Reagan's Rapprochement: A Brief Analysis of the Reagan Administration and the 1984 Olympics*

By Brad J. Congelio, PhD Candidate, Western University (Canada)

The final picture of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow: "We'll meet again at the Games of the XXIII Olympiad."

Photo: Volker Kluge Archive

I have had a busy four months since receiving the Ian Buchanan Memorial Scholarship. My research regarding the Ronald Reagan administration's role in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games is progressing well. My dissertation research, under the advisement of Dr. Robert K. Barney, has benefitted tremendously from the award. Initially a study on the Reagan administration's attempts at stemming the boycott effort by agreeing to Soviet demands, my research thus far has exposed larger foreign policy initiatives aimed at utilizing the Olympic Games to mend heavily damaged US/Soviet relations. The funding from the International Society of Olympic Historians provided me with the opportunity to take my second trip to the outstanding Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum in Simi Valley, California. It was during this funded trip that I began to unravel the larger implications of the 'Reagan Doctrine' on the Olympic Movement. Additionally, the trip enabled me to visit, for the first time, the mammoth Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee Records on the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles. In fulfillment of my final report as the recipient of the 2013 Ian Buchanan Memorial Scholarship, I would like to present a brief analysis of how the Reagan administration became intertwined with the Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games at a much more political level than hitherto revealed.

In the early morning of 20 January 1989, United States President Ronald Reagan stood in the Oval Office one final time as the leader of the free world. He would soon be escorted down Pennsylvania Avenue to the inauguration ceremonies of President-elect George H.W. Bush. Before Reagan exited his office, National Security Advisor Colin Powell entered to provide him with his last national security briefing. After years of teetering on the verge of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, Powell informed Reagan: "Mr. President, the world is quiet today." With that, Reagan departed the Oval Office.[1]

The Cold War Reagan bequeathed to George H.W. Bush was immensely different from the conflict Reagan inherited from President Jimmy Carter. The main difference was Reagan's policy towards the Soviet Union. Prior to Reagan's election as President, the American approach towards the Soviet Union was that of détente and containment.[2] Reagan believed that détente, a term integrated into the American political lexicon after the thirteen days that defined the Cuban Missile Crisis, was a "one-way street that the Soviet Union used to pursue its own aims."[3] Opponents from both extremes of the American political spectrum argued that détente merely provided a sense of legitimacy to both the Soviet Union and the socialist order. While Carter focused on the "immorality" of détente, Reagan, on the other hand, argued that the feebleness of détente underscored an acknowledgment of American weakness.[4] Further, Reagan felt containment, a strategy developed under President Harry Truman's tenure (1945-1953), was failing.[5] Reagan's beliefs were not unsubstantiated. Of utmost concern were the Soviet advances into the Third World, particularly Central America and Africa. The eruption of the Carnation Revolution in April of 1974 provided the Soviet Union an opportunity to spread communist

ideology to Africa.[6] For example, in the battle for political control of Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – a declared Marxism-Leninism faction – received support from both the Soviet Union and Cuba. The capture and subjugation of Angola to Marxism-Leninism rule supported Reagan's conviction that containment was no longer stemming the growing sphere of communist influence. To Reagan's dismay, Angola was not the only African country to fall to Communism; Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Cameroon, and Mozambique all fell into the Soviet orbit by the 1970s and early 1980s.[7]

In the public realm, Reagan was the epitome of an oratorical "freedom fighter." Though history now portrays the former President as an arch-conservative, Reagan's views on the Soviet Union were more liberal; that is, he viewed the Soviet Union system as an "unnatural deviation from society's normal path of political and social development."[8] Even on the campaign trail during his failed 1976 bid for the presidency, Reagan was harsh on the Soviets. In a 31 March 1976 campaign stump speech, Reagan implored Americans to ask the citizens "of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and all the others" what it was like to live in a world "where the Soviet Union is number one." Reagan insisted that he did not want to live in such a world and was not ready to "consign" every state of the Union "to the dustbin of history."[9] Reagan's anti-Communist rhetoric would continue unceasingly through the 1980 election campaign that won him the presidency.

