


The CIA, the IOC, and Efforts to Establish a Refugee Olympic Team*

By Toby C. Rider

The Union of Free Eastern European Sportsmen (UFEES), which had its headquarters in New York, demanded in a letter of 20th May 1952 the "participation of stateless athletes" in the Olympic Games in Helsinki. The initiator – with the support of the CIA – was the Hungarian Count Anthony (Antal) Szápáry (1905-1973), who in 1949 had married the great-granddaughter of railroad magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt.



In an address delivered to the United Nations General Assembly on 26th October 2015, the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Thomas Bach, explained that athletes of the highest calibre were among the millions of refugees swept up in the unfolding humanitarian disaster across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. "At present, none of these athletes would have the chance to participate in the Olympic Games even if qualified," he said, "with their refugee status, they are left without a home country and National Olympic Committee to represent."

In response to this tragic set of circumstances, Bach announced that the IOC planned to allow a small number of these men and women to participate at the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. "[H]aving no national team to belong to, having no flag to march behind, having no national anthem to be played, these refugee athletes will be welcomed to the Olympic Games with the Olympic flag and the Olympic anthem," he told the assembly. "This will be a symbol of hope for all the refugees in our world, and will make the world better aware of the magnitude of this crisis."¹ In March the following year, the IOC Executive Board established and recognised a Refugee Olympic Team (ROT) for the first time in the history of the modern Games.²

As far back as 1952, however a different refugee team was not given the same vote of approval. The Union of Free Eastern European Sportsmen (UFEES), a consortium of stateless athletes that had fled from behind the 'Iron Curtain' and sought to compete at the Helsinki Summer Games, roundly failed in its bid to receive official Olympic recognition. In many ways, the decision was fully justified. After all, recent research has revealed that the UFEES was connected to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the clearing house for the US government's early Cold War covert operations.³ These secret links, forged as part of America's strategy to defeat the Soviet Union, gave the IOC's Members a simple reason to deny the Union's application.

Recent research suggests that the IOC is an organisation that opposes the political interference of governments with the Olympics. Yet the available sources do not suggest that Olympic authorities had any inkling of the involvement of America's intelligence community in the activities of the Union. They made a decision, and a decisive one at that, based upon the merits of the case. Exploring the IOC's approach to the Union therefore reveals the organisation's change of policy with respect to the participation of stateless athletes in the twenty first century.

The Secret Behind the UFEES

There existed, quite clearly, a fundamental difference between the Union and the newly coined Refugee Olympic Team. One was organised by the IOC, the other by a clandestine organ of state. Indeed, tracing the origins of the Union reveals the evolution of America's covert Cold War apparatus. The formation of the Union was, in essence, inspired by the US government's strategy of "political warfare" to counter the threat of communist expansion in the early Cold War years. US officials argued that only through political warfare, the "employment of all means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives," could America effectively respond to the apparent success of Soviet propaganda following the defeat of Hitler.⁴ In 1948, this realisation was quickly made policy when the government created the machinery for secret operations and placed it under the umbrella of the Central Intelligence Agency.⁵

Armed with a massive budget and a cast of Second World War intelligence veterans, the US soon embarked upon a wide scope of covert operations in a global assault on communism. Moreover, this worldwide crusade was further driven and galvanized by the co-option of private actors to the cause. US policymakers determined that foreign audiences would be far more responsive to the message of American propaganda if it appeared that the message had not come from official government sources. As a result, they launched an unprecedented peacetime commitment to support US foreign policy objectives by working with and through private groups or, in more extreme examples, creating "private" organisations from scratch.⁶

The National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) fit into the latter category of this "state-private network." This émigré group provided a voice for Eastern European refugees who had fled either the Nazi invasion or the subsequent Soviet presence in their respective countries. Covert operators in Washington recognised that the exiles possessed the necessary lines of contact to breach Stalin's 'Iron Curtain', and spread propaganda that might disrupt and encourage revolt against Soviet communist ideology. More still, the State Department reasoned that if they controlled the refugees in an unofficial capacity, the US government could not be held accountable. And so in response to Soviet foreign policy and in light



Latvian Jānis Dikmanis (1882–1969) was the Vice-Chairman of the UFEES and an IOC member from 1926 to 1947. In the wake of the Red Army invasion of 1944 he fled to Germany and from there to England and to the USA. Far left: the committee was also supported by the Briton Tufton Beamish (1917–1989), from 1945 to 1974 conservative member of Parliament and thereafter Baron Chelwood of Lewes in East Sussex.

