

Bidding or Bribing? The Quest for the 1998 Olympics in Nagano*

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Introduction

By the time the Olympic torch relay reached the city of Nagano, the site of the 1998 Winter Olympics, the fire had been already gone out nine times.¹ Organizers blamed this on mistakes in the design of the torch, but it could have also been read as a metaphor for the state of the Olympic movement in general and the Nagano Olympics in particular. A group of citizens demanded access to the accounts of Nagano's bidding committee shortly after the end of the Winter Games. It turned out that another fire had been burning much more effectively than the Olympic one. The books had allegedly been incinerated after Nagano's bid was accepted by the IOC.² What at first was purely a local scandal soon attracted a far greater audience nearly a year later. In December 1998, Marc HODLER – high-ranking IOC member and head of the coordination committee for the Games – claimed that the Salt Lake City bid for the 2002 Winter Games had only succeeded because of the the lavish spending of money.³ The IOC members who were to elect the next hosting city after Nagano had effectively been bribed by such benefits as, financial aid in land deals and scholarships for family members at American universities and even plastic surgery.⁴ The bidding activities of Nagano also came under scrutiny worldwide. The fact that the bid records were no longer available did nothing to diminish the spotlight. In fact it was the effect was the opposite, the suspicions grew stronger. Nagano's behaviour whilst bidding became the introductory chapter to the story of what is now called the 2002 Winter Olympic bid scandal. Salt Lake City's officials excused their wrong-doings by pointing out that Nagano had beaten them in the bid for the Winter Games in 1998 only by heavy bribery.⁵ Thus Salt Lake City had only copied Nagano's behaviour in order to secure the Games for 2002. An official report by the prefecture in 2006 indeed concluded that Nagano's bidding committee was to be blamed for an "illegitimate and excessive level of hospitality".⁶

As a result, Nagano's bid for the 1998 Winter Olympics is probably the most controversial of the ten submitted to the IOC in Japan's Olympic history.⁷ Yet it is also a very typical bid in the era after the Olympic Games of Tôkyô in 1964 and the Winter Games of Sapporo in 1972. The reasons for the bid, the general bidding activities, the context for bidding and even the make-up of the citizens movement against the bid closely resembles the Japanese bids of Nagoya for the 1988 Summer Games, Ôsaka for those of 2008 and finally Tôkyô for 2016. Nagano follows the script of Japanese bids in the last four decades. The one outstanding exception in this resemblance is probably that Nagano's had been the only successful bid by a Japanese city since that of Sapporo for the 1972 Winter Games.

Thus Nagano's bid typical for a genre of bids in general which are a rather new phenomenon to Japan and to Asia. These bids are "post-Olympic" in the literal sense of the word. Since Japan had staged both Summer and Winter Olympics once before 1998. Each new bid had to take into account that the next Olympics would be the second one of their kind in Japan. Tôkyô had become the first Asian city to stage the Olympic Games in 1964. The general aim was to prove that Japan was a peaceful country but also modern enough to cope with the "mega-event". For this reason the script for bidding as well as for the Games was a national one and stressed Japanese qualities. Regional development is of much more importance for post-Olympic bids than proving something for the whole country. The one exception in this bidding pattern is probably Tôkyô 2016 which stressed a national revival by pointing out the success of the games in 1964 as national ritual. Modernity has been well-established in the meantime as well. Thus the bidding script changes decisively. It becomes more complicated to find convincing arguments for hosting Games which are "mega-events" vastly exceeding normal regional frameworks. Initial investments are high while future outcomes for the region are uncertain. All Japanese bids in the last four decades had to face these problems of generating good arguments convincing local citizens and making the bids meaningful for them.