Indeed, this discourse frightened Soviet leadership. Reagan's declamatory approach to the Soviet Union surely stemmed from the first meeting of his National Security Planning Group,[10] when the intention was voiced to begin a "concerted effort to play on the Soviet psychological vulnerabilities and weakness."[11] As further explained by Richard Allen, one of Reagan's national security advisors, the Kremlin "thought they had some first-class nut-ball on their hands."[12] The general thinking among Reagan's administration was that the Soviets did not desire to play a game of "nuclear chicken with a madman."[13] Early in Reagan's first term, KGB Chief Yuri Andropov worried that the "new administration" was attempting to "push the whole development of international relations on to a dangerous path."[14]

Reagan's vitriolic lambasting continued. It took only nine days from Reagan's inauguration for the new American leader to goad the Communist world in public. During his first news conference, Reagan noted that the Kremlin reserved "unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" in order to further their cause.[15] On 17 May 1981, Reagan provided the first public hint of his new strategy towards the Soviet Union during a speech at Notre Dame University. "The West," he said, "won't contain Communism, it will transcend Communism. It will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written."[16] In a speech to the British House of Commons on 8 June 1982, Reagan stated his certainty that "... freedom and democracy will leave Marxism and Leninism on the ash heap of history."[17] However, Reagan's most pointed verbal attack on the Soviet Union occurred on 8 March 1983. In a speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, Reagan lectured:

> *They preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on Earth. They are the focus of evil in the modern world. So, in your discussion of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride, the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves about it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.*[18]

In order to counter the freedom provided to the Soviets under the façade of détente, Reagan championed a new American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. The new strategy was officially outlined in National Security Directive Decision 75.[19] It was stated in NSDD-75 that the "primary focus of American foreign policy would be to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing with Moscow in military



The attempt by Jimmy Carter to prove his strength vis-a-vis the Kremlin with the Moscow Olympic boycott was not rewarded. In the presidential elections of November 1980 he lost to the Republican Ronald Reagan, whose right-wing conservative views won the support of a majority of the American public. In the photo: electoral supporters from New Jersey.

Photo: picture-alliance

power and in international diplomacy" as well as through economical warfare.[20] One of the longest of the 300-plus Reagan National Security Directives, NSDD-75 was considered "the blueprint for the [Cold War] endgame." After learning of the highly classified document, the Soviet media declared that the directive "threatened history."[21] Reagan's approach to the Cold War not only frightened the Soviets; it frightened even the US State Department. The Directive, a strategic plan to "move beyond containment and détente" was an avant-garde advancement from George Kennan's 1946 "Long Telegram."[22] Specifically important to this study is the line of NSDD-75 that states that the Reagan administration should seek to "engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance US interests."[23] The inclusion of the statement was later explained by the author of NSDD-75, Richard Pipes, who indicated that Reagan was adamant about the directive articulating that nothing could hinder "compromise and quiet diplomacy" with the Soviet Union.[24] National Security Directive Decision 75 was officially sanctioned with Reagan's signature on 17 January 1983. The process of "compromise and quiet diplomacy" that Reagan required in the directive was promptly enacted in the planning of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games.

In "The Olympic Crisis", John Hoberman argued that the Soviet Bloc withdrawal from the 1984 Games was the result of anti-Communist rhetoric from Reagan, the fear of defection by star athletes, and concerns about security and American public dissent.[25] My completed dissertation will largely be in agreement with Hoberman's arguments. That is, that Reagan's hardline rhetoric played a role in the 1984 Olympics; that the United States government was fully cognizant of the defection issue; and that concerns of security by the Soviets were unwarranted while such concerns over American public dissent were likely well founded. However, the completed research will also illustrate that Soviet concerns were largely fabricated as the Reagan administration provided all the support required by the LAOOC to meet the Soviet demands. Further, using the primary documents located in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, the finalized dissertation will present not only how the Reagan administration met the demands – including both the costs financially and politically – but how the administration manipulated the opportunity to reach "compromise and quiet diplomacy" with the Soviet Union through the strategic use of the Five Rings. Thus, a paradox was created – one consisting of Reagan's outwardly stated bluster towards the Soviet Union and his inward aim for quiet diplomacy. The remainder of this article will briefly introduce how Reagan's desire for compromise and diplomacy with the Soviet Union swiftly consumed the Olympic Movement.



Drive Started to Ban Soviets From Games

By KENNETH REICH and BILL BILLITER, *Times Staff Writers*

A campaign to collect 1 million signatures on petitions calling for a ban on participation of Soviet athletes in the 1984 Olympics was launched Monday by four Southern California businessmen, including two Korean-American community leaders. But the businessmen's claim to solid backing from the Korean community was soon challenged.

