

Side-Swiped: the IOC and the China Issue at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games

By Richard W. Pound | Part 2

The IOC Session in Montreal

Opening of the 78th Session at Place des Arts: Lord Killanin addresses the audience at the podium of the Montréal Symphony Orchestra (right).

The IOC Session in Montreal began on 13 July 1976, in the midst of the various and daily discussions at the Executive Board and efforts to negotiate with the government of Canada and the Republic of China delegation. By this time as well, the prospect of a boycott was also a very real possibility. Several delegations from Africa and other nations were threatening to stay away from the Games in protest against a New Zealand rugby tour of South Africa. Sessions of the IOC are particularly unwieldy as a forum for discussion and solution of complex problems, especially those when the factual context may be constantly changing and where there is a dramatically uneven level of knowledge among the IOC Members. Killanin was at pains to explain the situation, as well as the various actions taken by the Executive Board to find solutions to the China problem.¹ It was nevertheless apparent that many of the IOC Members were inclined to be much firmer than the Executive Board had been in the circumstances and Killanin, however defensive he may have been about the choices he had made and those made by the Executive Board, had little alternative but to open the matter for discussion by the Session.

Not surprisingly, the IOC Members were almost universally hostile in their attitude to the Canadian government's actions. The descriptions which follow are included to show the range of proposals advanced, as well as the unsuitability of a group of some 67 IOC Members (at that time) as an effective decision-making body. Reginald Alexander (KEN) pointed out that a number of



rules were involved in the question, one of which was the rule enabling a change of name of the Republic of China, requiring a two-thirds majority vote, and that it would be wrong to do this in retaliation against the Canadian government's "dishonesty". He suggested informing Prime Minister Trudeau that his government's decision had seriously embarrassed the IOC, and inviting him and all members of his political party in Parliament to excuse themselves from the Olympic sites and social functions connected with the Games. He also felt that Canadian sportsmen who were to compete in the Games should be invited to protest in any way they felt appropriate. He suggested calling an extraordinary meeting of the NOCs to support the resolution of the IOC so that the Canadian government would be fully aware of the demands of sportsmen from all over the world. Finally, having heard that a similar situation had arisen in Canada in November 1975, he wondered why this had not been taken up by the IOC as a warning of what

1 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, pp. 6–8. A certain amount of documentation had already been distributed to IOC Members, including a circular letter dated 1 July 1976 (IOC Historical Archives, document M/F/C1101), the letter from the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs dated 28 May 1976, Killanin's reply dated 8 June 1976, Killanin's telex dated 24 June 1976, the telex dated 27 June 1976 from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, a letter dated 11 April 1976 from the Federal Immigration Co-ordinator for the Montreal Games to the Montreal Organising Committee Director of Accreditations and Attachés, letters dated 21 May 1969 and 28 November 1969 respectively, from the Prime Minister of Canada and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and an extract from the Mayor of Montreal's speech at the IOC Session in Amsterdam in 1970. Copies of press releases issued by the IOC since arriving in Montreal (Annex 4, pp. 62–68, Annex 5, pp. 68–69) were also distributed.

2 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 8.

3 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 10.

4 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 12. It is not clear what this was supposed to mean and Roosevelt gave no further reported details. It is particularly puzzling, given the terms of the possible US non-participation on the basis of an IOC withdrawal of its support of Games in Montreal, all of which depended on an action on the part of the IOC to withdraw its sanction of the Games, not an independent action on the part of the USOC.

5 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 8.

6 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 8. This discussion during the Session was prior to the change Killanin negotiated with the Prime Minister on 15 July 1976 regarding use of the flag and anthem. (infra p. **)

7 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 9.

was now happening.² Julian Roosevelt (USA) supported this resolution. Manuel Gonzales Guerra (CUB) did not think the Session should make a separate motion and should leave it to the Executive Board to continue its discussions.³ Roosevelt intervened later in the discussion to say that if the United States team withdrew and returned home, it would be difficult to keep the US government out of the USOC's administration.⁴ Jan Staubo (NOR) thought it was too early to vote on such a proposed resolution and that negotiations should be taken up again and, in the meantime, members' opinions could be referred back to the Executive Board.⁵ General Vladimir Stoychev (BUL) felt that it was clear that the relationship of the Canadian government with the PRC was more important than the Olympic Games. At the same time, however, the ROCOC's decision not to accept the proposal to participate without using its country's name, flag and anthem was purely political. He urged Hsu to use his influence to persuade the ROC team to compete under the Olympic flag.⁶ Gunnar Ericsson (SWE) remarked that this was the first time the IOC had had to give up against political pressure, but felt that the Executive Board's decision should be accepted by the Session, under protest.⁷ Dr. Eduardo Hay (MEX) referred to the 1968 Games when a similar political problem had existed. The Mexican government did not recognize the Spanish monarchy and gave refuge to its exiles. In spite of the diplomatic problems in raising the Spanish flag and playing the national anthem of Spain, the Mexican government had agreed to abide by the Olympic rules. He wondered why the Canadian government could not do the same.⁸

General Sven Thofelt (SWE) considered that the problem arose from the fact that the IOC rules contained stipulations which it could not control. The IOC did not have any power over the names, flags and anthems of countries, although it might, if these attributes belonged to the NOCs. He suggested that the ROC team compete with no name, flag or anthem at all. The most important factor was the athletes. If the IOC did not succeed in assuring the participation of ROC athletes, then it could consider ways of showing up the Canadian government,

but the ROCOC should be urged to cooperate fully. Marc Hodler (SUI) supported Thofelt's proposal, but was concerned that if the ROC team was asked to march under the Olympic flag, then other teams should be allowed to do the same. Sir Ade Ademola (NGR) considered that, as a vote of sympathy for the ROCOC, all NOCs should be made to march under the Olympic flag and that national anthems should be abolished. Lance Cross (NZL) supported the complete abolition of names, flags and anthems of countries in future and agreed with Alexander's motion as a last resort.⁹ Rivera Bascur (CHI) supported the use of the Olympic flag and favoured urging the ROC to participate under it, showing the world the solidarity of the Olympic Movement. Raymond Gafner (SUI) intervened later in the discussion to say that if all NOCs agreed to march under the Olympic flag, they would all be competing under the same conditions and would be proving their solidarity with Taiwan, which would put the Olympic Movement in a strong position in the eyes of the world.¹⁰

The Marquess of Exeter (GBR) expressed the view that it should be made quite clear that the whole situation had come about because the Canadian government going against its word. It should be made clear to the ROC athletes that the IOC was on their side. Ahmed Touny (EGY) considered that the IOC was obliged to accept the conditions of the Canadian government while on Canadian territory. He concluded that the Session should accept the Executive Board's proposals, but that the entire problem should be studied, so that the same situation did not arise at future Games. These views were shared by Syed Wajid Ali (PAK), who emphasized the responsibility of the IOC to the athletes of the world to provide the Games.¹¹ Louis Guirandou-N'Diaye (CIV) was much more alarmist, saying that in accepting the government of Canada's decision against the ROC team, even if an alternative solution were found for its participation, the IOC was signing its own death warrant and was accepting a breach of its rules regarding discrimination.¹² Reginald Honey (RSA) said the Canadian government had acted dishonourably and dishonestly and the IOC should not compromise with it. It was essential for



8 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 9.

9 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 9. These are perfect examples of how a thought can catch fire and lead in directions that have nothing to do with the particular problem at hand. In the space of only a few minutes, the interventions moved from a ROC-specific solution, to a requirement for all NOCs to abandon their national identification on this occasion, to a complete removal of all national identification for all purposes in future Games. This last suggestion displayed a fundamental lack of understanding of the importance of national identity as a vital feature of the Games and resultant government willingness to provide sports infrastructure and to encourage development of sport in their countries. The Olympic Games are popular on a national basis because of national identification with a worldwide event. It is no accident that newly-emerging countries often apply for recognition by the IOC

even before seeking status in the United Nations Organization, as a sign of their "arrival" on the international scene.

10 IOC Session 1976, Montreal, p. 10.

11 IOC Session 1976, Montreal, p. 10.

12 IOC Session 1976, Montreal, p. 10. Guirandou N'Diaye would later become Ambassador to Canada.

13 IOC Session 1976, Montreal, p. 10. South Africa had come out on the wrong end of just such a matter of principle, having been prevented from participating in the 1964 and 1968 Games, followed by expulsion from the Olympic Movement in 1970, as a result of racial discrimination exemplified by its system of apartheid. Honey remained a Member of the IOC long after he would likely have chosen to retire, since he provided the only window for South Africa into the Olympic Movement following the 1970 expulsion. Lord Porritt (NZL) was invited by Killanin to speak as an Honorary Member,

the IOC to abide by principles and not give in, even if this led to serious consequences for itself and sportsmen.¹³ Paavo Honkajuri (FIN), one of the IOC's most sensible members, said that the IOC should not abolish national flags then and there without giving the matter very careful consideration. Nor could it allow a situation where some teams marched under the Olympic flag and others did not, since this would constitute a political demonstration, and thereby involve the IOC in politics.¹⁴ Constantin Andrianov (URS) added that the IOC had no right to force NOCs to change their flag and anthem, which could only be decided by each country, and he did not believe that every country would agree. In coming to a compromise with the Canadian government, very serious precedents could be created for the future. He supported making very strong protests against the Canadian government and holding it responsible for all consequences in the eyes of the world.¹⁵ Lord Luke (GBR) felt that bringing sanctions to bear against the Canadian government would constitute a political solution to the situation, and that the IOC should only consider solutions within the Olympic sphere.¹⁶

