situation which ignored the rules and tradition of the IOC that it is the IOC that controls of the Olympic Games."<sup>26</sup> But for the IOC, what was at stake with the Japan-Italy pact was its control of the Olympic Games. The IOC President believed that the IOC alone had the authority to determine any matter concerning the Olympic Games within the restricted domain of the IOC delegates and Executive Committee. Any agreements reached between members outside of the Olympic community were viewed as actions that encroached upon the authority of the IOC to decide any Olympic issue. As the

role of national governments increased in any decision by a city to host the Olympics due to the expanded scale of staging the Olympic Games in the 1930s, the political dimension of the Games also intensified. Their negotiations with Mussolini were viewed by Japan as a logical extension of national policy that did not interfere with the jurisdiction of the IOC over the Olympic Games.

The Oslo IOC Session proceedings revealed the degree to which the IOC President was ambivalent towards the Tokyo candidacy, and Tokyo bid officials vowed to change the opinion of the President by inviting him to Japan. This was another unprecedented tactic in host city campaigning. Japanese sport officials described the IOC President as being "sympathetic towards Japan only as a curious object of exoticism, like one would love a cute pet. In his innermost thoughts, he does not think that Japan could be called a strong Olympic host candidate despite the fact that Japan is a top-ranked sports nation."<sup>27</sup> The bid committee decided upon yet another unprecedented move: to have the City of Tokyo invite the IOC President to inspect Tokyo and Japan.<sup>28</sup> The IOC President coached the bid committee on how to invite him to tour Japan and how to present his trip to Japan to the international media so as to not appear impartial to Finland.<sup>29</sup> BAILLET-LATOUR agreed to visit Japan under the condition that the city of Tokyo pay his expenses and publicize his tour as a "private trip."<sup>30</sup> He encouraged the Japanese Foreign Ministry to work with the City of Tokyo to discourage being formally invited to Japan and to label the tour a "private trip" (*kojinteki ryokō*) which was still unprecedented in the history of IOC protocols.<sup>31</sup> The highly controversial nature of the inspection tour required the utmost discretion of the Japanese government and the IOC President. After a three-week, all-expense-paid trip to Japan, at an estimated cost of 15,000 yen to Japan in November, ultimately, the IOC President was converted into a strong supporter of the Tokyo candidacy.<sup>32</sup>

Japanese bid officials viewed Japan as uniquely positioned to disseminate the Olympic ideals throughout the world, for they saw Tokyo, Japan as the new centre of the world and a formidable imperial power. Tokyo was presented as the most logical entry point for popularizing the Olympic Movement in Asia. In addition, the bid rhetoric of 1936 encouraged the IOC to consume the difference between the East and West, while the definition of what constituted a harmonious blending was left unanswered. IOC member Count SOYESHIMA described the importance of the Tokyo Olympiad as blending the different cultural heritages of the east and west, "The true aspects of Japanese culture, old and new, would be open to the eyes of the world. Therefore, the organizers are advised to be well aware of the fact that the most careful attentions should be given in the preparations in order to convey the true spirit of the East and West and to aim at the harmonious blending of the two great cultures."<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the financial package emphasized that Japan had not only gained enough surplus capital to invest in the construction and planning required to host the modern Olympics, but also to finance the travel and living expenses of foreign athletes.<sup>34</sup> The financial package was then unprecedented in Olympic history; no other host nation had ever needed to

resort to subsidizing the participation of other nations.<sup>35</sup> With a final vote of thirty-six to twenty-seven, the Games of the Twelfth Olympiad were allotted to the City of Tokyo at the 1936 IOC Session in Berlin. After seven long years of aggressive campaigning and politicking, Japan won the right to host the 1940 Olympiad.<sup>36</sup> Tokyo/Japan became the first Asian nation to campaign for and win the right to host the Olympic Games.

### *Conclusion: The 1940 Olympic Bid and the East Asian Olympic Games*

In assessing the legacy of the 1940 Olympic Bid, the larger significance of the East Asian Olympic Games must first be considered. Many have likened the three Olympics held in East Asia, the 1964 Tokyo, 1988 Seoul and the 2008 Beijing Games, as "coming out parties" that would showcase their national achievements.<sup>37</sup> The Olympic Games provided high-profile events for all three of these East Asian nations to demonstrate not only the "political reliability" of their host cities to their international audiences but also their national identity to domestic citizens.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the East Asian Olympic Games serve as allegories of the "universalization of universalism" in that they display the inevitable, unfolding of the universal aspirations of the Olympic Movement. Recent efforts by the Japanese to consolidate its Olympic heritage in East Asia begin with the bid rhetoric made famous by the 1940 Olympic bid by Tokyo to universalize Olympism. Despite the fact that the Games never materialized, the Tokyo Olympic bid for 1940 revealed an often contentious encounter between the East and the West. In many instances, the IOC criticisms of the Japanese bid effort (outside politicking, travel subsidies, etc.) were the unspoken custom of campaigning within an European dominated hegemony of the IOC. Only further research will reveal the extent to which 1964 Tokyo, 1988 Seoul and 2008 Beijing also encountered various unspoken cultural customs between the East and West.