Announcing the 60-day petition drive at Los Angeles and Santa Ana news conferences were David W. Balsiger, an Orange County evangelical author; Edmond L. Anderson, a decorated Vietnam air combat veteran; Hoo Young Kun, president of the Korea Town Development Assn. in Los Angeles, and Ho Young Chung, president of the Korean Chamber of Commerce of Orange County.

They said they hope to present the petitions, supporting an Olympic ban to punish the Soviets for shooting down a Korean airliner, to President Reagan, members of Congress, United Nations delegates and Olympic officials.

The political climate between the superpowers worsened when on 1 September 1983 a South Korean passenger aircraft, which penetrated Soviet airspace over Sachalin, was shot down by an interceptor jet. Thereupon 169 anti-communist groups in the USA joined a coalition called "Ban the Soviets!", whose aim was to exclude the USSR from the Olympic Games.

Illustration: Los Angeles Times, September 1983

A Brief Synopsis of Reagan, NSDD-75, and the Olympics

The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games did not become a tool of "compromise and quiet diplomacy" for the Reagan administration until after the January 1983 signing of NSDD-75. Of the Soviet requests made, the issues of consenting to Aeroflot flights entering American airspace and the docking of a Soviet vessel at the Long Beach Harbor were the most highly queried in the upper echelons of the Reagan administration. The deadly attack on Korean Airlines flight 007 by a Soviet jet fighter in the early morning of 1 September 1983 further complicated the decision regarding more than two dozen Aeroflot aircrafts. Reagan christened the Soviet action an "act of inhuman brutality."[26] In a 5 September 1983 national television broadcast, Reagan let his feelings on the KAL 007 tragedy be known:

> *But, despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it, and the evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the truth. They have persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. Indeed, they have not even told the Russian people that a plane was shot down. The Soviet Government calls the whole thing an accident. I call it murder.*[27]

The Kremlin immediately responded to Reagan's television appearance, calling it an "aggressive, hateful speech" and that any United States' proof was "just another fabrication."[28] More damaging to the Los Angeles Olympics than Reagan's rhetoric was the President's swift and decisive action against the Soviet Union and Aeroflot regarding KAL 007. In the same speech, Reagan noted that his administration ordered the denial of Soviet airlines the "right to fly to the United States" and, further, the administration was "suspending negotiations on several bilateral agreements" that were under consideration prior to the incident.[29] Reagan's actions were even more severe than those that the speech outlined. Rather than simply restricting Soviet airlines from entering American airspace, the President opted to forbid US carriers from booking connecting flights with Aeroflot – even those away from American soil – and to sever any and all ties with the Soviet company. Further, he ordered the closing of Aeroflot offices in both New York and Washington, DC, and stipulated that the Soviet employees of both offices be expelled from the country.[30] Reagan's resolution on Aeroflot operations in the United States clearly obstructed the preparations being completed by the Los Angeles Olympic Committee. In a 9 December 1983 memorandum, Richard Levine – a member of Reagan's National Security Council – wrote that because of the "President's KAL decision" all

"Soviet proposals" regarding Aeroflot flights and vessels in Long Beach Harbor were to be rejected by both the State Department and "other concerned agencies."[31]

It was not only the issue of KAL 007 which impaired American-Soviet relations and Olympic affairs, but also the Soviet request to dock a vessel at Long Beach Harbor. The Soviet vessel inherently created loftier logistical complications than the acceptance of Aeroflot flights into Los Angeles International Airport in as much as the ship planned to "arrive in port [between] July 15–20 and remain there" until the Olympic Flame was extinguished above the Los Angeles Coliseum. With enough berths for 480 passengers, the vessel became a hot topic of discussion within the American government about providing adequate security for those aboard and protecting American interests from possible high-tech espionage activities originating from the ship. The general consensus within the Reagan administration concluded that allowing the Soviet vessel to dock at an American port would weaken Reagan's anti-Aeroflot resolve deriving from the KAL 007 disaster. Reagan's decision on the Soviet requests for the Olympic Games was ultimately postponed until "about" 15 January 1984[32] – a date which would coincide with both the anticipated release of the official report from the International Civil Aviation Organisation[33] regarding its investigation into KAL 007 and, perhaps more vital for the American government, a momentous speech on Cold War relations from President Reagan to be delivered on 16 January 1984. The speech would not only address increasingly vile and inflammatory rhetoric emitting from the Soviet propaganda machine, but also provided the underpinning for the discernible implementation of "quiet compromise and diplomacy" through the use of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.