As the discussion evolved, some of the members seemed to be leaning toward the idea that the ROCOC should be responsible for helping to find a solution. Tony Bridge (JAM) remarked that it seemed as if everyone expected that Hsu (as the IOC Member) should find a solution. Berthold Beitz (GER) supported Bridge and considered it imperative that Hsu should reach a compromise with the Taiwanese. Erik von Frenckell (FIN) suggested that Hsu speak to the ROC delegation to try to persuade them to formulate a proposal without attacking their honour and proposed that discussions be postponed until this could be done. Boris Bakrač (YUG) supported the Executive Board's statement because this was the only alternative, but added that it was not right for the IOC to attack the Canadian government, which had indirectly reminded the IOC that the way in which Taiwan had become known as the Republic of China had not been according to the rules.¹⁷ David McKenzie (AUS) was one of the younger IOC Members, but was well respected, and said that there were several problems, all being discussed at the same time. Failing a compromise with the Taiwanese, it was up to the IOC to try its

best to enable the maximum number of competitors to take part. He asked what the Canadian government could do about the two athletes already in Canada. He felt that the Games should continue, to which there seemed to be unanimous agreement. However, the Executive Board had not stated under what conditions the Games would go on. The question of the form of the Games should be discussed, together with what kind of protest should be made as a result of what he considered to be most unethical conduct. A protest should still be made even if a compromise was reached with the Taiwan delegation and they were allowed to compete.¹⁸ Mohamed Zerguini (ALG) urged that the IOC must be wise, realistic and courageous and that it was wrong to blame the Canadian government. The IOC should find out who was responsible beforehand (*au premier chef*) and he fully supported the Executive Board's proposal. The Canadian government was not against the (Taiwanese) athletes themselves, but only as to them participating as Chinese. There was only one China (the great China) and it was the Taiwanese who were acting as if they did not want to participate in Canada. Alexander's proposal was very dangerous, as it was too political and would imply that the IOC could not organize any Olympic Games.¹⁹

Killanin intervened to say that it was not the question of China that was being discussed (which, he said, would be studied separately at a later time), but the principle of an NOC's entry into Canada under its own name being refused by the government of Canada. The Executive Board had endeavoured to find a solution to enable the athletes to enter Canada, and had not made threats, because it had wanted to leave the door open for the Canadian government to change its mind.²⁰ Alexander re-intervened to refer to his resolution which the members now had before them. It read:

"Be it resolved that the Canadian National Olympic Committee and COJO [the French acronym of the Montreal Organising Committee], as agents of the International Olympic Committee, be instructed to inform the Government of Canada that its decision to refuse entry into Canada of the whole team from the Republic of China and participation in the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, in contravention of the

even though Honorary Members were not normally permitted to vote or to speak during the Sessions. Porritt thought the question of principle was important and supported Messrs. Roby and Honey. A similar situation had arisen in 1936, (when the IOC insisted that Hitler remove the Nazi swastikas from the Olympic stadium in Berlin, since they constituted political messages). On that occasion there had been sufficient time to act, which was not the case now. He did not recommend cancellation of the Games, although he felt that many of the suggestions were quite impractical. He expressed his disgust for the Canadian government, but felt that the situation was dangerous. The time element was the most important factor. He thanked the Executive Board [presumably for its

work] and only regretted that the recommendation made during its meetings had been announced to the world as a decision. He supported Alexander's statement, but felt that the IOC should be stronger. There was no advantage arising from the question of flags and anthems, although the IOC could not accept responsibility for this. If the Taiwanese wished to make a gesture, they would receive complete backing, but they would have to help themselves. The IOC had tried to correct its mistakes in the past by changing the rules and this would continue. However, it was too late to do so at this moment. [p. 12]

14 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 10.

15 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 10.

*fundamental rules of the IOC and solemn promises to fulfill all the requirements of the IOC, has seriously embarrassed both the IOC and its reputable members, the National Olympic Committee of Canada and the Republic of China, and the IOC invites the Prime Minister of Canada and his cabinet minister (sic) to excuse themselves from the Montreal Olympic sites and all social functions connected with the Games during the period after the opening ceremony until the end of the Games and furthermore we invite the sportsmen of Canada in Olympic events to register their protest throughout Canada in any way they consider appropriate."*²¹

Exeter proposed deleting the words, "and all the members of his political party in Parliament." There was sufficient good sense among the IOC Members not to adopt the proposal, which, apart from being insulting, incited Canadian athletes to protest against decisions of their own government and thereby turn themselves into political activists, something which ought to have been anathema for an organization like the IOC, which declared itself to be apolitical. Alexander later carried on a private and aggressive correspondence with Prime Minister Trudeau.²²

Killanin then called upon James Worrall (CAN) to explain the situation as it existed at the moment. Worrall explained that the Executive Board had met both the Taiwan delegation and the Canadian government in an effort to find a solution and to persuade the Canadian government to accept the athletes' participation. Certain suggestions had been put forward. The government would agree to let the athletes enter Canada if the Olympic hymn was played instead of their national anthem when the athletes entered the [Olympic] Village, the team marched behind the Olympic flag, and the Olympic rings and "CIO" or "IOC" was used for the placard, but no mention of China would be accepted. If these conditions were met there would be no problem concerning immigration. With regard to the uniforms, repeating what he had said to the Executive board, although he had not seen them, he described the crest as being small and that it was a minor detail. He added that he did not agree at all with the Canadian



The International Olympic Committee at its 78th Session in 1976 in Montreal. 68 of the 76 Members were present.

government's action and that, had there been any doubt regarding this issue when the application for the Games had been made, neither Harold Wright (President of the COC), nor the Mayor, nor he would have endorsed the government's agreement. It was very severe for an NOC, which had been accepted under a particular name, to be asked to change it, but he felt that there should be a free and voluntary decision on behalf of Taiwan.²³

Hsu was clearly in an awkward position. He agreed with the suggestion from Bridge and Beitz to allow all the teams to march behind the Olympic flag and thought this might be a solution. Killanin, however, reiterated that this solution, having already been proposed and discussed, was very impractical as it would divide the NOCs and (contrary to what he had already said) give them excuses of all types not to participate in the Games. He asked if anybody disagreed with him, and said that the Taiwan delegation was waiting outside the room. He reminded the Session that the question about the athletes marching behind the Olympic flag and under its name alone had already been turned down by the delegation. Killanin also noted that while the government in Taipei claimed to be the rightful government of all China, the NOC no longer made any such claims regarding the administration of sport in mainland China. There was some indication, he said, that the ROCOC delegates might reconsider their decision to withdraw from the Games. Hsu left the meeting to discuss the matter with them and to report on their views.²⁴

16 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 11. This was immediately supported by Dr. Frantisek Kroutil (TCH) who added that any action against Canadian government officials would be contrary to the principles (unidentified) expressed by Pierre de Coubertin.
 17 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, pp. 11–12. Bakrač did not specify which rule he thought might have been breached.
 18 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 11. Later in the discussion, McKenzie offered the view that the Canadian government would find it difficult under Canadian law to carry out its threat of deporting the Taiwanese who had already entered Canada. [p. 14] It is interesting to speculate as to the basis on which an Australian lawyer could give such an authoritative opinion on a complicated

question of Canadian public law.
 19 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 12. The minutes are not clear, but the sense of his intervention was that the Taiwanese were now acting in a manner which was calculated to prevent them from participating in the Games.²⁰
 20 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 13.
 21 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 13 and Annex 6 (p. 69).
 22 See Appendix "A."
 23 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 13.
 24 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, pp. 13–14.
 25 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 14. Daume proposed yet another possibility: since the Taiwan delegation had regarded this

In the meantime, it was unanimously agreed that the Games had to continue. Killanin asked for approval of the press release already issued by the Executive Board. It was, however, the sense of the meeting that the strongest protest should be made to the Canadian government. The Session also agreed that the ROC delegation be offered the honour of marching under the Olympic flag, playing the Olympic anthem and using either a signboard with the Olympic rings, a blank board, or no board at all.²⁵

The next day, Killanin informed the IOC Members that the Taiwan delegation would not compete under the Olympic flag, as proposed by the Executive Board, nor would it use the name of the IOC instead of the Republic of China. This decision had been reached after long consultations with the National Olympic Committee in Taiwan and the "Taiwanese people". Hsu reiterated that the Taiwan delegation wished only to be treated with fairness and in accordance with the IOC rules. He also noted that there were five members of the Taiwan team (two competitors and three officials) at the yachting basin in Kingston, where they had been training for some time and had been accepted by the Canadian government with official accreditation. These athletes should be allowed to compete in the Games and march under the ROC flag and banner, quoting IOC rule 3, which stated that no discrimination was allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or politics.²⁶

Willi Daume (GER) then reported that he had had meetings with Hsu and Ting, chef de mission of the Taiwan delegation, who had informed him of the rejection of the IOC's proposal. Ting said that the Taiwanese would only march under the Olympic flag on condition that all other teams did the same and did away with their national flags. Daume had informed him that this would be impossible. Ting then repeated the position of the Taiwan delegation and thanked the IOC and the Montreal Organising Committee for their help in trying to solve the problem. On the matter of the two athletes in Kingston, Daume said he would present a proposal to the Session to allow them to remain and participate in them in the Games. This led to the question of what would happen if these athletes were to attend the

Opening Ceremony under the ROC flag and banner. Many members thought this should be done, to see what the reaction of the government would be, at the time. While most of the members were in favour of letting these athletes attend the opening and take part in the Games, Killanin reminded the meeting that the ROC flag had not been raised in Kingston on the instructions of Rousseau, presumably in compliance with the position of the Canadian government.²⁷

Cross (NZL) challenged the reasoning on this point, saying there could be no differentiation between the Taiwanese athletes already in Canada and those waiting to cross the border. If the athletes in Kingston could take part in the Opening Ceremony and the Games under the ROC flag, then why should the rest of the delegation not take part as well? The question of the Kingston athletes taking part in the Games was, therefore, totally illogical. Other proposals were made, such as that by Sir Ade Ademola (NGR), asking the Canadian government whether it would accept those athletes already in Canada, and saying the IOC would not agree to the Games continuing unless this was done, and by Beitz (GER), proposing that the athletes should march in the Opening Ceremony in Montreal as well as in Kingston, at the time of the yachting races. If the government wanted to prevent the team from marching, then the IOC had made all the concessions it could.²⁸

Mohamed Zerguini (ALG) intervened to say that the problem was not the Taiwan NOC, but the Taiwanese authorities, who were holding such a strong position in this matter. Hsu assured the meeting (with the highly improbable statement) that the Taiwanese government had no stand on this question, especially given the high level committee established by the Taiwanese government to deal precisely with this question. Exeter (GBR), Roosevelt (USA), Guerlin Comelin (COL) and Rivera Bascor (CHI) all felt that the IOC should take a much stronger and positive stand on this situation – it was the IOC which laid down the rules and which must now abide by and respect them. Killanin asked Exeter to draft a press release strongly confirming the position of the IOC and for Roosevelt to draft a letter to the Organising Committee informing it that the team at Kingston would com-

proposal as discrimination, and had requested that every delegation should compete under the Olympic colours (which the Session felt to be unrealistic), perhaps the ROCOC would agree if one other country did so. This suggestion generated no traction.