From Nagoya to Nagano through the Bubbling 80s

The success of Nagano's bidding activities was partly due to the fact that its bidding committee had learned some lessons from Nagoya's failure in the early 1980s.⁸ Nagoya had lost out to Seoul in bidding for the 1988 Summer Games at the IOC Congress in Baden-Baden 1981. After the Montreal Games of 1976 which had left the French-Canadian metropolis with huge debts; cities worldwide were less willing to bid for the games. However, local politicians felt that staging the Olympics would help Nagoya to emerge from the shadow of Japan's mega-cities Tôkyô and Ôsaka which had hosted Olympics and the Expo respectively. The central government had also covered a huge share of the costs incurred by the Olympics in Tôkyô 1964 and Sapporo 1972 as well as the Expo 1972 in Ôsaka. Thus the Olympics were a tempting way for Nagoya in order to fast track the construction of its infrastructure. For a long time it seemed that Nagoya would be the only candidate city and would therefore win by default. Seoul only joined the race very late. Nagoya's bid was probably technically superior to Seoul's plan for the Games. When the IOC met at their 1981 session in Baden Baden, Seoul won by a huge margin. The South Korean government had wanted to earn public recognition by bringing the Games to the country and spared no effort in trying to

convince the IOC members.⁹ The Japanese team later concluded that their campaign had not only lacked convincing concepts but they had also failed in their efforts to make personal contacts to convince officials.

Japan's national Olympic Committee (JOC) as well as Nagano's bidding committee reasoned that a bid for the 1998 Winter Games had to be backed up by thorough spending on promotion. The idea of staging Olympics in Nagano was first ventured in 1983 according to Nagano's official Olympic report.¹⁰ The JOC had proposed supporting a bid for Winter Olympics by a Japanese city. Four cities started to prepare plans for the final national decision of 1988. The attitude to bidding changed after the Olympic Games of Los Angeles in 1984. By bringing in private investors and commercializing the Games, Los Angeles had been able to turn the Games into a profitable venture and thus erased the negative image of Montreal. Politicians worldwide now dreamed once again of bringing Olympics to their cities. The four Japanese candidates for 1998 shared the dream. Thus bidding was very competitive from the very beginning in 1983 and required intensive campaigning.

Nagano's bid was officially announced by the prefectural parliament in 1985.¹¹ Actually the announcement did not even state which city of the prefecture was to be named as host though Olympic Games are hosted by cities officially, not by states or prefectures. It soon became clear that the capital Nagano City, in Japanese terms a freshwater city of 350,000 inhabitants, was to head the prefecture's bid. Nagano was probably not even the favourite in Japan. A rival city, Morioka seemed to be much better suited to host Olympic Games. Not only had it been connected with Tokyo by bullet-train since 1982, but Morioka was also able to also offer some of the facilities necessary for different sports such as ice-hockey, luge or alpine skiing. Nagano lacked all of these venues.

Thus Nagano's goals in bidding for Olympic Games were very similar to those of Nagoya. Nagano had some skiing resorts in the 1980s but these were difficult to reach. The city also lacked state of the art communications. It had no bullet train or highways to connect the city and prefecture in the hinterland of Japan's main island Honshū with urban centres like Tōkyō, Yokohama or Ōsaka. Tourism was limited due to lacking access. Hosting the Olympics was seen as the perfect opportunity to overcome infrastructural problems – in the the same way it had helped Sapporo in 1972. They had gained a great deal by hosting the Games.¹² Nagano City and the area certainly did not need of ski-jumping venues or a bobsled run which are necessary prerequisites for hosting Winter Olympics. But if this was the price to be paid for the attraction of global attention and developing infrastructure, Nagano's officials

were certainly willing to pay it. Or as Nagano's mayor put it in 1987, one year ahead of the internal Japanese competition to decide on their candidate city: "If we succeed in inviting the Olympics, even the construction of a new Shinkansen line will be settled instantly".¹³ Instead of 2 hours and 50 minutes it would only take 60 minutes to get to Nagano from Tōkyō with such a new bullet train, the local politicians reckoned.