It was noted widely within the Reagan administration that the aftermath of the KAL 007 shooting led "Soviet leadership statements and media commentary" on any American president to become "more abusive than at any time" during the previous twenty years. Indeed, any number of examples can be extrapolated from *Pravda*, including Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov denouncing Reagan's "crusade against socialism" in a 19 November 1983 article.[34] Politburo member and chairman of the KGB Yuri Andropov stated in a 25 January 1984 *Pravda* interview that President Reagan refused to relinquish his desire to conduct talks with the Soviets from "positions of strength ... threats, and pressure."[35] Andropov continued his diatribe on American leaders, stating that the American government continued attacking the intentions of the Soviet Union and its people with "foul-mouthed abuse, mingled with hypocritical sermons, on morality and humanity." Reagan's National Security Council was exceptionally troubled by Andropov's remarks that "recent events" – in all likelihood speaking



Legislature Urges Ban on Soviet Olympians

National Director of Games Assails Lawmakers as 'Narrow-Minded,' Calls Action Dangerous

By KENNETH REICH, Times Staff Writer 9/16

Leaders of the U.S. Olympic Committee and the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee had sharply different reactions Thursday to a unanimous vote in the state Legislature for a resolution calling upon President Reagan and Congress to ban Soviet athletes from participating in the 1984 Los Angeles Games.

Ed Don Miller, executive director of the U.S. Olympic Committee, lambasted what he termed "narrow-minded" legislators for trying to use the Olympics in American foreign policy. He said such an action would be "very, very dangerous" for the Los Angeles Games and the Olympic movement as a whole.

But the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, which has been working closely with the Soviet Olympic Committee in preparation for the Games, said that it would be premature to comment on the resolution.

Miller, however, in a comment that also recalled the American boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, declared: "It's a sorry state of affairs that we do not have men with enough intellect to develop a foreign policy with some meat in it, but go back to the same thing again and again. Isn't there more to our foreign policy than amateur sports?"

The U.S. committee director called the Olympic movement "one of the strongest social forces in the world, dedicated to peace and amity."

"Yet we constantly find narrow-minded people trying to use the opposite of sportsmanship and disqualified themselves from participating in the Olympic Games."

BAN THE SOVIETS?

State Sen. John Doolittle, R-Sacramento, has launched what he calls a nationwide drive to bar the Soviet Union from the 1984 Summer Olympics in retaliation for the Soviets' downing of a Korean jetliner. Doolittle, working with a group of Southern California businessmen, wants to use the threat of a ban to goad Moscow into showing "just some sign of remorse."

However, American Olympics officials say the United States is not free to make that threat. Peter Ueberroth, president of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, says this country has committed itself to let all eligible nations attend the Games and would lose the right to host the Olympics if it went back on its word.

For the Public Forum on Saturday, Oct. 29, the Daily News would like its readers to offer their views on Doolittle's ban-the-Soviets drive. Letters on this subject must be in the editor's hands no later than Thursday, Oct. 27. Please sign them and include your address and telephone number.

The Executive Director of the USOC, Don Miller, described the actions of "Ban the Soviets!" as "very, very dangerous" The LAOOC with Peter Ueberroth behaved correctly in this situation, but in its efforts to make minimal concessions to the invited countries, it did not contribute to the improvement of the situation, which favoured the boycott by the eastern bloc.

Illustrations: Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1983, 26 October 1983

of KAL 007 – "dispelled any illusions about the possibility of a change for the better."[36] A "change for the better" was unambiguously what Reagan's administration sought. The end of détente and containment in order to install the 'Reagan Doctrine' and NSDD-75, the Reagan administration believed, protected American interests both domestically and abroad; the ability to create a "change for the better" would halt the nuclear warhead conglomeration that defined the second half of the Cold War. The two paradigms operated in contradiction to each other. It proved to be difficult for the Reagan administration to seek a "change for the better" when the Reagan Doctrine,' NSDD-75, and Reagan's general anti-Marxist rhetoric further agitated an already deeply seeded sense of mistrust of the American government among Soviet leaders.

It was this divide between policy and desired outcome that was an impetus for a critical speech pertaining to US-Soviet relations on 16 January 1984. The basis of the speech, outlined in a 7 January 1984 memo was to "demonstrate to a broader ... audience" that the American government was "not guided by a blind and uncomprehending form of anti-Sovietism." Further, the speech aimed to send the Soviets a "message of

Damage limitation: the attempt by IOC President Samaranch to change the minds of the chairmen of the sports organisations of the Socialist countries on the 24 May in Prague failed. They had an developed by Primo Nebiolo, the President of the Olympic Summer Sports Federations (ASOIF), at least to send symbol teams, was also rejected. Right: Samaranch travelled to Washington on 7 May 1984 in a last minute attempt to persuade Reagan to send a letter to Kremlin boss Konstantin Chernenko. This was to guarantee that Reagan would abide by the Olympic Charter. But before the IOC President had even reached the White House, the Soviet NOC had already announced its non-participation.