### Notes

1 "The Beijing Olympics Means More Than Just Entry Onto World Stage", in: *The Nikkei Weekly* (2008), 18<sup>th</sup> August and TAYLOR, Stephen: "Touching Olympic Glory at Museum", in: *The Daily Yomiuri* (2008), 8<sup>th</sup> August, p. 14 are just two examples of media reporting.

2 "Olympism" are the discourses by the IOC on the universal values of the Olympic Movement (goodwill, fair play, universal ethics, etc.) that have unfolding for over a century. Please see the official website of the IOC for detailed description, [http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en\\_report\\_122.pdf](http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf).

3 Most notably see, CLOSE, Paul, ASKEW, David & XIN, Xu: *The Beijing Olympiad: The Political Economy of a Sporting Mega-Event*. New York 2008; CHA, Victoria: *Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia*. New York 2009 and COLLINS, Sandra: "The Fragility of East Asian National Identity in the Olympic Games", in: PRICE, Monroe & DAYAN, Daniel (EDS.): *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of New China*. Ann Arbor 2008.

4 SAKAUE and TAKAOKA discussed the missing Olympic Games of 1940 by exploring the relationship between the 1940 Tokyo Olympics and wartime sports.

SAKAUE, Yoshihiro & TAKAOKA, Hiroyuki: *Maboroshi Tōkyō Orinpikku to sono jidai* (The Missing Tokyo Olympics and Those Times). Tokyo 2009. In the book *Olympic City Tokyo 1940-1964* architect KATAGI Atsushi discusses the various city planning and building aspects of Tokyo City for both the 1940 and 1964 Games. He also specifically addresses the 2016 Tokyo Plans to Host the 31<sup>st</sup> Olympic Games. KATAGI, Atsushi: *Olympic shiti Tokyo 1940, 1964*. Tokyo 2010. Lastly, CYNANYC: *Maboroshi no 1940nen keikaku – Taiheiyo sensō no zenya, "kiseki no toshi" ga tanjō shita* (Planning the City of Miracles: the Visionary Plans of 1940 on the Eve of the Asia-Pacific War). Tokyo 2009.

5 Asahi.com, 2016 nen Tokyo Orinpikku shōchi no kiseki. (The Locus of the 2016 Tokyo Olympic Bid) accessed [http://www.asahi.com/olympics/photogallery/091001\\_tokyohistory/20080823.html](http://www.asahi.com/olympics/photogallery/091001_tokyohistory/20080823.html)

6 The Tokyo Bid Committee for the 2016 Olympic Games, "Formulation of the Fundamental Principles for the Tokyo 2016 Olympic Games" <http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/TOPICS/2006/ftg5v100.htm>.

7 TAGSOLD, Christian has written on the 1964 Games in terms of "lieux de mémoire" in: "The Tokyo Olympics as a Token of Renationalization", in: NIEHAUS, Andreas & SEINSCH, Max (EDS.): *Olympic Japan: Ideals and Realities of (Inter)Nationalism*. Würzburg 2007.

8 COLLINS, Sandra: *The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics*. London 2009 and COLLINS: "The Fragility".

9 Please see my book for a more detailed treatment of situating the historical importance of the 1940 Tokyo Olympic bid within Japanese and Olympic history, COLLINS: *The 1940 Tokyo Games*.

10 COLLINS: "The Fragility".

11 This slogan was made famous by Avery BRUNDAGE the President of the American Olympic Association and his decision to support sending American athletes to the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. See GUTTMAN, Allen: *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement*. New York 1984, pp. 68-78.

12 Sugimura Report, *Orimupikku* 13(1935), May, p. 14.

13 Henshusha (Editorial Board): "1933 nendo: kokusai orimupikku iinkaisokai chikazuku" (1933: The IOC General Session Approaches), in: *Orimupikku* 11(1933), June, p. 76.

14 Tokyo-shiyakusho: *Tokyo shikai gijisokukiroku daiichigo* (A Record of the Tokyo Municipal Assembly Proceedings). 8 Volumes. Tokyo 1938, p. 1074.

15 12 October 196 COUBERTIN to Tokyo Mayor, Geneva letter as reprinted in Tokyo-shiyakusho: *Hōkoku*. Tokyo 1940, p. 58.



16 KASAI, Jiuji: "Japan's Olympic Message to America," (1938), 21 January National Broadcasting Company radio broadcast, (1938), 21<sup>st</sup> January, 3 in the 1940 Olympic Games File, Avery Brundage Collection (microfiche copy), IOC Archives.