Bidding activities came at a time when Japan's economy was expanding to hitherto unseen horizons. In the middle of the 1980s real estate and stock prices began to soar. Trade surpluses and falling restrictions in the financial markets helped to inflate the so-called bubble economy.¹⁴ Tōkyō land prices sky-rocketed and investment companies began to look for alternative areas to invest in. Provincial prefectures saw a chance to catch up with central regions by attracting investment money. The Japanese periphery had been mostly neglected during the country's economic upsurge in the 1960s and 70s. Now, regional politicians everywhere wanted to make up for this negligence. Nagano prefecture's politics was part of the ever-expanding bubble. Numerous ski resorts and golf courses were planned in the prefecture.¹⁵ What was missing was accessibility to draw the people of the Tōkyō urban area to the region. The other bidders had comparable motives for their respective bids though Morioka started from a different infrastructural level and started as favourite. But in the end the JOC chose Nagano, although Morioka did host the Alpine World Ski Championships in 1993 as some consolation for losing the national bid for the Winter Olympics.

Ironically in 1991, the year of the IOC's decision in Birmingham about the hosting of the 1998 Winter Olympics was also the year the bubble burst. Real estate prices had risen to untenable levels, started to plunge and so did Japanese stocks. As a consequence many investment companies were not able to pay back the loans they had taken out with the banks. With loans turning into non-performing liabilities, banks became troubled. The economy took a unparalleled down-slide. The ensuing decade has been termed "lost" in Japan. When the Nagano Olympics took place in 1998 the vigour of the bubble economy was gone and so were nearly all of the plans to develop the prefecture by building resorts and golf courses. But this could not have been foreseen in 1991. Nagano spent huge sums of money. In Birmingham they rented an estate used by pre war British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to greet IOC members.¹⁶ The IOC members were served exquisite Japanese dinners and entertained by Japanese geisha. This was just one example of lavish spending led to Nagano's entanglement in the scandal surrounding the bid of Salt Lake City.

Manufacturing "Disconsent"

While Nagoya as precursor and the bubble economy explain the direct make-up of Nagano's bid, the local campaigning for citizens' consent as well as the off-spring of a counter movement have deeper roots. Nagano had actually already ventured bids for staging Winter Olympics in the thirties and sixties. When Tōkyō was chosen to host the Summer Games of 1940 Japan was subsequently given the right to choose the host for the Winter Olympics too. In the end Nagano was not able to come up with a bid. The same is true for 1972.¹⁷ Sapporo was chosen on both occasions and became the official host for the Winter Games – which in 1940 were to be cancelled but took place in 1972.

The problems of Nagano in bidding for these Games were mostly due to internal friction within the prefecture.¹⁸ Nagano city in the north and Matsumoto city in the south are the historical centres of the prefecture. Because of the rivalry of both cities and the adjacent regions, a strong common identity of Nagano prefecture has never formed. The prefectural politicians which pushed Nagano's bid in the first place knew about that and tried everything to overcome these frictions. Since the Games promised to ameliorate the infrastructure of Nagano in general, economic leaders banded together with politicians to convince the public. The message was carried by the very influential local newspaper.¹⁹ Citizens did somehow support the bid but played no active role. The official report claimed: "From the very start, the Nagano bid captured the imagination and support of the people of Nagano, who lent their wholehearted support every step of the way."²⁰ A more thorough examination of bidding activities would suggest that this was greatly exaggerated. The bureaucratically driven pattern was typical since the bids for hosting Olympics in Tōkyō 1964.²¹ In these cases too it was the bureaucracy which was the driving force behind the bid while the citizens were expected to follow. Of course it is not easy to convincingly integrate citizens into bidding activities anywhere. But the bureaucratic appearance of Japanese bids is nevertheless very striking.