Photos: IOC Archive

reassurance ... that the world [was not] becoming a more dangerous place."[37] In short, Reagan's historic speech to a live television audience that January morning from the East Room of the White House was nothing short of an American declaration of its intentions to pursue rapprochement while maintaining its stance of protecting American interests via the derailment of détente. In doing so, the President declared that the United States posed no threat to the Soviet Union and that an urgent need to reconcile the "dangerous misunderstandings" between Washington and Moscow existed.[38] As noted by historian Beth Fischer, Reagan's 16 January address "was not simply an aberration" but, rather, "a turning point."[39] Reagan continued by asserting:

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding. Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the right of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free exchange or interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it."

Not since the signing of NSDD-75 had Reagan so openly avowed his intentions to seek quiet diplomacy and compromise with the Soviet Union. Reagan's words quickly translated into deeds as the American government embarked on a resolute journey to unilaterally approve the Soviet Union's entire request for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.

Prior to Reagan's tide-shifting speech, his government had viewed the requests as yet another form of political pressure from the Soviet Union, whose leaders continually searched for leverage in the fight for the "hearts and minds of the world."[40] This opinion was professed by Edward Derwinski – Reagan's Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs – in a 23 December 1983 memo to Michael Deaver, who served as the presidential liaison for the 1984 Summer Olympics.[41] Derwinski wrote to Deaver that "Soviet sports authorities are attempting to use the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee as a conduit for pressing certain demands on the US Government."[42] Further, the State Department as a whole was becoming increasingly concerned at the Soviet government communicating directly with the LAOOC. Derwinski requested Deaver to inform the LAOOC that Soviet requests were "properly government-to-government matters" and that the administration all but demanded that the Los Angeles group "decline to act as a middleman for the Soviets." Derwinski underscored the government's stance by stating that the White House planned to remind the Soviets that all formal requests for the Olympics were no different from requests made prior to the planning of the Los Angeles Games.[43]

The issues of allowing Soviet flights to enter American airspace and the docking of a Soviet vessel were still a bit muddied directly following Reagan's 16 January 1984 speech. Shortly after Reagan's remarks, Levine wrote to National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane to add further details on the issues. Regarding the Aeroflot flights, Levine indicated that the government should allow the flights pending the review of the KAL 007 incident by the ICAO. Regardless of the ICAO's findings, Levine informed McFarlane that the government should "be compelled by the dynamics of the Olympic situation to allow Soviet Aeroflot flights" into the country. Levine also introduced the idea of "putting an American crewman in to the Aeroflot cockpit during a stop before US airspace" for security reasons.[44] Levine, without outright declaring so, was falling in line with a developing governmental acceptance that banning Aeroflot flights

from entering American airspace would indubitably guarantee a Soviet-led boycott. The docking of a Soviet vessel however, according to Levine, was a request that the American government would "not be able to grant." Levine quoted an internal 30 November memo that stated that "State and all concerned agencies, including the Coast Guard representing the Port Security Committee, are opposed to any port call by a Soviet vessel, passenger or otherwise, during the Olympics that would involve the vessel berthing in Los Angeles/Long Beach for an extended period of time."[45]

However, Reagan wasted little time in upholding his aspiration for "compromise and quiet diplomacy." In a 31 January 1984 official action memorandum for the President, McFarlane outlined all the Soviet Olympic requests for the President's final decisions. The opening of the memorandum explained to the President that all governmental agencies involved arrived at a consensus regarding the Soviet issue. First and foremost, McFarlane informed, "granting the requests for Aeroflot flights would require suspending application of sanction applied to the Soviets airlines following the KAL shoot-down."

Additionally, McFarlane instructed the President that all agencies involved agreed that the Soviet requests "raise national security concerns."[46] Despite the apprehensions, the inter-agency consortium agreed on two substantial decisions. First, McFarlane expressed to the President that "all agencies recommend" that the Aeroflot flights "be granted for the specific purpose of bringing the Soviet 'Olympic family' to Los Angeles, but without the right to land elsewhere in the US or to carry third-country passengers."