Photos: Volker Kluge Archive

of the potential of the exiled community, the National Committee for a Free Europe was formed by the American intelligence community in 1949. The organisation's first press release stated that it would aid the exiles in their "stand against communism" and, of course, made no mention of where its funding came from. To anyone in the public that might be interested, the committee simply appeared to be a private philanthropic group led by prominent American citizens. In reality, however, it received millions of CIA dollars to fund Soviet bloc émigrés in an astounding breadth of activities. The most famous branch of the organisation's propaganda machine, *Radio Free Europe*, started to broadcast in 1950, but the committee also poured money into research centers, publications, "freedom" rallies, a Free Europe University in Exile, and a plethora of other exiled groups and individuals living in the West.⁷

One such benefactor, crucial to the story of the Union, was the Hungarian National Sports Federation (HNSF). Formed in December 1949, the Federation sought to "deal the greatest possible blows whenever and wherever possible to the communists in the field of sports."⁸ Led by a Hungarian exile named Count Anthony Szápáry, the group endeavored to help athletes to defect from Eastern Europe and aided those that had defected to start a new life on "free soil." As many of these refugees desired to continue competing in sporting competitions, the HNSF expelled a considerable amount of energy attempting to persuade international sports bodies such as the IOC to allow stateless athletes to enter their events. One of the HNSF's first major attempts to press this agenda resulted in the creation of the Union of Free Eastern European Sportsmen.⁹

The scheme developed throughout the middle portion of 1951. Realizing that many athletes from Soviet bloc countries were among the people in flight from the 'Iron Curtain', the HNSF and NCFE concocted a plan to create a refugee Olympic team for the 1952 Summer Games in Helsinki.¹⁰ It coincided, rather aptly, with another significant event. While the creators of the UFEES plotted about how to get Olympic recognition, the Soviet Union got it. At Helsinki, the Soviet Union's athletes competed



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Count Szápáry spoke in particular Hungarian athletes living in exile. In 1949 Kornél Pajor, became the only Hungarian to win a World Championship in speed-skating. He settled in Sweden after the 1951 World Championships. Adjacent: the fencer Imre Rajczy, who had won Olympic gold in 1936 with the Hungarian sabre team and had emigrated to Argentina after the Second World War.



for the first time in Olympic history, further drawing the Movement into the global ideological struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the world.¹¹ For this reason, too, the timing of the Union's operation was perfect. Stalin may have had expectations that Soviet athletes would promote communism on an international platform by dominating in Finland, but a group of exiles competing in defiance of communist control in Eastern Europe was sure to raise a few eyebrows in the Kremlin. Officials in the NCFE certainly believed that "tremendous propaganda" could be "derived" from getting a refugee team on the programme for Helsinki.¹²

In May 1952, the Union applied to the IOC for official recognition. A list of potential athletes for the team, compiled by the UFEES, included rowers, gymnasts, swimmers, boxers, wrestlers, over forty soccer players and a further twenty five basketballers. Notable stars on the list included the world champion speed-skater, Kornél Pajor, Olympic gold medallist fencer, Imre Rajczy, and the entire silver medal winning water polo team from the 1948 Games.¹³ Although the final number of athletes that would comprise the team was never fully established – ROT, incidentally, would have ten – one newspaper reported that it could contain, "16 Olympic, 20 world and 35 former intercollegiate champions."¹⁴ There is no doubt, however, about the Union's political objectives. Szápáry, who served as the chairman for the group, declared that it represented refugee athletes from "ten nations enslaved by the Kremlin."¹⁵

An Appeal to Olympic Principles

In 2016, the IOC reacted to a human crisis of immense proportions. For this reason, no doubt, the creation of the Refugee Olympic Team has been warmly greeted by the public and media. Yet the refugee situation in the post-World War Two years was also catastrophic. The bloody course of the confrontation shook and uprooted communities around the world. The European theater of battle alone, the main focus of Hitler's attention, led to the displacement of millions. Once the war was over, an already dire refugee situation was further complicated by the exodus of people from the newly established communist regimes in Eastern Europe.¹⁶