A second problem for the bid arose after the plans had been made public. Anti-Olympic groups formed which campaigned against bidding for the Olympics. The core members of these groups had started as activists against overdevelopment connected to the bubble economy. When they learned about the prefectures plans they regrouped and took the Olympics as an emblematic problem of a ravaging economy which threatened Nagano's countryside.²² In agitating against the Olympics, they could conveniently target all problems of the bubble economy and the local ruling elite's understanding of bringing Nagano forward. While the groups were small they were able to make themselves heard. A certain echo of initial friction within the prefecture could be felt since groups in Matsumoto were also active.

The prefectures questionable efforts to manufacture consent were helpful in pointing out irregularities in the bidding process. In preparing the national bid against the other contenders a petition of signatures was started in

the prefecture to show the citizens support. With the help of neighbourhood organizations – a typical feature of communal politics – about 2.5 million citizens of Nagano signed. EZAWA Masao, a central figure for the anti-Olympic movement in Nagano, pointed out the absurdity of this number.²³ Nagano prefectural officials had collected half a million more signatures than the prefecture's number of inhabitants. Even taking into account former prefectural citizens living in other parts of Japan who might have signed while visiting the area the numbers still seem suspect. Thus the organization of the petition can serve as starting point for analyzing the problems of the bid's attempt to inspire prefectural citizens. EZAWA was one of the early anti-Olympic activists who harshly criticized the local bidding committee's activities. He not only questioned the number of signatures for the collection but also suggested that they were partly irregular. The use of the neighbourhood organizations as well as collecting signatures in schools was also problematic. In such interpersonal contexts it is not often easy in peripheral Japan to voice discontent and to not sign. The same is true if teachers ask pupils for their signatures.

The sheer number of collected signatures seems to prove the official announcements that it was the utmost wish of all prefectural citizens that the Games be hosted in Nagano. Indeed only a minority of citizens were against the Games. But another number proves that discontent did exist. Elections for the mayor's office took place four months after Nagano had beaten Morioka and the other contenders to become official Japanese candidate city for 1998. The ruling mayor backed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party and the contender from the Communist Party –were both in favour of hosting the Olympics and promised to do everything for a successful bid with the IOC. EZAWA Masao and his anti-Olympic movement found a rival candidate in EZAWA Junko, his wife.²⁴ As a housewife at 30, she had just reached the age necessary to be eligible for the position of mayor. In the election about 11% voted for EZAWA Junko, and she finished ahead of her communist rival by some margin. The LDP's ruling mayor scored an overwhelming victory. Nevertheless approximately 15,000 votes cast for EZAWA were a strong sign of an anti-Olympic mood. In Japanese local politics, a young housewife would normally have had no chance against a ruling LDP mayor anyway. The LDP had not only dominated national Japanese politics for over four decades since the 1950s but they enjoyed an especially strong position in rural areas. As a result of that close elections generally took place only between rival LDP candidates. So winning 11% of the electorate without party affiliation is quite outstanding. In addition EZAWA ran a more or less one issue campaign. Voters for her were therefore more or less people who were definitively against Nagano's bid for the Olympics while the votes cast for the other two candidates were not necessarily an endorsement for the bid. It may well have been that the opposition to the Nagano candidacy for the Olympic Games was even greater.

However the anti-Olympic movement in Nagano had problems in connecting to the public. Print shops in Nagano refused to print the posters for EZAWA Junko's cam-

paigned because they feared losing business in the region if they did so. Eventually the posters were printed in Tokyo.²⁵ Local and economical networks can be very tightly knit in Japan and in Nagano this was certainly the case. Additionally a strong civil-society which would counterweight the balance of powers was about to form in Japan in the 1990s on topics such as environmental problems, disparities of gender-rights or the future of the aging society. At least Nagano's anti-Olympic movement got help from colleagues in Nagoya who had been very successful and creative in campaigning against the bid for the Games of 1988.²⁶

Neither the success of the bid in 1991 nor the actual Games of 1998 meant the end of the anti-Olympic movement in Nagano. The movement did agitate against the Olympics right up to 1998, demanding that Nagano city return the right to host them to the IOC. Since environmental groups joined the fight against the Olympics some of the problems were discussed more widely than the initial anti-Olympic movement. After the Games the movement was pivotal in demanding clarification of the bidding scandal. It fought its case through the courts to get access to bidding information and unveil the network of bribery. Though the whole truth about official Nagano bidding activities still remains unclear in some areas, many facts have become public due to the constant pressure of the anti-Olympic movement.