26 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, pp. 14–15. This was typical repetition of arguments which had already been rejected.

27 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 15.

28 IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 16. The IOC had not made any "concessions," other than to consider formalizing the decision made regarding Taiwan in relation to the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome.

29 IOC Session 1976, Montreal, p. 15. It is not at all clear what Killanin may have feared, since the China issue was, despite the rhetoric of the Session, of no practical importance whatsoever to the over-

whelming number of NOCs, let alone their governments. There was far more danger to the Games arising from the incipient African-led boycott, which the IOC was also in the process of mismanaging. Killanin and Berlioux did not seem to take this threat seriously soon enough, paying little attention to the African sport-political leaders, Abraham Ordia and Jean-Claude Ganga, and failing to come up with the obvious political solution to the African proposal to exclude the New Zealand athletes from the Games because the government of New Zealand did not prohibit rugby teams from participating in matches with South Africa. Had Samaranch been President of the IOC at the time, given his political skills, demonstrated by his role in finding the eventual solution to the problem of China, managing the delicate negotiations with the two Koreas and finding a way to bring South Africa back into the Olympic

pete in the Games as planned. Killanin again warned that with the decision of Taiwan to withdraw from the Games, there could be repercussions with other NOCs pulling out in support. Should such a case arise, the Games would go on, no matter how many dropped out, even if only one NOC remained.²⁹

Guilio Onesti (ITA) suggested the possibility of moving the Games to the US or Mexico, but most Members supported keeping the Games in Montreal. Exeter had pointed out the vast financial burden such a change of venue would place on NOCs, many of which could hardly afford to send their athletes to Montreal, let alone transferring them to another country.³⁰ A vote was eventually taken as to whether the Games should continue or not. Of the 66 Members then present, 57 voted that the Games should continue and 9 abstained.

Within the IOC, discussions continued on 15 July 1976 at the Executive Board, which continued its own meetings in and around the IOC Session, which had started on 13 July 1976. Killanin raised the question of the two athletes already in Canada, who had been issued with official accreditation cards by the Montreal Organising Committee. Under IOC rules, they were entitled to compete in the Games and the IOC could not stop them, such an action being a responsibility of the Organising Committee. Worrall pointed out that the IOC must be careful not to encourage the Republic of China athletes to march in contravention of the Canadian government's decision. It was also unlikely they would be allowed to march. Daume believed that the IOC was not respected by the Canadian authorities and appeared to have lost face before the whole world. Everyone, he said, was now laughing at the IOC in this moment of weakness. Vitaly Smirnov (URS) stated that the IOC could not use force against a government, a matter which should be explained to the Republic of China team.³¹

The only possible solution was to march the athletes under the Olympic flag and, if the NOC refused to accept this, it was out of the hands of the IOC, which had done everything possible to help. Masaji Kiyokawa (JPN) said that if other NOCs wished to withdraw, that was their own business, but the IOC should fight the situation to the very end and the very last moment. The IOC should

remain in the lead of other organizations. He suggested that Killanin contact the Prime Minister of Canada directly, to show Members of the IOC and the public that the greatest efforts had been made to dissuade the Canadian government. As far as the stand of the ROCOC was concerned, there could be no doubt that politics were just as much involved and that it was under pressure from its own government.³² Samaranch (ESP) raised the question of why, when the IOC had changed the name of Taiwan to Republic of China in 1968 in Mexico, the name should now be changed back to Taiwan. Killanin said that, in 1968, the world recognized the country as Republic of China.³³

Daume asked how aware the Canadian Prime Minister might be of the situation. Worrall responded that Trudeau had been fully briefed and that the government decision came from the Cabinet, not from individual officials. Killanin was asked, and agreed, to telephone the Prime Minister during the morning of 15 July. Killanin had also sent a message to the Governor General of Canada stating that, in view of events, neither he, the Vice-Presidents, nor Worrall, would be able to attend the arrival of the Olympic Flame in Ottawa that same day. To avoid any "misunderstanding" as to why this decision had been taken, the IOC issued a statement to the press:

"In view of the unforeseen amount of work, Lord Porritt, Honorary Member of the IOC, will represent the President of the IOC at the arrival of the Olympic Flame today in Ottawa, and will be accompanied by Lady Porritt, Lady Killanin and Mrs. Samaranch."³⁴

Later in the day of 15 July, Killanin reported to the Executive Board that he had contacted Prime Minister Trudeau and ensured that he was fully conversant with the up-to-date situation regarding the Republic of China and the impasse which had been reached. The Prime Minister, he said, appeared willing to assist and, holding a Cabinet meeting at that time, had been able to obtain a decision quickly. The Canadian government now agreed that the Republic of China could march under its flag and use its national anthem, provided that it did not use any name with a reference to China.³⁵ The name Taiwan was acceptable on the basis

Movement, it would have been highly unlikely that there would ever have been such a boycott. For Killanin to position the China matter as one which would require the IOC to fight, as it were, to the last man, seems, in retrospect, rather foolish and puerile.

³⁰ IOC Session 1976, Montreal, pp. 14–15. This is another example of a completely impracticable suggestion, which displayed no understanding of the complexities and expenses involved, despite the leading role Onesti had played in the organization of the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome. He, as much as any IOC Member, ought to have known that it was a foolish suggestion. Smirnov (URS) agreed that it was not realistic to transfer the Games and suggested that the Taiwan delegation be advised that their support was needed to affirm the position of the IOC in order to save the Games and the name of the Olympic Movement. [p. 16]

³¹ IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p.31. It was, no doubt, not lost on Smirnov that his country would be hosting the 1980 Games and that this issue (and perhaps others) might well surface on that occasion. He would have been conscious of the need not to compromise the position of his own government in that respect. The USSR had long recognized the PRC, would have had no sympathy whatsoever for the ROC and might well try to capitalize on its rapidly-increasing marginalization. The US was also concerned about what might happen in Moscow if political considerations intervened on that occasion. Presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter, also criticized Canada for its political intervention, which, in view of his own Olympic-related political actions in 1979 and 1980, can be viewed with extreme irony.

³² IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p. 31.

that it had been previously used at the Rome Olympic Games in 1960. Having made progress with regard to the anthem and flag, the next step was to ask the chef de mission of the Republic of China team to accept the arrangement. This would then have to be voted on by the Session, where a two-thirds majority was needed, since the solution amounted to an effective change of the existing IOC Rules. There were still pressures from the USOC, which was eager to make a declaration regarding its position in support of a solution to allow Taiwan to participate.³⁶

The ROCOC still maintained that its team should compete as officially recognized by the IOC. Given the stakes involved, it seems to have been a matter of extremely bad political judgment on the part of the Taiwanese not to have accepted the concessions. It must have been apparent that the IOC eventually wanted China to participate and that the status quo would not be allowed to remain, which put the ROCOC in definite danger of being excluded. The suggested compromise allowed it to retain its "official" name, use its flag and anthem, and in the Olympic context, be known by its territorial extent. In addition, it had done so in the past, so this was not entirely unexplored political territory for it. IOC Director Monique Berlioux referred to a letter dated 15 July 1976 received from the President of the ROCOC, which implied that the IOC had given instructions to the Montreal Organising Committee not to raise its flag at the Olympic Village, raised questions regarding the Opening Ceremony of the Games and requested protection of ROC athletes. Killanin was to reply as follows:

"... No instructions have been given not to raise flags in the Olympic Village. The flag raising ceremony is the responsibility of the Organising Committee to whom I am transmitting this letter.

In regard to the Opening Ceremony, the protocol is that of the IOC, but it is carried out by the Organising Committee. We are studying this matter.

*Finally, I would point out that security is the responsibility of the Canadian Government."*³⁷

Several IOC Members attended portions of the meeting. Douglas Roby (USA) arrived, to be briefed by Killanin.

Roby said that the USOC did not want to interfere in the matter politically, but had merely tried to press the Republic of China to agree to compete under IOC patronage. He thought that if the name Taiwan could be agreed upon, this was a step forward in solving the China problem for the future. Killanin responded that only principles were being discussed here and that any solution reached would apply to the Montreal Games only.³⁸ Roby was followed by Hsu. Killanin described his earlier conversation with the Prime Minister of Canada and the latest agreement of the government. He asked Hsu to communicate this information to the ROCOC delegation to see if it could accept the proposed solution, in consultation, if necessary, with the President and Executive Director of the USOC. Julian Roosevelt (USA) appeared and was informed of the latest developments. With respect to the US team, Roosevelt stated that the threat to withdraw had been made to urge the IOC to maintain its rules, but that taking all into account, it was unlikely that this threat would be carried out.³⁹

In the midst of the discussions during the Session on 15 July, Killanin had left to speak with the Prime Minister following upon the earlier request of the Executive Board.⁴⁰ When he returned, he said to the Session that there was a ray of light, but would not comment further until later (obviously hoping that the Taiwanese might by then have accepted the latest proposal), when he advised the Session that the Canadian government had accepted that the Taiwan athletes could enter the country and compete under their national flag, with their national anthem and with "Taiwan" written on their placard. However, the government would not agree to any mention of China and had refused to agree to "Republic of China – Taiwan."