This turn events, coupled with the hardening anti-communist sentiments of many in the West after 1945, certainly made the case for refugee sportsmen all the more compelling to those who were aware of it. "There must be athletes of considerable ability among well over a million refugees from the Russian-dominated countries, and perhaps even among exiles from the Soviet Union itself," wrote the British politician, Major Tufton Beamish, in a plea to his fellow countrymen and IOC Member, Lord David Burghley. "I am myself very much in favour of trying to enable these people and their offspring to compete in the Olympic Games. It would be a small gesture that could have considerable effect on the morale of the people in the occupied countries."¹⁷

Representatives of the UFEES harnessed these attitudes and this political atmosphere to spark their campaign into life. In letters to members of the IOC, and in trenchant statements to the media, they charged that refugee athletes were victims of ruthless communist forces in Eastern Europe. "In these countries," Szápáry wrote in a missive to the IOC, athletes "are selected on a political basis, those with different political opinions are considered unreliable and therefore cannot practice sports and are prosecuted or imprisoned." Having been essentially forced to leave their homelands, Szápáry added, these athletes were then "barred from the most noble festival" of "youth" in the world. "The Union of Free Eastern European Sportsmen, considers as its prime duty to obtain the necessary recognition for the stateless athletes in order to help them in reaching the ultimate goal of every athlete, that of taking part in the Olympics," he explained.¹⁸

The primary obstacle for supporters of refugee athletes in general, and the UFEES in particular, was the IOC's rules on national representation. As Lord Burghley succinctly put it, "we deal essentially with National Olympic Committees, and not with individuals, and we can only have one national team from each country."¹⁹ Thus, without a national committee to compete for, an individual refugee could not compete at the Olympics, and a team of refugees clearly could not represent any one country. Moreover, if a refugee had already participated for their nation of birth at the Olympics, as many had done before defecting, the IOC's rules prevented the individual from wearing the colours of a second country at the Games. Refugee athletes, then, simply did not fit anywhere within the organisational framework of the Olympic system.²⁰

To overcome the incompatibility of the Union with the IOC's edicts, the case Szápáry and others made, in public announcements and private correspondence, mainly tackled the issue from two perspectives. First, advocates of the Union combatted the IOC's rules by pointing to another, the first to be found in the *Olympic Charter*: "The Olympic Games are held every four years and assemble amateurs of all nations in fair and equal competition under conditions which are to be as perfect as possible. No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of colour, religion or politics."²¹ This famous rule, so often recited by both friends and enemies of the Games to attack or defend them, encapsulated the inclusive philosophy that underpinned the Movement. In appealing to this regulation, the UFEES argued that many athletes had no choice but to flee from Eastern Europe; their way of life had been attacked and their freedom compromised.²² Szápáry reasoned, therefore, that "the non-admittance of stateless athletes to the Games is in every sense a political discrimination."²³



After the Hungarian uprising of 1956 the subject of refugees became a hot topic. Among those athletes who did not return to their country was László Tábori, who had been fourth in the 1500 m in Melbourne and sixth over 5000 m. Together with coach Mihály Igloi (1908-1998) he emigrated to the USA. As a "stateless athlete" he had no chance of taking part in the 1960 Games in Rome.

In a second argument, one that apparently transcended the first, supporters of the UFEES invoked the virtuous ideals of Olympism. As such, they asked that the IOC make a decision based upon the lofty "principles" of fair play and good sportsmanship, important features of the festival's peaceful aims. Though not denying the centrality of regulations to the functioning of the Games, Szápáry called upon the IOC to follow the "spirit" if not the "strict wording" of its rules.²⁴ To press this point, and to lure their audience into feelings of guilt no doubt, multiple times officials from the Union paid homage to the historical origins of the Games and the musings of Baron Pierre de Coubertin. "After all," noted Peter Zerkowitz, the Union's secretary, the Baron "meant to assist mutual understanding among the youth of the world, without regard to politics. The rules were made to further international sportsmanship, but the refugee problem didn't exist then. Now those same rules are working against those very same aims of sportsmanship."²⁵

Throughout months of lobbying, the Union's main arguments were made and remade on numerous occasions. Yet the leaders of the group do not appear to have harbored any misplaced confidence. They accepted that their cause might be doomed to fail. They remained optimistic. In a letter to American Olympic officials, the President of the NCFE, Charles Douglas Jackson, noted that while the "consideration" of a refugee team would "raise some questions" for

The 1952 Olympics in Helsinki saw the entry of the Soviet Union as a new global player. Their team and those from other 'Iron curtain' stayed in a second Olympic Village in Otaniemi. They were kept apart from competitors from Western nations. A picture of Stalin was intended to "beautify" the accommodation.



the IOC, he believed that such questions "may not be found insoluble."²⁶ In reality, though, Jackson and his colleagues hoped rather than expected for good news.