Second, the multitude of governmental agencies had no objections to "brief calls" by a Soviet vessel to "deliver and, subsequently, pick up equipment and passengers." McFarlane informed Reagan that the agencies were "strongly opposed to allowing the ship to stay at the pier in Long Beach Harbor during the Games, primarily because of the potential for electronic eavesdropping." McFarlane provided Reagan with a counterpoint to the Soviet requests, correctly stating that "no other country" had been granted "permission to keep a ship in port during the Olympics, and so long as we allow no one else in port during the Olympics ... we should be able to defend refusal of this request as non-discriminatory. Although the Soviets are likely to press the point, we believe that permission should not be granted."[47]

Directly after McFarlane presented his case, four recommendations were presented to President Reagan to either approve or disapprove with a simple check-mark and his initials. Reagan's decisions on these recommendations inarguably indicate that "compromise and quiet diplomacy" weighed heavily on his mind regarding Los Angeles Olympic matters. The recommendations, provided in their entirety, along with Reagan's decisions and hand-written notes are as follows:

That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis, unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.[48]

Reagan check marked and initialed "OK." However, those with knowledge of the Olympic Games will certainly be aware that McFarlane's first recommendation is loosely bound to the "Olympic Charter" in regard to the non-discrimination of any country or athlete. Reagan had already publically declared his intentions of following the "Olympic Charter" throughout the planning stages of the Los Angeles Olympics. Thus, it would have been highly unorthodox for Reagan to veto McFarlane's first recommendation. Reagan also approved of McFarlane's second recommendation, which read:

That Aeroflot be allowed to operate special flights to support their Olympic team, but without the right to transport third-country nationals or to land at intermediate stops in the U.S.[49]

Reagan had little choice but to approve McFarlane's second recommendation if he truly planned on treating the Olympics as a special event and partaking in "every effort" to treat the Soviets fairly. Simply put: if other countries were permitted to fly their Olympic family into Los Angeles, than the Soviet Union had to be provided the same privilege. In regard to the terms outlined in NSDD-75, Reagan allowing Soviet athletes safe air passage to Los Angeles despite the international sanction in place as a result of KAL 007 was a prime example of his deploying "compromise and quiet diplomacy" with the Soviet Union. However, Reagan's decision on McFarlane's third recommendation called for further cooperation with the Soviet Union. The original third recommendation read:

That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the Olympics, but not to remain at the pier during the Games, unless such privilege is granted to other countries.[50]

Reagan did not approve the recommendation as written. In his handwriting, Reagan edited the proposal to read:

That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the Games, ~~but not~~ and to remain at the pier during the Games subject to the establishment of all possible measures designed to minimize intelligence loss, ~~unless~~ and that such privilege is granted to other countries.[51]

The broken red ring – title page of "Sports Illustrated" of 21 May 1984.

American media reaction was mixed. Some felt the Soviets should "play with themselves", others regretted their absence from Los Angeles. Either way, the Games had lost some of their lustre and there was a serious threat of a split in the Olympic Family.

Photos: Olympiaboken 1984, Svenska Sportförlaget AB

Reagan's decision – and subsequent edits to the recommendation – went against the beliefs of his administration as outlined in the introduction to the action memorandum. With the caveat of providing measures to counter intelligence loss, Reagan provided yet another compromise to the Soviet Union. As will be later discussed in the completed dissertation, Reagan's decision renounced the requests to deny the Soviet ship a stay in the Long Beach Harbor by the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Coast Guard, and local Los Angeles law enforcement. Despite the trepidations of his administration, Reagan made every possible effort to assure that the Soviet Union's requests were satisfied. However, Reagan's response to McFarlane's fourth recommendation is perhaps the most telling political action taken by the President to illustrate NSDD-75's aim for "compromise and quiet diplomacy" through the lens of the Olympic Games. The final recommendation of the memorandum read:

> *That the LAOC [sic] be instructed to ask the Soviets to submit their requests through normal diplomatic channels.*[52]

Reagan's check marked and initialed "No" on the recommendation. While Reagan provided no explanation, his decision to allow the Soviet Union to deal directly with the LAOOC rather than through "normal diplomatic channels" such as the State Department says much about the sense of trust Reagan was attempting to build with the Kremlin. Reagan's decision to allow the LAOOC direct communication with the Soviet Union again went against the wishes of his own administration, thus further accenting his quest for "compromise and quiet diplomacy".