Hsu reported that he was still discussing this proposal with the Taiwanese.

A final statement was eventually agreed, after a vote of 58 in favour, 2 against and 6 abstentions.⁴¹

"The Games of the XXIst Olympiad were awarded to the City of Montreal by the IOC on the condition and upon the undertaking and assurance of the Government of Canada that free entry would be accorded to all National Olympic Committees recognised by the IOC.

33 IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p. 32.

34 IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p. 32.

35 Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 53, states that the Cabinet meeting lasted for four hours and that the Cabinet "capitulated" on two of the three government conditions (flag and anthem), but not the name. This would have been satisfactory to the IOC and to the USOC. It is evident that the Canadian government was feeling considerable pressure as a result of its actions, doubtless far more than it might have expected, both domestically and internationally. The latest compromise represented major concessions from its position to date.

Worrall Report, p. 15: "Following direct telephone discussions between Lord Killanin and Prime Minister Trudeau, the latter agreed on behalf of the Government that the team would be admitted as

Taiwan, and would be allowed to carry its flag and play its anthem. These two latter 'concessions' appeared to take Mr. Bissonette and Department officials by surprise after their 'hard line' on all issues."

36 IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p. 33.

37 IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p. 33.

38 IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, pp. 33–34.

39 IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p. 34. Philip O. Krumm, president of the USOC, had sent a message to Rousseau (copied to Berlioux) on 2 July 1976. "The USOC strongly protests and urges immediate reconsideration of the action taken by the Canadian Government to restrict the participation of the Taiwanese National Olympic Committee, as a Member (sic) in good standing of the IOC, in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. If the Games are declared by the IOC

In late May 1976 the Government of Canada advised the IOC that it would not abide by those undertakings and assurances in respect of the Republic of China Olympic Committee in Taiwan.

The Canadian Government for political reasons would permit entry of athletes and officials under the name Taiwan but would not allow the use of the flag or anthem provided to the IOC by the ROCOC. After most intensive discussions with the Canadian Government they have withdrawn their objections not only to the use of the flag but also the anthem. However, the Government will not agree to the use of any name which includes the word or abbreviation of 'China' or 'Republic of China.'

The IOC has strongly protested the actions of the Canadian Government in this matter and continues to deplore its failure to live up to its original undertaking.


The ROCOC has been kept fully informed of all discussions. In view of the Canadian Government's agreement to remove its opposition to the use of the flag and anthem of the ROCOC, that Olympic Committee has been invited, for these Games only, to compete under the name 'Taiwan', as they had previously.

Due to the shortage of time and the fact that the athletes of the world are already assembled in Montreal, the IOC cannot take the action it would have preferred or considered more appropriate.

The IOC therefore, with great reluctance and under protest, has passed the following resolution:

Resolved that, for the period of the Olympic Games in Montreal, the provisions of Rule 58 of the IOC, requiring each contingent in the Opening ceremony to be preceded by a shield bearing the name of the country or area under which it is affiliated, insofar as that rule relates to the ROC Olympic Committee be waived, and further, that the teams of the ROCOC be informed that if they desire to compete in the Games in Montreal they must take part in all events and ceremonies under the name 'Taiwan' using their flag and anthem."

The Taiwanese delegation, undoubtedly so instructed by the political authorities in Taipei, ultimately



Jon's view of the African walkout from Montreal (Daily Mail, 20 July 1976)

ly refused to accept this latest solution (which the ROCOC Secretary-General described as "completely unacceptable") proposed by the Executive Board and Session and approved by the Canadian government. On 16 July 1976, the team officially withdrew from the Games. The official letter, dated 17 July 1976, from Ting to Killanin stated:

"I wish to inform you that the Republic of China Olympic Committee cannot accept the proposal put forth by the Executive Committee [sic] of the International Olympic Committee to change the Republic of China name to Taiwan for the duration of the XXI Olympic Games. We consider this change to be improper under the IOC rules preventing political discrimination and interference. Since our counter proposal to the IOC to use the name Taiwan ROC was not accepted by the Canadian Government, we deeply regret that we have no alternative but to not participate in the Games.

We remain faithful to the Olympic movement and extend best wishes for success of the 1976 Olympics."⁴²

Subsequent to the decision of the Taiwan delegation to refuse the offered compromise, the Games commenced, as scheduled, on 17 July 1976. There was further

not to be 'official' seriously question United States of America's participation. The Games must remain free from international politics." The IOC received many such communications in support of its position and the participation of Taiwan. [see IOC Historical Archives/Olympic Games-Montreal 1976-Political Matters-1975-1976, ID iRIMS 205122, 206439, 204887, 204888, 205179] Most of the material relating to the possibility of non-participation by the USOC (never too serious, especially given the fact that the US had already been selected to host the 1980 Olympic Winter Games in Lake Placid) took the form of correspondence with Julian Roosevelt, not directly with the IOC, and did not reflect decided policy of the USOC. Even the USOC's official communication of 2 July 1976 was ambiguous and threw responsibility back into the hands of the IOC. There could hardly be any complaint by the IOC about non-participation by the

USOC if the IOC were to have declared the Games non-official. In any event, a statement was issued by the USOC and reported in the *New York Times* of 4 July 1976: "Since the President of the IOC has clarified his position that the IOC will not withdraw recognition, sanction or patronage of the Games, there should no longer be a question of the United States' team participation in Montreal". There could have been no doubt, however, that the US government was following the matter closely. The US may have still been somewhat annoyed about the unilateral Canadian action to recognize the PRC and that, at the time, the US, was increasingly alone in its recognition of the Republic of China. On the other hand, it could not be seen to be interfering in the internal matters of one of its major allies, Canada, even if assorted commentaries were reported in the media by informed "sources".

The hurdler Chi Cheng, who in Mexico City in 1968 had been the first Taiwanese woman to win an Olympic medal, was able to get through the security control of the Olympic Village, but her participation came unstuck for political reasons.



discussion of the China matter during the Executive Board meeting on 20 July 1976, when Daume raised the matter of statements issued by the Canadian government claiming that the IOC had had prior warning of the China situation in relation to the Montreal Games. This, he said, was laying the IOC open to public criticism. Worrall was asked to prepare a report giving an accurate account, with dates, of events leading up to a final resolution regarding the Republic of China question.⁴³ There was some obvious element of attempted damage control in Killanin's later statement on the point:

"In regard to the statements made by Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, about Canada's dealings with the International Olympic Committee, I wish to point out that Mr. MacEachen was not present at the informal lunch held in Toronto in April 1975 when, accompanied by Mr. James Worrall, Q.C., Member of the IOC in Canada, I said that I could not foresee a change in the status quo regarding the Republic of China (Taiwan) by the time of the Montreal Games. I prefer my own personal recollection and confirmation by Mr. Worrall to an inter-departmental note. No concern was expressed to the IOC. Had this been done and in view of the construction situation in Montreal, the question of the withdrawal of the Games would have arisen.

In February [1976] at Innsbruck when the Republic of China (Taiwan) was competing in the Winter Games, this status quo was reiterated and again no indication was given by the Canadian authorities.

On 11th April 1976, the Canadian Ministry of Immigration confirmed to the Organising Committee identity cards as travel documents without any exception in regard to the Republic of China (Taiwan) which had been officially invited by H.E. Roger Rousseau, President of the Organising Committee, in accordance with the IOC regulations.

The first intimation of the refusal of entry of the Republic of China team was confirmed in a letter to me dated 28th May 1976 from Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, after a meeting with Mr. Worrall.

In regard to 'normal regulations' referred to by Mr. MacEachen, the Canadian Olympic Association and the Mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, confirm that they did not assume this to be a political reservation and had this been so they would not have made the bid for the 1976 Games.

It is surprising, if the Canadian Government intended to refuse admission to a recognised national Olympic Committee for the Olympic Games that they did not inform the President of the Organising Committee, an Ambassador seconded from the Department of External Affairs, who was correctly issuing accreditations to Republic of China (Taiwan) Olympic Committee nominees up to 22nd June 1976."⁴⁴

Killanin missed, however, the opportunity to draw public attention to a communication dated 11 April 1975 from the Federal Immigration Co-ordinator, Olympics '76 (L.R. St. Vincent) to the Director, Accreditations and Attachés of the Montreal Organising Committee (Frank J. Shaughnessy, Jr.), which stated:

"On April 5th, 1975, Mr. Robert Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, pursuant to authority vested in him by Subsections 27(1), 27(2) and 28(2) of the Immigration Regulations, agreed to amend and add to the Official Instruments N and Z-4, to include the Olympic Identity Card.

Consequently, persons entitled to receive Olympic Identity Cards in accordance with the Rules and Procedures concerning the issue of Olympic Identity cards

⁴⁰ IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, p. 18. The Canadian government's treatment of the IOC, and especially Prime Minister Trudeau's attitude at the official opening of the Session, was generally deplored. The IOC had always had to negotiate with an ambassador who had no real authority to make policy decisions, which was why the Executive Board had insisted that Killanin speak directly to Trudeau. [p. 18]

⁴¹ IOC Session 13–16 July 1976, Montreal, pp. 18–19.

⁴² Letter from Lawrence S. Ting, Vice President ROCOC, to Lord Killanin, President, International Olympic Committee, dated 17 July 1976,

delivered in Montreal. [IOC Historical Archives/Olympic Games – Montreal 1976 – Political Matters]

⁴³ IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, pp. 39–40. The eventual Worrall Report (supra) was dated 1 October 1976. [IOC Historical Archives/Olympic Games – Montreal 1976 – Political Matters ID iRIMS 205122]

⁴⁴ See *Newsweek*, 6 September 1976 and *Olympic Review*, No. 107/108 (September–October 1976). It is also attached as Annex 31 to IOCEB 10–31 July 1976, Montreal, p. 87.