Judging the Case

The creation of ROT, of course, required no such labors. The IOC's Members merely had to convince themselves that such a team could be admitted into the Games. They evidently decided that it could. But how did the IOC react to the Union's campaign? The IOC first discussed the subject at length during its February Session in 1952. In a record of the debate, held in Oslo before the same city hosted the Winter Games, the minutes of the meeting note that several members expressed their opinion on stateless athletes. Yet the same minutes only provide greater detail on the viewpoints of two participants. Both were negative.

The British delegate, Lord Aberdare, called the idea of a refugee team "purely fanciful" and demanded that it be rebuffed, "without delay," in a statement to the media. Erik von Frenckell, the Finnish delegate, offered a different reason to deny the proposal. He stated that the request from the refugees had come far too late for Helsinki, and added that in the long-term, the athletes would be too old to compete at the 1956 Games in Melbourne. Von Frenckell reasoned that the problem was short term, and convinced many that it would disappear with time.²⁷ His comments appear to have made an impression on others in the room. Sigfrid Edström, the IOC President, wrote a month later that the "fugitive question" was "a passing problem that we must not pay too much attention to."²⁸

The discussion offered little promise for the Union. Yet the matter was certainly not dismissed by everyone in the IOC. Some clearly sympathized with the situation faced by refugee athletes. The evidence suggests, for instance, that the Vice-President of the IOC, Avery Brundage, was sensitive to the cause. "They have a very impressive list of ex-national, international and Olympic champions," he told a colleague. "As a matter of fact, since the Olympic Games are supposed to assemble the youth of the world, perhaps there really should be some way of allowing them to compete."²⁹

It was this collective sympathy that probably led to the Union receiving space on the IOC's agenda at its next Session in Helsinki. The NCFE, in one final push, paid for a Hungarian exile living in England named Thomas de Márffy-Mantuano to travel to Finland and speak on the issue.³⁰ He made the usual appeals based upon the interpretation of Olympic rules and Olympic principles.

These contentions were, by this point, synonymous with the case. But he also added a few more. To prevent the "plight" of stateless athletes, Márffy suggested that the IOC could instruct the International Sports Federations to recognise the refugee athletes, an act that might clear the path to full Olympic recognition. He proposed, as an alternative, that refugees could compete under the flag of the International Red Cross, or the Olympic rings, or as part of teams from countries such as Switzerland or Greece. He asked, as well, that the "question be studied with leniency." It changed not a thing. Once the Hungarian had finished his oration, the IOC voted to deny the proposal for a refugee Olympic team.³¹

If some of the IOC delegates clearly sympathized with the refugees, what stopped them from making the alternative choice? The Union's connection to the CIA might have offered a plausible explanation, but the available sources simply do not support this claim. Interestingly, too, the IOC was not evidently bothered about the political aims of the UFEES. It was unequivocally clear that a key component of the

Union's mission was based around the propaganda that Eastern European exiles competing at the Games might generate. The Union made no secret whatsoever of its anti-communist agenda. This goal, however, was not a factor, or at least does not appear to have been, in the IOC's decision to block the group's proposal.

In a published statement condemning the ruling, Szápáry accused the communist IOC Members of sabotaging the entire request for recognition.³² This appears to be a reasonable assumption. Escapees from the Soviet bloc were a considerable problem for the communist regimes, hidden if at all possible or empathically criticized if necessary. "These men are deserters, traitors," the Soviet IOC Member, Alexey Romanov, told Brundage.³³ For the Soviet bloc representatives in the room, listening to Márffy's oration must have been awkward. They would surely have been given orders by communist authorities about how to act if the Union's proposal gained traction. But it did not. Once again, moreover, the sources remain silent. And even if the communist delegates were against the refugees from Eastern Europe, which is highly likely, the effort to squash the proposal was also backed by the IOC membership, and this included the anti-communist Brundage and Edström.³⁴