Japanese Post-Tokyo Bidding

The 1964 Olympic Games in Tōkyō and 1998 in Nagano stand in stark contrast. The former have become deeply embedded in public memory in a positive way. This fact has been exploited not only by the new bid for Games in 2016²⁷ but also art projects like guided tours to spots where the optimism of modernity so typical for 1964 can be sensed.²⁸ The Games of Nagano are most vividly remembered for the bidding scandal. A guided tour to typical spots of the Games would have not much to tell about the venues apart who won in 1998. The venues at most might be introduced as decaying relicts of a boosterism typical for the bubble economy but already outdated in 1998.

This not only sheds some light on the Games in 1998 themselves but also on the character of the bid. First of all the bids were carried mostly by a bureaucratic boosterism which is typical for many bids worldwide. Politicians hoped to ameliorate Nagano's infrastructure to keep up with local development plans of the bubble economy. Companies welcomed this boosterism and helped in financing the bidding activities though tax money was still most important. Tight networks of these companies and politicians assured smooth proceedings. The public was less informed. Many of the bidding activities remained non-transparent, especially the spending of money.

As a direct consequence of boosterism, Nagano's bid lacked a convincing story, enchanting not only IOC members but also local citizens. It was simply not clear through reading the bidding committee's statements or listening to politicians promises what Olympics would achieve for

Nagano except a better infrastructure and global self-advertisement. Allusions were made to the Games as a harbinger of world peace or "festival of nations". The first prefectural declaration in 1985 did indeed use the title of the first part of Leni RIEFENSTAHL's film on the Olympics in Berlin 1936 as an argument for bidding! The problematic implications of the term "festival of nations" in the context of national socialism were ignored by Nagano's politicians. EZAWA has pointed out that this was a clear indication of the bidding group's ignorance of the real essence of Olympism.²⁹ Besides boosterism and partly misunderstood Olympic ideals the bid had not much to offer in terms of winning over the hearts of the citizens. Instead it relied on social networks within the prefecture to convince the citizens and to manufacture consent. Most citizens did indeed support the bid though it remains unclear how deep the level of understanding was.

The absence of a convincing story to back up the bid is one of the most outstanding differences compared to the Tōkyō Olympics of 1964. These Games had something to offer the people beyond infrastructure and lofty Olympic ideals. Japan was in the middle of a period of revival after the disasters of war – economically as well as psychologically. The Games helped to mark the transition from the immediate post-war era into an affluent modern and peaceful consumer society.³⁰ In the 1950s when the bidding began, this story was already about to unfold. Politicians and citizens alike were convinced that hosting the Olympics would help to regain national self-esteem. Such a strong civic element was clearly missing in the Nagano bid which could only offer some reconciliation between the north and south of the prefecture as an idealistic goal. Thus it is not surprising that an anti-Olympic movement sprang up. Some citizens of Nagano choose to oppose the bid openly since it had no convincing story but only plans which were potentially hurtful for the environment. In the bidding phase of 1964 such a movement would have been unthinkable. Though some criticism was discernible, it focused on the question of whether Tōkyō would be able to stage Games, not whether hosting Games made sense at all.³¹ The underlying message of the Games or Olympics in general was not questioned by such critical voices.