⁴⁵ This was four days before the meeting between Killanin and Worrall with the officials of the Department of External Affairs. It does

*for the Games of the XXI Olympiad will be allowed admission in to Canada from June 17th until August 31st, 1976, on the sole presentation of the Olympic Identity Card. The rightful holder of an Olympic Identity card will also be exempt from the non-immigrant visa requirements, where this is mandatory."*⁴⁵

There had not been the slightest indication of any possible problem regarding the Republic of China in that, or any other, official communication emanating from the Canadian government.

Meeting in Barcelona in October 1976, the Executive Board discussed the political problems which had occurred in Montreal. As they related to China, it said, there had been an impact on the Games (and particularly the athletes), the Organising Committee and the IFs resulting from the Canadian government's refusal to allow the ROCOC to enter the country.⁴⁶ A more interesting issue, however, was the perceived threat of withdrawal by the USOC in response to the Taiwan issue, which, had it materialized, might have had an enormous effect on the Games, not only from a sporting perspective, but also financially. Killanin seemed to think that the television revenues from the United States (the main source – then and still now – of television revenues) would have vanished or been drastically reduced had the USOC not participated.⁴⁷ The television agreement between the Montreal Organising Committee and American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC) dated 18 November 1972 contained a provision (section 11) which stated in part

"... or if the United States fails to participate by reason of an act or omission of Cojo [the French acronym of the Montreal Organising Committee] which Cojo can and fails to remedy, ABC shall be entitled to terminate this agreement... Any advance payments made to Cojo by ABC prior to a termination of this agreement by reason of any of the above causes shall promptly be reimbursed to ABC."

It is by no means clear that, had the Games gone on without the participation of the USOC, this clause would have required any reimbursement to ABC. Indeed, the better legal view is that ABC would have had no success with any such claim. The Montreal Organising Committee was obviously in no position to force the Canadian government or the IOC to do anything. Some

90% of the amounts due from ABC had already been paid prior to the Games.

Killanin noted that these and other political problems had drawn attention to political influences on the Games and showed that the IOC was not able to uphold its principles.⁴⁸ A lengthy press release was prepared.⁴⁹ Stripped of its formulaic "IOC Speak", the substance of the release, following a meeting of the Executive Board with the IFs, was that there would be no retroactive sanctions, which would be counterproductive and most harmful to the athletes and, insistence that "anyone who requests the honour of organising or participating of his own free will in the Olympic Games, must accept, without reservation, the IOC rules and undertake not only to respect them but to have them respected". The IOC rules were to be reviewed, amended, strengthened and implemented in the future.

It was an ignominious conclusion to the whole unfortunate matter.

Aftermath

Primary responsibility for the situation must be assigned to the Canadian Government, which reneged on an unconditional commitment made in 1969. The flip-flop position was not justified on any legal or political principle. The knowledge that it was already well into the process of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC when its commitment had been given to the IOC, which relied on the commitment when awarding the Games to Montreal, underscores the matter even more. It is difficult to believe that the Canadian government would have deliberately misled the COC, the City of Montreal and the IOC, or would risk having any perception to that effect. It is far more likely that no one thought of the issue at the time or, indeed, until the later stages of organizing the Games. It would have been perfectly easy and justifiable (legally and politically) for the Canadian government to have advised the PRC that it had given a binding and unconditional international commitment at a time during which it still recognized the Republic of China and prior to its recognition of the PRC. The state of mutual diplomatic recognition should be regarded as a forward-looking relationship, not a basis for re-writing history and legal agreements. No great crisis or initiative would have been compromised.⁵⁰

not appear that the two Departments were aware of each other's policies. The dispensation was not withdrawn until MacEachen requested Andras to revoke the Olympic identity cards for the Taiwanese athletes, although nothing seems to have happened until mid-1976, since, as indicated above, the list of Taiwanese athletes had been approved in late June 1976. [Re revocation, see Mackintosh, op. cit., 50–51.]

46 IOCEB 13–17 October 1976, Barcelona, p. 7. In respect of the China problem, the impact on the athletes and IFs is rather overstated. The major impact on the Games and the competitions had come

from the African-led boycott.

47 Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 51, notes that Killanin maintained this position in his memoir.

48 IOCEB 13–17 October 1976, Barcelona, pp. 7–8. Some IOC Members were in favour of a special Session and strong action, but this was more likely in relation to the African-led boycott, rather than the China problem. No such special Session was held.

49 IOCEB 13–17 October 1976, Barcelona, (Annex 21) p. 71.

50 The Republic of China thought that the volume of Canadian wheat sales to the PRC might have had some impact on the decision.

On the political front, the Canadian government had received considerable criticism from many quarters, including the opposition parties in Parliament, which led to a series of statements by the Prime Minister, MacEachen and Sharp. MacEachen's defence was the weakest, when he took the position that the letter given by Sharp in 1969 was not unconditional, having used the phrase, "pursuant to the normal regulations". He said, referring to the additional sentence, "I should be pleased to provide you with further information respecting these regulations should you desire it", that "It is obvious from that literal quotation that the undertaking ... was not an unqualified undertaking. At no point in making such an undertaking did Canada undertake to relinquish its sovereignty to an international organization, no matter how respected that organization may be". In the House of Commons, when questioned, Trudeau simply stated, with no more convincing reasons, that the government was right on the issue. The government's stance on this occasion did Canada no good on the international front, since it was generally perceived that a commitment had been made by the Canadian government. Its willingness to walk away from it on the basis of a change of policy and unpersuasive resort to wording that never had any connection with the current issue raised larger questions of the reliability of any international commitments. While its position may have temporarily satisfied the PRC, this satisfaction came at a high international price.⁵¹ The IOC did not cover itself with glory, having first failed to seize the issue of political risk in the circumstances at an early date and then squandered all of its potential leverage by failing to act quickly and firmly, marshalling all of its international resources, when there was still time to do so and in circumstances which might have forced the Canadian government to abandon a political position which, when analyzed, was well short of a principled stand. The IOC failed to follow its own rules, failed to act quickly once the problem was recognized, failed to generate public reaction and support for its position and failed to anticipate that there might be a problem in the first place. It was certainly aware of the PRC position regarding Taiwan, from its own experiences

with the two NOCs and its general knowledge of world politics. It was also aware of the fact that Canada had, following the award of the Games to Montreal, recognized the PRC and withdrawn its recognition of the Republic of China.

This criticism would be even more acute if the Canadian government claims of prior notice were true and were ignored by Killanin. At the very least, it is now clear that Killanin was well aware of the issue considerably in advance of what he claimed publicly and within a time frame which would have given the IOC much more room to manoeuvre. If such notice had been effectively given as early as April 1975, and perhaps even earlier, whether in words of one syllable or more diplomatically, for the IOC to have given it no serious attention amounted to a huge mis-judgment, especially when added to the accumulation of the many organizational problems encountered by Montreal in the lead-up to the Games. The Canadian action to refuse entry to Taiwanese athletes as representatives of the ROC for purposes of the pre-Olympic competition in November 1975 should also have been a cause for serious concern and there can be no doubt that Killanin had been fully aware of that situation. The Montreal China-Taiwan affair turned out to be the first of four political crises poorly handled by the IOC during Killanin's presidency.⁵²

While it is occasionally fashionable to criticize the IOC for failing to deal decisively with the China-Taiwan problem, it usually means that observers believe the IOC should have acted sooner to exclude Taiwan. This may be seen as a normal political solution, in which Taiwan would have been placed in the dustbin of the political world and simply ignored until absorbed in the PRC or armed conflict occurred, which would then have re-engaged the political actors in their own respective interests. The IOC and Olympic Movement had a different, more humanistic, set of considerations, motivated by an overall desire of inclusiveness, if at all possible, since following the political model would clearly have resulted in the effective exclusion of all Taiwanese athletes (who, unlike the PRC, had supported and participated within the Olympic Movement and Olympic Games). There was, therefore, a moral element

There is no doubt that trade was a significant feature of the Canadian foreign policy initiative in recognizing the PRC and, in the early days of the bilateral relations, the balance of trade with the PRC was very much in Canada's favour, arising, in considerable measure, from wheat sales. [See: Xu, op. cit., p. 167.] The PRC was not shy about threatening to reduce or cut off economic ties if it became sufficiently unhappy with the Canadian decisions regarding Taiwan, even if Canada had considered itself bound by its previous, pre-recognition, commitments.

51 See: Xu, op. cit., at pp. 164, 182, 195.

52 The three others were the concurrent African boycott in 1976, the postal vote on China in 1979 and the US boycott in 1980. On the other hand, Killanin had been extremely effective in defusing the effort of the International Federations, led by Thomas Keller, the

Swiss President of FISA, to take effective control of the Olympic Movement, in and around the time of the Olympic Congress in Varna in 1973. He also managed an adroit deflection of one of the periodic attempts by UNESCO to expand its authority in organized sport, which occurred during the same period. While the threat posed by UNESCO was, as a practical matter, probably more apparent than real, there was some risk of interference in sport that was best avoided. See: Norbert Müller, *One Hundred Years of Olympic Congresses 1894-1994*, International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, 1994, pp. 149-159; Stephan Wassong, *The United Nations' Attitude to Olympic Peace*, in: Robert K. Barney et al. (ed.), *Rethinking Matters Olympic: Investigations into the Socio-Cultural Study of the Olympic Movement*, Tenth Annual Symposium for Olympic Research, The University of Western Ontario, London, 2010, pp. 448-450.



involved, unlike the political calculus of self-interest and expediency. This necessarily required a more cautious approach and a hesitancy to commit to absolute positions prior to generating some form of consensus. Significant responsibility for the ultimate debacle must also rest with the Taiwanese. Their intransigence on the point was expressed in a manner seemingly calculated to ensure that such participation would not occur. If the decision was being made (as was claimed) by the ROCOC, it was completely inexplicable. The ROCOC had already competed in other Games under the designation of Taiwan or Formosa and there was absolutely no reason, from the "sport" side of that political question, why it could not do so again. Prime Minister Trudeau had also agreed at the last moment to allow Taiwan to use its national flag and anthem, a considerable improvement over his government's initial position. If, as most suspect, the decisions affecting Taiwan's participation were really being made by the political authorities in Taiwan, the complete inflexibility on their part could only serve to accelerate and increase the marginalization of Taiwan on the international scene. No political good whatsoever could have come from non-participation in the Montreal Games based on that particular issue. If the decision had been the ROCOC's alone, without government "guidance", the judgment would be even harsher. The Taiwanese political stance also played directly into the hands of the PRC, which even though it was self-excluded from the Olympic Movement, was able to receive every possible political advantage and outcome from the episode, even despite the Canadian government's last-minute concessions on the flag and anthem aspects, since, with the Taiwanese refusal to accept any portion of the compromise, all

the other elements disappeared as well. In addition, it stayed out of sight, on the political sidelines, attracting no public attention.