Conclusion

As this research progresses into a dissertation, no effort will be made to answer *why* the Soviets boycotted; rather, my dissertation will examine what the Reagan administration did to *prevent* a Soviet boycott. In doing so, and perhaps more importantly, the completed dissertation will explore how the ebb and flow of Cold War relations under President Reagan boded well for the Olympic Movement. As noted in this article, Reagan used the Los Angeles Olympics to answer the call for "compromise and quiet diplomacy" engrained in NSDD-75. It has been argued that President Carter's actions regarding the Soviet Union and its invasion of Afghanistan nearly brought an end to the Olympic Movement; conversely, I argue that Reagan's actions towards the Soviet Union as dictated in NSDD-75 began to repair the damage to the Movement done by the 1980 fiasco. The funding provided by the International Society of Olympic Historians will allow to me complete the entirety of this research and

substantiate such arguments. There is still much to do. The record of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is voluminous; another trip to the Reagan Presidential Library is likely needed to examine the history of Cold War relations in Reagan's first term. Additionally, a trip to the Alexander Haig Papers housed in the National Archives in Washington, DC, should prove highly beneficial. The Reagan Library has but a small number of those documents originating from the State Department. The papers of Haig, who served as Reagan's first Secretary of State, will be crucial in analyzing the exact role of the State Department in the narrative.

Additionally, the research I have thus far completed contributes significantly to the succinct analysis provided in this article. Though I have much yet to write towards the completed study, a further investigation of the relationship between KAL 007 and Olympic planning, American government plans to aid in the safety of Soviet defectors, the American government's security plans for the 1984 Olympics, and the media circus created by the "Ban the Soviets" Coalition are also necessary topics to be discussed using primary documents found in my various archival research trips. In summary, the completed dissertation will begin to fill the void in an otherwise woefully under researched area of Olympic history. ■

1 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 722.

2 At their core, détente and containment were a defensive strategy aiming to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence outside of its satellite states while waiting for a gradual mellowing in relations. For more, see Mark Lagon, The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994).

3 Quoted in Francis Marlo, Planning Reagan's War: Conservative Strategists and America's Cold War Victory (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2012), 13.

4 Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2013), 149.

5 Strikingly familiar to the 'Reagan Doctrine,' the 'Truman Doctrine' was born in March of 1947. Truman made it robustly clear to world leaders that the American government would provide both financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere. Truman's philosophy ultimately was derived from the famed "Long Telegram" as authored by George F. Kennan

in 1946. Kennan vehemently argued that the Soviets would only respond to use of force; thus, the optimal way to combat communism was through slowing its geographical expansion. For a thoroughly detailed account see Arnold Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953 (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 2002) and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe (New York: Free Press, 2008).

6 There is substantial literature on the Angola situation of 1974–1976. Many of these histories contain the history of those last Portugal colonies in Africa that also took part in the revolution. See for instance Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (New York: Westview, 1980); Rene Lemarchand, ed., American Policy in South Africa: The Stakes and the Stance, 2d ed. (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1981), 63–143; Suzanne Jolicoeur Katsika, The Arc of Socialist Revolution: Angola to Afghanistan (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1982), 55–84.

7 For a detailed account of the Soviet Union's foray into Africa see Vladimir Shubin, The Hot 'Cold War': The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

8 John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collaspe of Communism to the War on Terror (Chicago: Ivan Dee Publishing, 2006), 37.

9 David W. Houch and Amos Kiewe, Actor, Ideologue, Politician: The Public Speeches of Ronald Reagan (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 157.

10 Heresafter NSPG.

11 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened The Collaspe of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 8.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Hanhimaki, 141–42.

15 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 28. After the press conference, Reagan approached Richard Allen, his national security adviser, and asked: "Say, Dick, they do lie and cheat, don't they?"

16 Paul Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (Harper Perennial, 2007), 77.

17 Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jeresey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 293.

18 Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 486. Italics mine.

19 Hereafter NSDD-75.

20 Quoted in Mann, 30.

21 Staff reports, "Crucial Cold War Secret," WashingtonTimes.com, January 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/13/crucial-cold-war-secret/?page=all (accessed August 2, 2013).

22 Ibid.

23 Memo, William P. Clark to Ronald Reagan, Jan. 17, 1983, folder "NSDD 75 (1)," box 91310, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council Files, Ronald Reagan Library (hereafter RRL).

24 Richard Pipes, Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 198; Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 240.

25 John Hoberman, The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics, and the Moral Order (New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986), 128.