§ The shortcomings of the bid are also typical for all other Japanese bids since Nagoya 1988. Boosterism, no convincing story, superficial support for the bid by a majority of citizens but intense opposition by vibrant anti-movements were characteristic for Nagoya 1988, Nagano 1998, Ōsaka 2008 and Tōkyō 2016, not to mention the internal competitions amongst Japanese rivals such as Fukuoka for 2016.³² Strategies to overcome these problems of public support have also been similar to those of Nagano in some cases. Tōkyō's bids also used schools and local networks for questionable activities to win citizens over.³³ In a post-Olympic, post-modern environment it is simply doubtful whether the hosting of the Olympics has something to offer for host cities and the Japanese bids reflect these problems.

Learning from Japanese Failures

Nagano's bid for the 1998 Winter Olympics was the last successful bid by a Japanese city – if a bid which was a major reason for one of the largest scandals in Olympics history can be termed as successful at all. Further bids have been waged and lost by Japanese cities. New ones are likely. But it remains dubious whether Japan will host the Olympics again in the near future given their bidding problems. It is rather unlikely unless bidding activities reach the citizens – if possible by bringing them into organizational activities.

Under the paradigm of modernity many Asian intellectuals have seen Japan as a role model for their respective countries since the early 20th century. This is certainly also true for Olympism in Asia. By hosting the first Olympics in Asia, Tokyo set an example followed by Seoul and Beijing. Many parallels exist between these Games, especially promoting national pride and modernity through them. Regarding the state of Olympism in Asia, countries like China and South Korea can now probably learn a different lesson from Japan. Hosting the Olympics once is one thing – bringing the Olympics back is another. This is reflected in bidding activities. Unless some convincing reasons are found to once again host the Olympics, bidding will remain tough. Anti-Olympic movements will spring up and maybe even take up the lessons from Japan. Some of the most creative ideas from Nagoya's anti-Olympic movement have made their way to China already.³⁴ For the time being Japan is still a rather outstanding case in Asia – with the exception of South Korea, no other Asian country has experienced post-Olympic bidding.

Notes

- 1 "Nagano gorin no seika hirê: Kairyô tôchi mo kieru" (Nagano Olympic Torch Relay: The Improved Torch Dies Down too), in: Yomiuri shinbun Ôsaka Edition (1998), 19th January, p. 30.
- 2 TAJIMA, Atsushi. "Amoral Universalism: Mediating and Staging Global and Local in the 1998 Nagano Olympic Winter Games", in: *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 21(2004)3, 241 – 260, p. 250.
- 3 MALLON, Bill: "The Olympic Bribery Scandal", in: *Journal of Olympic History: The Official Publication of the International Society of Olympic Historians* 13(2000)5, 11 – 27, p. 11.
- 4 MALLON: "The Olympic Bribery Scandal", pp. 11 – 12.
- 5 MALLON: "The Olympic Bribery Scandal", p. 14.
- 6 "IOC won't probe reports of Nagano gift-giving: Report says Japanese city provided millions of dollars in hospitality", in: *NBC Sports* (2006), 13th January, <http://nbc.com/sports/mnbc.com/id/10838584> (last accessed 6th September 2010).
- 7 The ten bids were submitted by Tokyo for the Summer Games of 1940, 1960 and 1964, Sapporo for the Winter Games of 1940, 1968 and 1972, Nagoya for the Summer Games of 1988, Nagano, Ôsaka for the Summer Games of 2008 and Tôkyô for the Summer Games of 2016. Only Tôkyô (1964), Sapporo (1972) and Nagano succeeded in the bidding process.
- 8 AIKAWA, Toshinide: *Nagano Orinpikku sudôku. Tôkyô 1998*, p. 71 – 72.
- 9 IKEI, Masaru: *Orinpikku no seijigaku (Political Science of the Olympics)*. Tokyo 1992, p. 196.
- 10 The Organizing Committee for the XVIII Olympic Winter Games, Nagano 1998 (NAOC): *Official Report of the XVIII Olympic Winter Games. Vol. Vol. I Planning and Support*. Nagano 1999, p. 31.
- 11 EZAWA, Masao: *Orinpikku wa kinmamire: Nagano orin no uragawa. Tôkyô*

1999, p. 21.