Finding a Solution for the Future

In a sense, the Montreal story of China and the Olympics ended with the decision of the Taiwanese to refuse the offered compromise. The refusal did nothing to enhance its position or reputation and, indeed, made it all too clear that political, not sporting, considerations played the primary role in determination of the matter. The ROCOC had long acknowledged the obvious, namely that it did not control sport in the whole of China and, furthermore, that it did not purport to do so. The political authorities, however, had not brought themselves to the same reality, with the result that the limited political support they had enjoyed in many quarters was dwindling in the face of the reality of the whole of China. The champion of the Republic of China, the US, was in the process of moving toward full recognition of the PRC, which carried with it the concomitant non-negotiable de-recognition of the Republic of China. The Taiwan end-game was incomprehensible and ultimately self-destructive.

Despite the stinging defeat suffered by the IOC in Montreal, where for the first time in its history the government of a host country had reneged on an obligation central to the entire philosophy of the Games, and the authority of the IOC to determine who could participate and under what conditions, the IOC still had to deal with the political reality of the two Chinas. The PRC was formally knocking on the door for re-admission to the Olympic Movement, albeit with the awkward pre-condition that Taiwan could no longer be recognized. The PRC's supporters raised a number of formal objections to the existing recognition of Taiwan which did not conform to the historical reality of what had happened since 1949. The fact of the matter was that the formerly recognized NOC had moved to Taiwan. Whatever organization existed in the PRC was not that NOC. When the PRC eventually re-applied for recognition, it did not base its request on the dubious historical construct, but simply requested recognition of the All China Sports Federation as the NOC of the PRC.

The crux of the problem was the name of the ROCOC. The other issues appeared to be manageable. The IOC was searching for a way to accommodate both NOCs, if at all possible. It resented the PRC demand that it expel a NOC which had generally comported itself well as the price of admission of a new NOC, even if that NOC was from the most populous country in the world. There had been two Chinese NOCs in the past, as there had been two Korean and two German NOCs. The current situation was marked by an obstinacy on the part of both Chinese

For the first time the Olympic Flame was lit by a couple in 1976 in Montreal, to symbolise the bilingual host country: Sandra Henderson represented the English speaking community and Stéphane Préfontaine for the francophone population.

entities which was particularly frustrating. It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that the entity which was most entitled to refer to itself as the Chinese Olympic Committee was that of the PRC, which governed sport in all of China, except for Taiwan. The Taiwan committee was limited to Taiwan and simply could not continue to hide behind the formal name of the country to suggest otherwise, especially when its government persisted in claiming that it was the legitimate government of all China.

Over the course of 1978 and 1979, the IOC moved to find some way to compel Taiwan to use a different name, an effort stubbornly resisted by the Taiwanese. Different names were suggested, but rejected by one or the other of the Chinese organizations, or, more accurately, by their governments. The culmination of the unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a solution was the decision to conduct a postal vote in November 1979, by which the IOC Members were asked to approve the admission of the PRC committee and to de-recognize the Taiwan committee until it re-applied under a different name and, by this time, with a different flag and anthem, unlike the compromise offered by the Canadian government in 1976. Although the postal vote achieved the result sought by the IOC Executive Board, the process was sufficiently flawed that legal actions were taken by the ROCOC and by the IOC Member in Taiwan, Henry Hsu, which caused the matter to be suspended pending the outcome or settlement of the proceedings. The state of flux persisted through 1980. Taiwan did not compete in Lake Placid or in Moscow, for different reasons.

It fell to the new IOC President elected in Moscow, Juan Antonio Samaranch, to find a solution. It is not difficult to imagine the concerns faced by the IOC in the period following the Montreal Games. The next Games were to be held in Lake Placid in February 1980. The US government was manifestly unsatisfied with the idea of IOC identity cards assuming the legal quality of entry visas, based not only on the Montreal experience, but also arising from its own experience with the Pan American Games in Puerto Rico in 1979 and the complete lack of

discipline exhibited by the NOCs within the Americas in supplying timely, accurate and complete information in respect of their delegations. Despite being willing to admit all teams and officials, the US would not accept any exceptions to the visa requirement. On the heels of Lake Placid were Games in another, diametrically-opposed, super-power, the USSR, still quite suspicious of all foreigners entering the country. These in turn were to be followed by Games in Sarajevo and Los Angeles in 1984. The combination of circumstances had all the potential for a perfect storm. Even before the matter of boycotts raised its head, the potential for host country entry complications over the next four Games was extremely high. The IOC now knew that it could make all the rules it wished, but that governments could, if they were concerned about their own sovereignty, override the IOC rules with impunity, knowing that the IOC had shown no willingness to take firm action based on principles.⁵³ This political reality was augmented by the practical problem of the IOC's effective inability to move competitions as large and complex as the Olympic Games anywhere on short notice at the last moment.

The Chinese matter was discussed at every succeeding IOC Executive Board meeting and Session following the Montreal Games. It is not within the limited scope of this paper to follow the post-Montreal discussions in detail. The obvious solution was to try to find a way to include the PRC and, if at all possible, to keep from having to exclude Taiwan. But, if the fully inclusive approach failed, it was increasingly evident that, if the price of getting the PRC back into the Olympic Movement was the exclusion of Taiwan, then Taiwan would be sacrificed.⁵⁴ Nothing at a practical political level had changed: the PRC controlled mainland China and the authorities in Taiwan controlled Taiwan. From an Olympic perspective, the PRC did not control sport in Taiwan and *vice versa*.

This set the stage for the postal vote called for by Killanin in November 1979. The mechanics and supporting documentation form part of the minutes of the Executive Board meeting in Nagoya from 23–25 October 1979.⁵⁵

It seemed reasonably clear, in advance, that the PRC NOC

53 See IOCEB 23–5 October 1979, Nagoya, (Annex 34) pp. 97–98 and (Annex 35) p. 99. The US government recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China as of 1 January 1979 and, at the same time, withdrew its diplomatic recognition of the authorities in Taiwan. As a consequence, the US government did not recognize as symbols of national sovereignty the flag and anthem of the Republic of China, although it continued to make visa facilities available to travelers from Taiwan. The US also hoped, with respect to the details concerning the Lake Placid Games, that the IOC would find a solution which would avoid politicizing the Games in a way which could cause embarrassment to the host or the IOC itself. [Letter from the US government agency, International Sports and Physical Education Programmes to Julian Roosevelt, 22 June 1979, p. 100.] This was a clear warning to the IOC, given well before the invitations to participate in the Games were to be sent out, not to do something which would exacerbate the problem.

54 Killanin had very little personal appetite for supporting the Republic of China, as opposed to the PRC, and would later try to engineer a process by which the ROC would effectively be excluded and the PRC recognized. The thought of bringing the largest country in the world back into the Olympic Movement was all but irresistible to him. Following extensive discussion throughout 1977, 1978 and 1979, the IOC Executive Board decided to have a mail vote on the question, which was held in November 1979, but its outcome was challenged. See IOCEB 23–25 October 1979, Nagoya, pp. 30–32 for a discussion of the background leading to the postal vote.

55 IOCEB 23–25 October 1979, Nagoya, Annex 40 (pp. 102–105) and Annex 38 (p. 101). Annex 40 in particular, was a long and cumbersome explanation of the background and reasons for the Executive Board proposal.

56 Hsu instituted legal proceedings in both Switzerland and London against the decision. Killanin was furious and was determined, at

would be recognized as the Chinese Olympic Committee. The matter of Taiwan remained to be decided and the risk was that it would no longer be recognized, which might complicate and jeopardize any aspect of re-recognition, since the IOC's political appetite for once again alienating the PRC would be minimal. Added to that risk was the demonstrated refusal of the Taiwan authorities to show the slightest flexibility, even in the face of certain disaster. Its delegation to the 1979 IOC Session in Montevideo had taken several particularly offensive positions, leading to a considerably diminished level of support among the IOC Members. The stakes were extremely high for Taiwan, and even before the postal vote, the ROCOC had telexed all the IOC Members (except Killanin and the Executive Board) warning that if the resolution was passed, it would institute legal proceedings against the IOC. The resolution, pursuant to which full recognition of the Olympic committee in Taiwan was "pending" until its anthem, flag and constitution were modified to meet the latest IOC requirements, was passed and the threatened legal proceedings were commenced. Hsu also commenced a legal action against the IOC, challenging its decision.⁵⁶ The first formal discussion of the legal proceedings occurred at the Executive Board meeting immediately preceding the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Games. Killanin said he would be reporting to the Session as a result of the postal vote on the China problem. Hsu's action had greatly surprised Killanin, coming from an IOC Member, but Hsu, he said, may have been under particular pressure.⁵⁷ Hsu had been asked in Lake Placid to withdraw his case, but had not done so and the proceedings had continued.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, on 13 February 1980, Shen Chia-Ming, President of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, wrote to Killanin to say:

"This letter is to advise you it is not the intention of our team to take part in the Opening Ceremony of the Games. In view of the short time since the determination of legal proceedings in the State of New York and changes in the IOC Charter during

*its recent Session, it is not possible to resolve such matters as the change of the appropriate NOC flag to be used for protocol purposes in the time available to us. Until such matters are resolved we would seek your Committee's approval to excuse our team from taking part in these Games."*⁵⁹



Killanin replied the same day, in a letter addressed to the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee:

"Thank you for your letter, which I received just as I was leaving for the Opening Ceremony of the XIIIth Winter Games. I am passing the contents on to the Executive Board.