17 The New York Times reported that the IOC "feeling that Japan would get the Games some day, decided it might as well make the award now, especially since the year 1940 is such a significant one in Nipponese history. DALEY, Arthur J.: "Olympics on Even Greater Scale," in: *New York Times* (1936), 1<sup>st</sup> August, p. 6.

18 Tokyo-to, 1940nen dajūnikai Orinpikku Tokyo taikai: *Sōchi kara henjō made* (The 1940 XIth Olympic Games: From the Bid to the Forfeiture), Tokyo 1952, p. 2.

- 19 Tokyo-to, Sochi kara henjo made, 2.
- 20 The meeting took place on 15<sup>th</sup> March 1934. Tokyo-to, Sochi kara henjo made, 3 and Tokyo shikoho, #2385, 17<sup>th</sup> March 1934, 2386.
- 21 Upon the recommendation of KANO Jigoro, SUGIMURA Yotaro became the third IOC delegate in Japan in 1934. When SUGIMURA was a student at the Tokyo Imperial University, he met KANO during judo practice. SUGIMURA continued to give judo demonstrations during his varied diplomatic posts around Europe. In 1935, SUGIMURA was the Japanese Ambassador to Italy and was stationed in Rome. After SUGIMURA'S appointment, SOYESHIMA Michimasa became an IOC member in 1934 upon the 1934 death of KISHI Seiichi. SOYESHIMA was sometimes spelled SOEJIMA in various Olympic materials. IOC (ED.): Olympic Biographies. Lausanne, Switzerland 1987, p. 170 and p. 174.
- 22 SOYESHIMA to Dr. GRAEFF, Yasukuni-maru, 15<sup>th</sup> March 1935, Soyeshima Letters, His Imperial Highness Prince Chichibu Memorial Sports Library archive.
- 23 While some speculated that using the 1940 Tokyo Olympics to commemorate the 2,600<sup>th</sup> Year of Kigen appealed to the dynastic pretensions of MUSSOLINI, others believed the escalation of the "incident" between Italy and Ethiopia was the true reason behind the unexpected support by Mussolini of the Tokyo bid. SOYESHIMA to Dr. GRAEFF, Yasukuni-maru, 15<sup>th</sup> March 1935, Soyeshima Letters, His Imperial Highness Prince Chichibu Memorial Sports Library archive, and Imamura Shichiro, "Orinpicqu Tokyo taikai kittei no shinso" (The Truth Behind the Decision for the Tokyo Olympic Games), in: Kaizo 19(1937), February, pp. 95 - 96.
- 24 The Oslo IOC Session took place from February 25 to March 1, 1935. Sugimura Yotaro Report "Dai jūnikai orinpicqu kaisaichi ni kansuru Osuro kokusai Orinpicquinkai gijikeika hokoku no ken" (Report on the Proceeding at the Oslo IOC Session on the Campaign for the XII Olympic Games) to Hiranuma Ryozo, JAAA President, and Ushizuka Torataro, Tokyo Mayor, March 1935, Count Soyeshima Michimasa Letters, His Royal Highness Prince Chichibu Memorial Sports Library (the Sugimura report hereafter cited as Sugimura Report) Tokyo, Japan. The Sugimura Report was also reprinted in the May 1935 issue of Orimupikku magazine. "Soyeshima taishi osurochaku" (Ambassador Sugimura Arrives in Oslo), in: Tokyo Asahi (1935), 24<sup>th</sup> February.
- 25 "Roma ha hisshō' to Ikuni daiyo yogen" (Italy's Certain to Win' Asserts Italy's IOC Member), in: Tokyo Asahi (1935), 27<sup>th</sup> February, C(2).
- 26 SUGIMURA, Yōtarō: Sugimura Report, in: Orimupikku (1935), May, p. 20 and Sugimura Report, p. 8, "Wireless to NYT", in: New York Times (1935), 28<sup>th</sup> February, p. 26, and "To Decide Next Year on 1940 Olympic Site", in: New York Times (1935), 2<sup>nd</sup> March, p. 5.
- 27 TAKASHIMA, Fumio: "Raicho wo tsutaerareru- Baie Latouruhaku to Harandoshi no fūbo" (Talking about Their Upcoming Visit to Japan: the Personal Appearances of Count Baillet-Latour and Mr. Garland), in: Orimupikku 13(1935), September, p. 3.
- 28 Soyeshima would later reveal that William-May GARLAND, the IOC member in the United States, suggested in December 1935 that the Tokyo Bid Committee invite Count BAILLET-LATOURE to tour Japan. SOYESHIMA, Michimasa: "Welcome to a Great Sports Leader", in: Orinpicqu 15(1937), April, pp. 2 - 3. The official plan to invite Baillet-Latour and Garland was discussed at the 17<sup>th</sup> July 1935 director's meeting of the JAAA. See "Gijiroku" (Meeting Notes), in: Orimupikku 13(1935), August, p. 39.
- 29 Although there were no codified Olympic protocols regarding inspection tours, they were seen as out of the ordinary.