12 ESSEX, Stephen J. & CHALKEY, Brian S.: "The Winter Olympics: Driving Urban Change, 1896–2004", in: GOLD, John Robert & GOLD, Margaret M. (EDS.): *Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning and the World's Games, 1896–2012*. London 2007, pp. 48–58; p. 54.

13 "Tôki gorin kôho yon shi yûchi resu: Nerai wa chiiki kasseika" (Four Cities Compete for the Winter Olympics: The Aim is to Activate the Region), in: *Asahi shinbun* (1987), 9th October, p. 25.

14 For a thorough treatment of the Japanese bubble economy see WOOD, Christopher: *The Bubble Economy: Japan's Extraordinary Speculative Boom of the '80s and the Dramatic Bust of the '90s*. New York 1992.

15 EZAWA: *Orinpikku wa kinmamire*, pp. 30–32.

16 "Japanese lavished pounds 1 m in Brum; Concern over amount spent on Olympic officials", in: *Birmingham Post* (1999), 4th February.

17 Under the headline "Third Time Lucky" the official report of Nagano implies that the inner-Japanese bids for 1940 and 1968 were actually officially submitted (see Organizing Committee: *Official Report*, p. 30). But AIKAWA shows convincingly that both bids collapsed before getting to the final stage (AIKAWA: *Nagano*, p. 19).

18 AIKAWA: *Nagano*, p. 19.

19 TAJIMA: "Amoral Universalism", p. 247.

20 Organizing Committee: *Official Report*, p. 35.

21 TAGSOLD, Christian: *Die Inszenierung der kulturellen Identität in Japan: Das Beispiel der Olympischen Spiele Tôkyô 1964 (The Staging of Cultural Identity in Japan: The Example of the Tôkyô Olympics 1964)*. München 2002, pp. 61 – 62.

22 EZAWA: *Orinpikku wa kinmamire*, pp. 252 – 254.

23 EZAWA: *Orinpikku wa kinmamire*, p. 197.

24 EZAWA: *Orinpikku wa kinmamire*, p. 257.

25 EZAWA: *Orinpikku wa kinmamire*, p. 258.

26 TAGSOLD, Christian: "The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as Political Games." *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 8(2009). <http://www.japanfocus.org/~Christian-Tag-sold/3165> (last accessed 6th September 2010).

27 TAGSOLD, Christian: "Vorwärts in die Vergangenheit? Die Diskussion um die Bewerbung Tôkyôs für die Olympischen Spiele 2016" (Forward to the Past? The Discussion about the Bid Tôkyôs for the Olympic Games 2016), in: *Japan: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (2009), pp. 195 – 216.

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29 EZAWA: *Orinpikku wa kinmamire*, p. 21.

30 TAGSOLD, Christian: "The Tôkyô Olympics as a Token of Renationalization", in: NIEHAUS, Andreas & SEINSCH, Max (EDS.): *Olympic Japan: Ideals and Realities of (Inter)Nationalism*. Würzburg 2007, pp. 111 – 129.

31 UCHIUMI, Kazuo: "Orinpikku no hihan – hiteiron no kentô" [Examining Olympic Criticism and Theories of Negation], in: *Hitotsu daigaku supôtsu kenkyû* 27(2008), pp. 11 – 18, p. 15.

32 WAKI, Yoshishige: *Fukuoka ga marumie ni natta hi: Kensho "Fukuoka Orinpikku" [The Day Fukuoka understood: Inspecting Fukuoka Olympics]*. Fukuoka 2007.

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34 WU, Zhongyi & GAO, Caiyun: "Wo guo trops yun dong de li lun jian gou yu shi jian [Theory Construction and Development Trend of Troops in China]", in: *Ti Yu Xue Kan* 9(2002)3, pp. 9 – 11.

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