*The IOC did ask for a reply about the flag and anthem before 31st December last. As you know my only object is to endeavour to allow all eligible athletes to compete. I would ask you to think again about competing, although I appreciate the time factor regarding a change of flag in relation to IOC rules. This is why I am quite sure the Executive Board would agree to the use of the Olympic flag in the case of a medal winner and the Olympic anthem in the case of a victory."*⁶⁰

This produced a further response from Shen, also dated 14 February 1980:

"Thank you for your letter of 13th February 1980. I fully agree with you that all athletes eligible should be allowed to compete. After conferring with our team

The Executive Committee including IOC Director Monique Berlioux in 1979 in the Château de Vidy.

his final IOC Session as President in Moscow in 1980, to expel Hsu as a Member of the IOC for daring to challenge an IOC decision. He was talked out of this, however (by me and perhaps other IOC Members), but the Olympic Charter was changed, in view of his legal action, to include the following as part of the oath taken by new IOC Members when they are sworn-in: "... to respect and ensure the respect of all the provisions of the Olympic Charter and the decisions of the International Olympic Committee, which I consider as not subject to appeal on my part; (emphasis added) ..." I have always referred to this as the "Hsu Amendment". Its legal efficacy is, at best, doubtful and adding the language at that stage seems to be an acknowledgment that his legal position of being entitled to sue the IOC may have been well-founded.

57 IOCEB 8-15 February 1980, Lake Placid, p. 3. Also, prior to the Games, an individual from Taipei had brought an injunction against the Lake Placid Organising Committee. He had lost in the

summary hearing in Plattsburgh, but was appealing. (The case had been brought by the flag-bearer of the Chinese Taipei team, who wanted to carry the flag of the Republic of China. The IOC had requested the NOC to submit a new flag and anthem by 1 January 1980, but no reply had been received.) The IOC was not a party to this particular action, but was represented in court. When two officials of the Chinese Taipei delegation had gone to the Olympic Village, they had refused the new nomenclature and now more than 20 people from Taipei were staying in the Lake Placid Resort Hotel.

58 IOCEB 21-23 April 1980, Lausanne, p. 4. Further discussion of the case can be found at p. 31. The object of the lawsuit seemed to be to have the IOC drop the Nagoya resolution, but the IOC was concerned that such an action could be considered as a mistake or weakness.

59 IOCEB 8-15 February 1980, Lake Placid, Annex 28, p. 77.

60 IOCEB 8-15 February 1980, Lake Placid, Annex 28, p. 78. The "Canadian" solution of allowing the national flag and anthem

manager this morning, it is apparent that the safety of our athletes and other participants would be compromised if our team compete without familiarisation with perhaps the world's most dangerous courses.

I am enclosing a copy of the English translation of a letter addressed to me from our team manager for your convenience.

In the past week, repeated attempts to allow our athletes to practice were denied while efforts are on the way to resolve the issue of the name, anthem and flag. For the sake of our athletes, I again request that they may be immediately excused from the Games."⁶¹

Taiwanese team did not compete in Lake Placid.

The matter was again discussed by the Executive Board in June 1980. As to the Lausanne suits, there were two cases: one for preliminary measures and the other for the substantive measures. The only rulings to date had been the preliminary measures, but the suit was proceeding and would be heard in March or April 1980. Hsu had sued the IOC because under Swiss law, only a member of an association could sue the association to void a decision taken by the organization in contravention of its own rules. The IOC's counsel had recommended certain measures be taken to protect the IOC in the future, including clearing up differences between the French and English versions of the rules. Adding to the general confusion, it appeared that (notwithstanding the warning from the US authorities) the Taiwanese had originally been invited to participate in the Games as ROCOC, but, following the Nagoya resolution as adopted in the postal vote, the Lake Placid Organising Committee had been asked by the IOC to reissue the invitation to the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. The Olympic Village had also been instructed not to let the delegation in under the old flag and nomenclature.⁶² Killanin also asked for an "examination" regarding Members of the IOC under Swiss law. This was with the objective of instituting measures to expel Hsu, because, as a Member, he had sued the IOC.⁶³

In April 1980, it looked as if the Chinese Olympic Committee, despite having finally been recognized on

terms that it regarded as acceptable, would not be participating in the Moscow Games. Nor would Taiwan, unless either the Nagoya resolution was withdrawn or another solution was found.⁶⁴ Killanin had put the matter of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee on the agenda of the Executive Board meeting immediately prior to the IOC Session in Moscow, but it was not discussed.⁶⁵ Nor did the matter come up for discussion at the Moscow Session.⁶⁶

In a strange way, the Moscow boycott in 1980 may have saved Taiwan from complete exclusion from the Olympic Movement (other than as a province within the PRC), since the boycott, combined with the non-participation of the PRC, meant that the IOC was not put to any choice between the PRC and the Republic of China on that occasion, especially in the midst of considerable litigation. It also provided enough time for the IOC, following the Moscow Games, now led by a much more politically adept President, Juan Antonio Samaranch, to find and implement the so-called "two Chinas" solution.

The Executive Board dealt with the matter at its meeting in October 1980. At the end of the Moscow Session, a meeting had been arranged with Hsu and the President of the Olympic Committee in Taiwan, as a result of which it had been agreed to suspend the trial in the legal proceedings until 1 December 1980, in the hope that a solution could be found during that period. The Taiwanese committee still did not accept that it should alter its emblem and wanted the Nagoya resolution annulled. Lance Cross (NZL) suggested that Hsu be requested to extend the moratorium until 1 March 1981, to enable the question to be discussed at the February 1981 Executive Board meeting. He thought that by taking legal action against the IOC, the NOC was acting to the detriment of the country's sporting interests.

Prince de Mérode (BEL) considered that the steps taken by Hsu, as a Member of the IOC, especially instituting a legal action against the IOC, were totally unacceptable. Samaranch said that to avoid recurrence of such a situation, a neutral appeals committee should be established, to deal with any internal disagreements. Killanin had agreed to preside over such a committee, along with two Honorary Members. Alexandru Siperco

was no longer on the table. Taiwan had lost considerable political ground as a result of its stance in Montreal. And its principal ally and supporter, the U.S., no longer recognized it.

61 IOCEB 8-15 February 1980, Lake Placid, Annex 28, p. 78.

62 IOCEB 8-15 February 1980, Lake Placid, p. 4. Cross (NZL) thought that both parties had approved the new nomenclature. Killanin told him that the Taiwanese had subsequently gone back on their decision.

63 IOCEB 9-10 June 1980, Lausanne, pp. 17-18.

64 IOCEB 21-23 April 1980, Lausanne, p. 31.

65 IOCEB 11-31 July 1980, Moscow, Item 13(A), p. 2.

66 IOC Session 15 July-3 August 1980, Moscow, Item 17(B), p. 40. Killanin simply said that cases had been brought before the courts in Lausanne concerning the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and felt that this should be left in the hands of the Executive Board and the lawyers, since it was sub judice.

67 IOCEB 30-31 October 1980, Lausanne, p. 23.

68 IOCEB 23-24 February 1981, Los Angeles, pp. 33-34. The agreement was accepted, with the name of the CTOC to be in English only, due to translation difficulties in French. Agreement was reached with the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee on 23 March 1981 and the following month, the Executive Board unanimously approved the decision reached. [IOCEB 9 April 1981, Lausanne, p. 26.] See also p. 28 regarding the roles of Samaranch and Berlioux in concluding the matter. There is no doubt that the solution was engineered by Samaranch and the mechanics of having the proposed solution appear to emanate from Hsu was obviously for the purpose of saving face for Taiwan.

69 IOCEB 23-24 February 1981, Los Angeles, Annex 43, pp. 93-94. The Executive Board had also examined the proposed emblem and flag of the NOC.

(ROM) did not agree that an appeals committee should be set up, although he felt that the rules and decisions of the IOC should be respected. Berlioux proposed that all members sign a declaration to confirm that they would obey IOC rules and decisions; once this had been signed, the Member in question would not be able to sue the IOC, which would protect the IOC from a recurrence of this situation.⁶⁷ Samaranch agreed and requested preparation of a document for review at the next Executive Board meeting and submission to the forthcoming Olympic Congress in Baden Baden in 1981. In Los Angeles in February 1981, Samaranch advised that Hsu had proposed an agreement to put an end to the pending law suit.⁶⁸ The draft agreement, to be executed by the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and the IOC, was produced. After a series of preambles, the agreement provided:

"NOW BOTH PARTIES AGREE as follows:

The name of the NOC shall be CHINESE TAIPEI OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, and is as such hereby approved by the IOC. The CTOC hereby submits its flag and emblem as per attached specimens (exhibits 2 and 3) which are hereby approved by the IOC.

The IOC hereby confirms to the CTOC that the latter is entitled to participate in the future Olympic Games as well as other activities sponsored by the IOC like every recognised National Olympic committee, with the same status and the same full rights, in compliance with the 'Olympic Charter'.

*The IOC will assist the CTOC in its application for and/or reinstatement of membership in various international federations affiliated to the IOC."*⁶⁹

It goes almost without saying that the proposed solution was carefully shepherded through the PRC, to be sure that it would be acceptable to it, otherwise there would have been no point to the whole exercise and the ROC (and Hsu) would not have agreed to end the litigation, since there would have been nothing gained from abandoning the litigious position.

Thus was brought to a reasonably amicable conclusion a difficult controversy which had beleaguered the Olympic Movement for almost thirty-five years. The solution is to recognize two autonomous NOCs, one in the PRC, which uses its national flag and anthem and is designated as Chinese Olympic Committee, and the other in Taiwan, which uses the name Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, its NOC flag and the Olympic anthem. There have been occasional political skirmishes around the edges, but, on the whole, the solution has operated quite satisfactorily within the Olympic Movement.