- 30 The Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated the efforts to negotiate the visit of Baillet-Latour. See Kokusai Orimupikku kyogotaikai kankei, I-1-12-0-9 (Olympic Games Related Material), Gaimusho gaiko shiryokan (hereafter cited as GGS) and Zen-nihon taiiku shinkōkai-sha, Seika ha higashi e, p. 110.
- 31 BAILLET-LATOURE accepted the invitation on 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1935. The following month, the IOC President discussed his upcoming trip with the Japanese Ambassador to Belgium stating that his trip should not take the form of a formal invitation but should be described as a "personal trip" (kojinteki no ryoko). The IOC President made tentative plans to travel to Japan in March and estimated that his expenses would be around 15,000 yen. The City of Tokyo sent fifteen-thousand yen to the Count to cover his expenses on January 29<sup>th</sup> and the Count received the transfer of funds on 31<sup>st</sup> January 1936. ARITA Hachiro to Foreign Affairs Minister HIROTA, Telegram, 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1935, GGS; OMORI to HIROTA, Telegram, 30<sup>th</sup> December 1935, GGS; OMORI to HIROTA, Telegram, 31<sup>st</sup> December 1935, GGS; and OMORI to TASHIRO, Telegram, 31<sup>st</sup> January 1936, GGS.
- 32 The General Consulate of Japan in Geneva wrote to the former IOC President and founder of the modern Olympic Games, Pierre de COUBERTIN, discussing the discretion surrounding BAILLET-LATOURE'S visit to Japan, "I make the promise to you that the utmost discretion will be kept around his trip and the newspapers will not be allowed to mention it." COUBERTIN had written a letter to YOKOYAMA discussing BAILLET-LATOURE'S trip to Japan and had apparently informed YOKOYAMA that he expressed his support for the Tokyo Olympics to BAILLET-LATOURE. YOKOYAMA sent a cablegram to Foreign Minister HIROTA relaying COUBERTIN'S support. This inspection tour was unprecedented. In September 1934, Avery BRUNDAGE visited Germany as President of the AOA in order to verify that Jewish athletes were being invited to participate in the planned 1936 Berlin Olympic Games before the AOA would accept the invitation to participate in the Berlin Games. See GUTTMAN: The Games, pp. 68-78. See also YOKOYAMA Masayuki to COUBERTIN, Geneva, 10<sup>th</sup> January 1936, Coubertin, IOC President's Correspondence Dossier, IOC Archives; Yokoyama to Hirota, Telegram, 14<sup>th</sup> January 1936, GGS.
- 33 The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad Tokyo 1940, Official Report, page 22.
- 34 Ibid., p. 5.
- 35 The IOC meeting notes also stated that Japan was willing to provide a daily stipend of two gold dollars per athlete and five gold dollars per official delegate. This stipend would have amounted to an additional several hundred thousand gold dollars. International Olympic Committee (ed.): The International Olympic Committee: One Hundred Years. Lausanne 1994, p. 272.
- 36 SUGITA, Masao: "Ushiwareta Orinpicqu" (The Lost Olympics), in: Bungeishun-jū(1938), 27<sup>th</sup> August, p. 303.
- 37 Most notably see, CLOSE, ASKEW & XIN: The Beijing Olympiad; WASSERSTROM, Jeffrey: China in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York 2010; BROWNELL, Susan: Beijing Games: What the Olympics Mean to China. Lanham 2008; MANHEIM, Jarol: "Rites of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy", in: The Western Political Quarterly 43(1990)2, 27<sup>th</sup> August; ESPY, Richard: The Politics of the Olympic Games. Berkeley 1979 and Collins: "The Fragility".
- 38 COLLINS, Sandra: "Asian Soft-Power: Globalization and Regionalism in the East Asia Olympic Games" presented at The International Centre for Olympic Studies at The University of Western Ontario - 10<sup>th</sup> International Symposium for Olympic Research Proceedings, October 2010 forthcoming.

# OLYMPIAD



(A) Olympic Stadium (B) Olympic swimming pool (C) Olympic Village (D) Equestrian stadium (E) Murayama shooting ranges (F) Jingu swimming pool (G) Jingu stadium (H) Jingu wrestling field (outdoor court) (I) Jingu baseball ground (J) Tokyo Art Gallery (K) Olympic indoor athletic building (L) Tokyo Municipal Auditorium (M) Shiba park stadium (N) Shibaura Hall (O) Shibaura cycling stadium (P) Kokugi kwan amphitheatre (Q) Toda rowing course (R) Todabashi (S) Yacht harbour.

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