26 Reagan, 582–584. The history of the Cold War still maintains many mysteries; KAL 007 is but one of them. Factually, history tells us this: KAL 007 was a flight between New York City and Seoul, with a stop in Anchorage for refueling. As it is told by governmental agencies, a mechanical error provided the KAL 007 pilots with incorrect flight path data. The inaccuracy resulted in the commercial aircraft venturing into Soviet airspace; the Soviets ordered the plane shot out of the sky. All 269 aboard perished. Despite the release of flight transcripts and recordings from the Russians, opposing viewpoints on the incident have never been fully reconciled. The pilot of the Soviet SU-15 fighter that downed KAL 007, as of 1996, still vehemently believed that the passenger flight was on a spy mission. See Michael Gordon, "Ex-Soviet Pilot Still Insists KAL 007 Was Spying," NYTimes.com, December 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/09/world/ex-soviet-pilot-still-insists-kal-007-was-spying.html (accessed April 11, 2013). The lack of solid answers surrounding the incident has fostered numerous conspiracy theories concerning the doomed flight. See for example Michel Brun, Incident at Sakhalin: The True Mission of KAL Flight 007 (New York: Four Wall Eight Windows, 1995); Seymour Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What American Knew About It (New York: Random House, 1986); David Pearson, KAL 007 Cover-Up: Why The True Story Has Never Been Told (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

27 Presidential Television Address: Flight 007, Sept. 5, 1983, folder "KAL 007 (2)," Box 28, John F. Matlock Files, RRL.

28 The Associated Press, "Kremlin flays Reagan for speech about jet," The Reading Eagle, Sept. 6, 1983.

29 Presidential Television Address: Flight 007, Sept. 5 1983, folder "KAL 007 (2)," Box 28, John F. Matlock Files, RFL. Note that no "bilateral agreement" had been reached at this point for the Los Angeles Olympics. Regardless, the suspension of future agreements was an issue of serious concern for the LAOOC.

30 Sentinel Wire Services, "US Halts Aeroflot business," The Milwaukee Sentinel, Sept. 9, 1983.

31 Memorandum, Richard Levine to Robert C. McFarlane, December 9, 1983, folder "Olympics 1984 – USSR (2)," Box 30, John F. Matlock Files, RRL.

32 Memorandum, Robert C. McFarlane to George P. Shultz, December 10, 1983, folder "Olympics 1984 – USSR (2)," Box 30, Jon F. Matlock Files, RRL.

33 Hereafter ICAO.

34 Special Memorandum: Soviet Public Treatment of President Reagan, Foreign Broadcast Information Service to White House, June 1, 1984, folder "USSR Propaganda, Communications, Media, etc. (4/6)," Box 33, John F. Matlock Files, RRL.

35 Ibid.

36 Cable, Moscow Embassy to Department of State, September 29, 1983, "US USSR Relations Sept – Oct 83," Box 41, John F. Matlock Files, RRL.

37 Memorandum, Donald R. Fortier to Robert C. McFarlane, January 7, 1984, folder "Presidential Address, US-Soviet Relations (1/16/84)," box 31, John F. Matlock Files, RRL.

38 Presidential Address on US-Soviet Relations (draft), November 22, 1983, folder "Presidential Address, US-Soviet Relations (1/16/84) (1)," Box 31, John F. Matlock Files, RRL. The draft of the address was double-checked against the finalized version found on the Reagan Archive's website. Aside from minor tweaks and the rewriting of the introduction, the general thrust of the speech remained intact from the November draft version to the delivered version.

39 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia, Missouri: The University of Missouri Press, 2000), 4.

40 The battle for the "hearts and minds of the world" is a phrase used by Kenneth Osgood. For example see, "Heart and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (May, 2002), 85–107.

41 The memorandum as found in the Ronald Reagan Archives is published with the date 23 December 1984. This is clearly a typographical error. I have taken the liberty of correcting the date within the content of this article for the sake of clarity.

42 Memorandum, Derwinski to Deaver, December 23, 1984[3], folder "Olympics 3," box 82, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject Files, RRL. Please see note 40 concerning the incongruity of the memorandum's date.

43 Ibid.

44 Memorandum, Richard Levine to Robert McFarlane, January 16, 1984, folder "Olympics 3," box 82, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject Files. RRL.

45 Ibid.

46 Memorandum, McFarlane to Ronald Reagan, 31 January 1984, folder "LAOG Counter Intelligence & Security," box 9, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject Files, RRL.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid. Strikethroughs and italics indicate Reagan's edits.

52 Ibid.