China and Taiwan now participate side-by-side at the Olympic Games and in all aspects of the Olympic Movement, under terms and conditions satisfactory to both. The PRC got everything it wanted (other than the

complete exclusion of Taiwan) and Taiwan managed not only to survive as an independent entity in both the political and sport worlds, but also achieved an important element for its own identity, namely the inclusion of the word "Chinese" in the name of its NOC, albeit as an adjective regarding its effective territory. The international sport community has adopted the IOC formula and the Olympic Movement has been able to achieve a solution of a troublesome international issue which has to date eluded professional politicians.

Appendix "A"

Correspondence between Reginald Alexander (KEN) and Prime Minister Trudeau

Letter from R.S. Alexander

Nairobi, Kenya

Dated at Montreal Monday, 26th July 1976

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau

Prime Minister of Canada

Montreal, Que.

Dear Prime Minister,

The Republic of China National Olympic Committee and Olympics

May I respectfully, recall to you the brief conversation we had when I was introduced to you by His Excellency, Mr. Roger Rousseau in the V.I.P lounge at the Velodrome on Saturday afternoon, the 24th July, 1976. I said then, that on this subject, I had very blunt and frank words to convey to you and pleaded with you to spare a few minutes of your busy and important life to read them as that was neither the place nor the time to utter them.

You said that "... all of life is politics ..." and I replied: "No, Prime Minister not all of life, much of it yes, and one important feature that can be excluded from politics is the Olympic movement and the Olympic Games...". I understand completely but thoroughly disagree with you and your Government in choosing to use the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal for political purposes. To say that "... all of life is politics ..." is wickedly sinister, almost as immorally weak as saying that "all of life is a swindle", that is the language of politics, and the people of the world are becoming bored and disenchanted with it, there is an international revival for good faith and honour.

(2) I understand that your answer to the criticism of the action of your Government in preventing the entry of the Olympic team from the Republic of China to enter Canada and participate in the Games is that the International Olympic Committee was fully aware of the political recognition by your Government of the Government of Peking China, and that the IOC should have taken the hint long ago that your Government would discriminate against the Olympic team from the Republic of China.

That answer is totally irrelevant and dishonourable.

(3) Your Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Honourable Mitchell Sharp, as long ago as the 28th of November 1969, signed a letter on behalf of you and your Government solemnly undertaking to comply with the Rules of the International Olympic Committee which reads as follows:

"The Government of Canada has been informed of the application made by the City of Montreal to act as host for the 1976 Summer Olympics Games and expresses the hope that this application will be favourably received.

I would like to assure you that all parties representing the National Olympic Committees and International Sports Federations recognized by the IOC will be free to enter Canada pursuant to the normal regulations. I should be pleased to provide any further information respecting these regulations should you desire it.

I am certain that all Canadians appreciate the significance of this event and would be very pleased to offer a warm welcome to all those associated with the Olympic Games."

and at no time was that promise withdrawn until it was too late for the I.O.C. to cancel or change the venue of the Games: political opportunism of the most evil kind.

(4) Fortunately for Olympic Sport in Canada, the National Olympic Committee of your country has disassociated itself from the actions and policy of your Government on this subject, and Olympic sportsmen all over the world will continue to have happy and friendly relationships with the Sportsmen of Canada.

(5) It is my opinion that the political maneuver of your Government immediately before the start of the Games encouraged the mood of "boycott" and you can be held responsible, in part, for subsequent developments.

(6) You know the rules of the Olympic Games and if you wish to play by some other rules, you, as a well-known sportsman could have voluntarily and politely excused yourself from the Games.

Very Sincerely,
R.S. Alexander

Letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to R.S. Alexander, dated Ottawa August 9th, 1976

Dear Mr. Alexander:

It is clear from your letter that we disagree on a number of fundamental issues, and I am far from hopeful that I shall be able to persuade you to alter your views. Nevertheless, I am prompted to say the following.

"Politics" is the organization of human activity. I am disappointed that you regard the term with such disdain and I am astonished that you believe the institutions and processes of the International Olympic Committee

and its associated organizations are "non-political". A Canadian swimming team was penalized by the authoritative world body a few years ago because it swam in China. I find it difficult to believe that that territory was forbidden for athletic reasons or that the decision to invoke a sanction was an athletic one.

Indeed, the recognition by each of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of the reality of this mixture of athletics and politics was, to my mind, wholesome. Their recent message, it seems to me, emphasizes what all men and women in our global community must come to accept – that events and issues are interconnected, that our destinies are, interdependent, that rights and responsibilities are intertwined. If this be so, then the salient ingredient in our social system should not be the maintenance of artificial barriers but the insistence throughout of honesty.

It was this basic question of honesty which led the Canadian government to decide as it did on the demand of Taiwan that it be permitted to participate in the Montreal Olympics while masquerading as China.

You will excuse me if I do not attempt to engage in argument with you on your broadside of tendentious arguments. You were not present, for example, at the meeting held between senior Canadian diplomats and Lord Killanin in April, 1975, yet you do not permit this fact to diminish your outrage at what you have been told took place on that occasion. Nor does your letter make any reference to the precedent set at the Rome Olympics in 1960. Again, your allegation that the Canadian position on Taiwan somehow influenced the decision taken by the Organization for African Unity is simply not supported by any evidence. All information which has reached me from African sources is quite inconsistent with your remarkable theory.

In conclusion, Mr. Alexander, you raise in your letter but a single issue on which we can agree – that there is a desire in the world for good faith and honour. I suggest to you that Canada's decision and Canada's conduct was consistent with each and I am content that the record, when complete and public, will prove this to be the case.

30th August, 1976

Dear Prime Minister

May I congratulate you on your erudite and scholastic reply dated the 9th August, 1976: this reply concludes a brief and interesting exchange between us, if I may be allowed to say "we agree to disagree". If ever time becomes available to you (and I am likely to be dead by then) I would enjoy you, as my gust, possibly to watch the wildebeest migration (the eighth wonder of the world) alone together where we could continue our ... with only the animals, the mountains and the wind to listen.

2. Until then I will always remember another notorious piece of paper that Hitler handed to Chamberlain in 1938 and which was later torn up by Hitler in the same way that you tore up the solemn undertaking of your Government dated 23th [sic] November, 1969.

3. You mention a swimming team from Canada prevented from competing in mainland China. I am not familiar with the exact circumstances but I am reasonably certain that if the official in your appropriate Ministry who is responsible for sport carefully reads the rule of the Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (headquarters at 508, Waterloo Street, London, Ontario) he will be able to brief you as to how sporting sanctions are applied under rules created by sportsmen without any political implications.

4. I prefer another definition of "politics" – who was it that said "politics is the art of the possible" and I have added a few words of my own "of timing, with integrity". What this sick world now needs is statesmen who have grown above and beyond the opportunism of politics. One such person you may know personally and certainly by reputation – Mr. Malcolm MacDonald who is a personal friend of mine and to whom I intend to show our correspondence when I am next through London, as I respect and cherish his advice in such matters.

6. (sic) You use the word "... Taiwan ... be permitted to participate in the Montreal Olympics while masquerading as China". Would you attempt to persuade us that there is also masquerading in respect of:

Two Germanies

Two Koreas

And, until recently,

Two Vietnams

7. What a nation cares to call itself is its business, and one day it could be within the bounds of possibility that the nation of Canada wishes to be called "Mapleland" or "Beaverland." We would welcome a team at the Olympic Games under either of these titles. (see post-script below)

With warm personal regards

P.S. Suppose that the Fédération du Liberation de Quebec [sic] were successful in breaking away from the rest of Canada, creating English Canada and Canada Français; what would you expect the International Olympic Committee t[o] do in these circumstances.

7th September, 1976

Dear Prime Minister

Your Letter dated the 9th August, 1976

In paragraph 5 you mentioned a meeting in April, 1975, and your words tended to imply that the International Olympic Committee was aware then of the withdrawal of the undertaking from your Government dated 28th November, 1969. Immediately I wrote to the Lord Killanin, President of the International Olympic

Committee asking him for an explanation. Now, through the keen observation of a friend of mine here in Kenya, Sir Wilfrid Mavolock, I have received a cutting from "Newsweek" published on the 6th September, 1976 in which there is a letter signed by Lord Killanin, that refutes completely the attempted implication by you in your letter.

2. I am bound to say that I consider it the height of discourtesy that you should have attempted to undermine to me my President in circumstances which only shower more dishonor and discredit upon you and your Government.

Yours sincerely,

R.S. Alexander to The Right Honourable

Pierre Elliott Trudeau

Dated at Montreal 20th September 1976

Dear Prime Minister:

Political Interference of the Olympic Movement

So far as you are concerned this subject is now "history", but those final words of mine are written in the hope that other political leaders, like yourself, may, in the future, pause carefully before embarking upon actions that could do as much damage to the Olympic Movement as you inflicted upon it.

2. I refer in particular, to the senseless attempt by your Foreign Minister – Mr. MacEachen – to take the words "normal regulations" completely out of context and turn them to Political advantage. I consulted the most distinguished Lawyer in this part of the world (never has any Democracy, anywhere in the world, had such a brilliant speaker as he was during nine very difficult years in Kenya) he writes as follows:

3. "We are of course dealing herewith politics rather than law; but I cannot imagine even Trudeau's best political friends accepting interpretations of the phrase 'pursuant to the normal regulations', which was contained in his Government's original undertaking, as reservation of the right to exclude teams on grounds of international diplomacy.

4. In fact, I should have thought that abnormal diplomatic tactics were the very antithesis of 'normal regulations'. Surely what phrase means no more than the written regulations according to which immigration officers and other civil servants are required to operate in the ordinary course of events. If it did in fact mean that the Canadian Government reserved the right to exclude any team recognized by the IOC at its own sweet will, the whole undertaking was meaningless."

5. This correspondence is now concluded. For it to be of any possible help and guidance to others who may be concerned now, and in the future, it has to be published and I intend to do this before the end of this year.

Our paths may cross again: I would enjoy that! ■