One more explanation is left: the rules apparently presented the IOC with an insurmountable wall. There seemed to be a general, albeit weak, desire in the IOC to work out a solution but none of the suggestions put forward by exiles or interested parties were deemed acceptable when weighed against the structure and spirit of the organisation's rules. The IOC was dedicated to promoting peace through sporting competition between national teams. A refugee team, the IOC replied, was impractical for an Olympic system based on national sports federations and National Olympic Committees. In fairness, this was not a justification wheeled out at the last moment by the IOC; its members consistently told emigres throughout 1951 and 1952 that a refugee Olympic team would probably fail. Rightly or wrongly, the IOC acted in precisely the same manner as it said it would. The IOC's Members understood that there should be no "discrimination" at the Games, but, as Edström explained, it was "fundamental" that the athletes "belong to a nation."³⁵

Concluding Remarks: The Path to ROT

After its request for recognition had been refused, the Union gradually stopped sending letters to the IOC. Within a few years, the group appears to have disappeared. Yet the problem of refugee athletes did not "pass" as the leaders of the Movement thought that it would. The IOC remained the target of public criticism, some of quite vehement, for its approach to

the issue.³⁶ Slowly, though, the IOC began to rewrite its rules and to display a modicum of flexibility. In 1956, it voted to allow women the opportunity to compete for a second country of citizenship, that being the country of the man that they married.³⁷ Nearly a decade later, in 1964, the IOC ruled that it would allow any athlete, man or woman, to enter under the colours of a second country of citizenship after the individual had been a naturalized citizen of that country for three years.³⁸ These alterations to the *Charter* allowed for many refugee athletes to secure Olympic eligibility, yet the changes still only worked around the Movement's structure of National Olympic Committees. A refugee remained in a state of limbo until citizenship was secured, a process that could take years.

In an effort to accommodate the unfortunate people that remained in transition between countries, the IOC began to allow some athletes to enter the Games as independent participants under the Olympic flag. In 1992, for instance, the IOC handled the breakup of Yugoslavia in just this way. While the war torn Yugoslavian nation splintered into separate states, it was hit with United Nations Security Council sanctions that included a ban on participation in sports events. The IOC carefully listened to international calls for intervention and invited Yugoslavian athletes to enter the Barcelona Games as individuals. William Hybl, the President of the United States Olympic Committee, called the arrangement "the Olympic ideal at its best."³⁹ More recently, too, the IOC granted four athletes from East Timor (2000), three athletes of the dissolved NOC of the Netherlands Antilles and one athlete from South Sudan (2012) permission to compete under the Olympic flag as each country awaited official recognition in the Movement.⁴⁰



For cox Róbert Zimonyi (1918–2004) there was a sixteen year gap between 1948 bronze medal for the Hungarian coxed pairs and a gold medal with the American eight in 1964 in Tokyo.

Behind the Olympic flag and the designation "Independent Olympic Athletes", three participants of the dissolved NOC of the Netherlands Antilles, as well as a sportsman from South Sudan, marched in 2012 in London. There was a similar solution in 1992 for the sportsmen and -women from Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia as well as in 2000 for four athletes from Timor Leste.

At the 2014 Winter Games three Indians initially had this status. But during the Games, as the Indian NOC, which had been suspended, was again recognised, they could in the end take part under their own flag.

Photo: picture-alliance



With far greater financial resources and global influence than in the early Cold War, the IOC has also become far more engaged with the broader refugee problem. Since 2004, for example, the IOC has worked with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to provide thousands of refugees with sports equipment and clothing. In 2015, the IOC went a step further and announced that it would create a two million dollar refugee fund for National Olympic Committees to distribute to selected projects and programmes.⁴¹ On the back of this initiative came the formation of the Refugee Olympic Team. "Through the [ROT], we can demonstrate that sport has values, which these days are sometimes put in doubt for various reasons," said IOC official, Pere Meró. "By bringing these athletes back to the Games, back to sport, back to life, and by bringing sport to the refugee camps to improve the quality of everyday life, we believe we are going back to our roots and really demonstrating that sport can serve society."⁴² In comparison to 1952, then, the IOC of 2016 has adopted an entirely different approach to refugee athletes. It elected to privilege the principles of Olympism over the rules as written in the *Olympic Charter*. ■

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